onal 
ity 


CONFIDENTIAL: 

[ERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN 
ACTICAL  STUDC.S 


TRANSLATIONS  OF  C AI'Tl  RFT>  <  \M) 

AISTRIAN  DO( iMi'NTs  AND  INFORMATION 

OBTAINKD    I  ''ROM    (.F.RMAN  AND   Al'STRIAN 
PRISONKRS     FROM    THK    BRITISH,    I  RF.NTH 
AND  ITALIAN  STA1 


V 


(MMI'IIII)  AM)  11)1111)  A  I     llll    AK.\n    \\  \  l<  ((M.II.Cl 
DECEMBER 


EOJVLY 


WASHINGTON 

(;o\ I:KN.\TT-:NT  PKIMIM;  OFFICE 


CONFIDENTIAL! 

GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN 
TACTICAL  STUDIES 


TRANSLATIONS  OF  CAPTURED  GERMAN  AND 
AUSTRIAN  DOCUMENTS  AND  INFORMATION 
OBTAINED  FROM  GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN 
PRISONERS— FROM  THE  BRITISH,  FRENCH 
AND  ITALIAN  STAFFS 


WASHINGTON 
GOVERNMENT  PRINTING  OFFICE 

1918 


WAR  DEPARTMENT. 

Document  No.  708. 

Office  of  the  Adjutant  General. 


WAR   DEPARTMENT, 
WASHINGTON,  December  7,  1917. 

The  following  pamphlet,  entitled  "  German  and  Austrian 
Tactical  Studies,"  is  published  for  the  information  of  all  con- 
cerned. 

[062.1,  A.  G.  O.] 
BY  OKDER  OF  THE  SECRETARY  OF  WAR  : 

JOHN  BIDDLE, 

Major  General,  Acting  Chief  of  Staff. 
OFFICIAL  : 

H.  P.  McCAIN, 

The  Adjutant  General. 

8 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS. 


German- Austrian  tactical  studies: 

I.  Experience  gained  from  the  September  (1915)  of- 
fensives on  the  fronts  of  the  Sixth  and  Third 

Armies 9 

II.  Report  on  the  execution  of  the  raid  in  the  Spion, 

April,  1916 29 

III.  Experiences  of  the  Fourth  German  Corps  in  the  bat- 

tle of  the  Somme,  July,  1916 49 

IV.  Lessons  drawn  from  the  battle  of  the  Somme  by 

Stein's  group 87 

V.  The  German  attack  of  July  31,  1917,  on  the  Cerny 

plateau 103 

VI.  Notes  on  the  German  attack  at  Bois  le  Chamne,  Sep- 
tember 25,  1917 115 

VII.  German  defensive  tactics 121 

VIII.  The  construction  of  positions  for  the  coming  winter.       139 
IX.  Information  gathered  concerning  the  enemy's  ar- 
tillery   '.....• 147 

X.  Employment  of  machine  guns  in  trench  warfare. .      161 
XI.  The  German  attack  of  August  10,  1917,  south  of  La 

Royere 169 

XII.  Experiences  gained  during  the  English-French  of- 
fensive of  the  spring  of  1917 179 

XIII.  The  battle  of  Malmasson 195 

XIV.  Actions  on  the  Carso,  August-September,  1917 205 

XV.  German  principles  of  elastic  defense 223 

5 


I. 


EXPERIENCE  GAINED 
FROM  THE  SEPTEMBER  (1915)  OFFENSIVES 

ON  THE  FRONTS  OF 
THE  SIXTH  AND  THIRD  ARMIES. 

[Translation  of  a  German  document.! 


CONTENTS. 

Pago. 

Experience  gained  from  the   September   offensives  on  the 

front  of  the  Sixth  and  Third  Armies 9 

A.  Enemy's  preparation  for  the  attacks 9 

B.  The  execution  of  the  attack 10 

C.  Experiences 12 

General : 13 

Tactical 14 

Command 14 

Infantry 16 

Machine  guns 18 

Trench  mortars 19 

Artillery 19 

Preparation  of  defenses 22 

Bringing  up  supplies,  etc 23 

Medical  service 25 

8 


I. 

EXPERIENCE  GAINED  FROM  THE  SEPTEMBER 
(1915)  OFFENSIVES  ON  THE  FRONTS  OF  THE 
SIXTH  AND  THIRD  ARMIES. 


The  events  of  the  great  September  offensives,  as  far  as  can  be 
ascertained  from  subsequent  discussion  with  the  staffs  con- 
cerned, may  be  summarized  as  follows : 

A.  ENEMY'S  PREPARATION  FOR  THE  ATTACKS. 

For  weeks  prior  to  the  commencement  of  operations  the  enemy 
threw  out  saps  practically  along  the  whole  front  of  his  attacks 
to  within  100-50  meters  or  less  from  our  trenches. 

Our  aviators  were  continually  locating  new  support  and  com- 
munication trenches.  The  latter  extended  in  the  Champagne 
as  far  back  as  10  kilometers  (6i  miles).  The  number  of  hostile 
aerodromes  kept  on  increasing.  In  the  Champagne  there  were 
finally  about  200  enemy  aeroplanes  in  action  against  60  of  ours. 
Near  Arras  squadrons  of  about  20  machines  each  appeared.  Im- 
portant air  raids  were  undertaken  against  railway  junctions. 
The  task  of  our  own  aviators  was  rendered  very  much  more  diffi- 
cult by  the  additional  number  of  hostile  machines.  The  French 
and  English  artillery  kept  on  increasing.  In  several  corps  as 
many  as  130-140  active  enemy  battery  positions,  as  against 
about  36  of  our  own,  were  located  in  each  corps  sector  by  aero- 
plane photographs  and  the  survey  sections.  From  the  middle  of 
September  onward  the  enemy's  artillery  and  trench-mortar  activ- 
ity was  always  on  the  increase  and  numbers  of  mines  were 
blown.  All  these  preparations  made  it  clear  that  an  attack  was 
coming. 

After  six  days'  registration  and  three  to  four  days  before  the 
great  offensive  of  September  25,  the  hostile  artillery  started  its 
methodical  bombardment  with  guns  of  all  calibers  and  with 
ever-growing  intensity.  Continuous  bombardments  of  several 
hours'  duration  were  interspersed  with  periods  of  slow  fire  and 
short  bursts  of  rapid  fire.  The  bombardment  was  equally  in- 
tense along  the  whole  stretch  of  front-line  trenches.  Heavy  fire 
was  directed  against  the  communication  trenches,  rear  lines  of 
defense,  rest  billets,  and  villages  to  a  distance  of  15  kilometers 
(9J  miles)  behind  the  front.  Our  batteries  were  subjected  to 


10          GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES. 

severe  shelling  by  guns  of  large  caliber,  and  the  observation 
posts,  even  those  farthest  back,  were  heavily  fired  on.  In  the 
Champagne,  the  Bazaucourt-Challerange  railway  was  cut  in 
.several  places,  so  that  we  were  obliged  to  unload  trains  farther 
back  than  we  had  intended.  During  the  last  few  hours  before 
the  infantry  attack  the  enemy  made  use  of  gas  shells,  so  that 
with  our  infantry  and  artillery  positions  hidden  in  smoke 
clouds  the  observation  posts  were,  to  some  extent,  rendered 
useless. 

B.  THE  EXECUTION  OF  THE  ATTACK. 

2.  In  the  Champagne  the  main  attack  was  launched  simulta- 
neously on  a  front  of  32  kilometers  (25  miles).  The  French 
infantry  advanced,  under  cover  of  gas-shell  clouds,  in  thick 
skirmish  lines  in  considerable  depth ;  each  wave  was  succeeded 
closely  by  another,  and  the  regiments  of  ,  division  followed 
each  other,  a  divisional  front  extending  over  about  1  kilometer. 

After  a  French  attack  on  the  24th  had  been  repulsed  a  second 
attack,  preceded  by  another  severe  bombardment,  was  launched 
on  the  25th.  This,  too,  was,  generally  speaking,  driven  back. 
Only  in  the  neighborhood  of  Souain  did  the  French  achieve  any 
success.  Some  days  before  we  had  withdrawn  an  infantry 
brigade  from  that  sector.  The  resulting  gap  had  been  tempo- 
rarily filled  by  thinning  out  the  line  on  either  side  and  bringing 
up  a  "cavalry  battalion."  The  relief  by  freshly  arrived  in- 
fantry units  was  impossible  to  carry  out  owing  to  the  intensity 
of  the  bombardment. 

Only  at  this  weak  point  in  the  position  were  the  French  suc- 
cessful in  breaking  through.  The  advancing  masses  swung  right 
and  left,  and  got  behind  the  fire  trenches  which  had  so  far  held 
out,  took  them  and  thus  pierced  a  wide  gap  in  the  front  system. 
The  artillery  which  was  in  position  between  the  first  and  second 
lines,  owing  partly  to  the  communications  having  been  cut  and 
partly  to  the  smoke  clouds,  did  not  notice  the  advance  of  the 
hostile  infantry  in  time  and  a  number  of  batteries  fell  into  the 
enemy's  hands. 

The  advance  came  to  a  standstill  in  front  of  our  second  line, 
which  had  been  promptly  occupied  by  all  available  reserves, 
including  recruit  depots.  During  the  night  we  were  successful 
in  saving  many  guns  from  between  the  first  and  second  lines. 

Fierce  close  fighting  took  place  in  the  area  between  the  first 
and  second  lines  which  had  been  overrun  by  the  enemy.  This  is 


GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES.  11 

the  sole  explanation  that  can  be  given  as  to  why  the  French,  who 
broke  through  about  midday,  did  not  reach  the  second  line 
(2.-A  kilometers  back)  until  several  hours  later.  We  have  to 
thank  the  stubborn  resistance  of  our  troops  and  the  irresolute 
action  of  the  French  infantry,  who  failed  to  make  quick  enough 
use  of  their  initial  success  that  the  second  line  was  not  pierced 
and  that  time  was  secured  in  which  to  occupy  it  in  sufficient 
strength.  The  large  number  of  prisoners  taken  by  the  enemy 
leads  to  the  assumption  that  some  of  the  occupants  of  the  front- 
line trenches  surrendred  as  soon  as  they  perceived  that  the 
enemy  was  in  rear  of  them.  On  the  other  hand,  companies  of 
other  regiments  engaged  the  enemy  from  behind  and  took  sev- 
eral thousand  prisoners  between  the  two  lines. 

Evidently  counting  on  successfully  breaking  through,  the 
French  had  prepared  a  special  communication  trench  for  their 
cavalry  to  come  up  by  in  columns  of  half  sections.  Through 
this  a  French  cavalry  regiment  advanced  up  to  our  old  front 
line,  crossed  it,  and  appeared  in  column  of  troops  before  the 
second-line  positions  held  by  the  One  hundred  and  fifty-eighth 
Infantry  Regiment.  This  cavalry  regiment  was  entirely  anni- 
hilated. 

3.  In  the  Sixth  Army  the  Seventh  Corps  completely  repulsed  a 
gas  attack  made  by  the  English.  The  One  hundred  and  seven- 
teenth Division,  just  farther  south,  was  likewise  attacked  with 
gas.  Under  cover  of  this  cloud,  rendered  more  dense  by  a 
smoke-producing  contrivance,  the  English,  whose  trenches  in 
this  sector  were  separated  from  ours  by  a  stretch  of  300-500 
meters,  succeeded  in  capturing  the  positions  of  both  wing  regi- 
ments of  the  division.  Further,  on  the  southern  flank,  the  sup- 
port companies  occupying  the  cellars  of  the  well-known  village 
Loos  were  overrun  and  several  batteries  were  captured.  The 
center  regiment  of  the  division  waited  for  the  gas  clouds  to 
pass  over  it  and  then  repulsed  the  attacking  Englishmen,  who 
were  equipped  with  smoke  helmets.  Not  until  it  found  itself 
practically  surrounded  by  the  Englishmen,  who  had  broken 
through  on  its  right  and  left,  did  the  regiment,  from  sheer  neces- 
sity, fall  back. 

By  putting  in  all  the  reserves,  as  well  as  the  recruit  depot  and 
also  a  part  of  the  eighth  division,  which  was  in  army  reserve, 
the  second  line  was  held  and  part  of  the  ground  gained  by  the 
Englishmen  was  immediately  recovered.  The  enemy  on  a  front 
of  6  kilometers  had  driven  a  semicircular  wedge  into  our  posi- 


12          GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES. 

tion,  forming  a  salient,  the  extreme  easterly  point  of  which  lay 
3  kilometers  behind  our  original  line.  The  present  line  con- 
sists partly  of  our  old  second  line  as  it  was  before  the  attack 
and  partly  of  newly  dug  trenches  connecting  the  first  and  second 
lines. 

As  regards  the  Sixth  Corps,  the  result  of  repeated  attacks  by 
the  French,  who  considerably  outnumbered  us  both  in  infantry 
and  artillery,  was  that  the  corps  was  to  some  extent  pushed 
back.  The  right  wing — the  Thirty-eighth  Fusilier  Regiment — 
only  gave  way  when  it  was  entirely  outflanked  from  the  north 
by  the  French,  who  had  broken  through  near  Souchez.  On  the 
right  wing  the  ground  lost  amounted  to  about  1  kilometer,  while 
on  the  left  wing  a  line  of  trenches  situated,  generally  speaking, 
some  250-500  meters  behind  the  original  line  was  held.  The 
behavior  of  the  French  infantry  opposed  to  the  Sixth  Corps  is 
described  in  the  report  of  the  Twenty-third  Infantry  Regiment 
as  follows : 

"  The  first  French  attacking  line  consisted  of  a  thin  skirmish 
line  equipped  with  hand  grenades.  As  soon  as  this  had  reached 
our  front  trenches,  attacking  columns  in  close  order  left  the 
enemy's  trenches.  These  consisted  either  of  parties  about  50 
strong,  formed  in  column  of  fours,  or  irregular  lines  in  close 
order.  For  purposes  of  close  combat  the  French  were  armed 
with  bayonets  and  hand  grenades.  Whereas  in  the  trenches  the 
fighting  was  principally  carried  out  with  hand  grenades,  in  the 
open  country  the  bayonet  was  successfully  employed  by  the  com- 
panies of  our  regimental  reserve  during  the  counter  attack.  Sec- 
tions for  bringing  up  materiel  followed  the  enemy's  attacking 
columns.  The  French  showed  remarkable  skill  and  speed  in 
consolidating  the  positions  which  they  won.  In  places  where  we 
seriously  threatened  them  they  offered  little  resistance  and 
were  soon  prepared  to  give  themselves  up.  Each  French  infan- 
try company  carried  red  and  yellow  flags  into  the  attack  with  it 
to  act  as  indications  to  their  own  infantry  and  artillery  of  the 
newly-won  positions." 

C.  EXPERIENCES. 

4.  The  experience  gained  from  the  September  offensives  con- 
firms in  the  main  the  correctness  of  the  observations  made  by 
the  Second  Army.  Certain  points  have  been  particularly  empha- 
sized ;  only  a  few  new  points  have  come  to  light. 


GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES.  13 

The  very  instructive  reports  handed  in  by  the  units  of  the 
Sixth  Corps  form  the  basis  of  the  following  summary. 

GENERAL. 

5.  The  infantry,  after  enduring  in  its  dugouts  the  70  hours' 
artillery  preparation  of  unparalleled  intensity,  repulsed,  prac- 
tically along  the  whole  front,  an  attack,  preceded  by  gas  clouds, 
launched   by   a   considerably   superior   opponent.     In   certain 
places  the  enemy  broke  through  in  close  masses  and  appeared 
in  rear  of  our  troops,  but  the  trench  occupants,  under  courage- 
ous and  determined  leadership,   fought  their  way  backward 
with  the  result  that  they  made  thousands  of  French  prisoners. 
On  the  other  hand,  at  a  few  other  places,  under  apparently 
similar  conditions,  the  front  line  gave  way  before  the  gas  attack 
or  surrendered  when  attacked  from  the  rear,  but  this  merely 
demonstrates  afresh  the  enormous  value  of  good  "  morale." 

6.  Every  officer,  noncommissioned  officer,  and  man  must  be- 
lieve (as  has  indeed  been  once  more  proved  by  the  experiences 
of  this  battle)    that  our  infantry  is  superior  to  that  of  the 
enemy,  even  though  the  latter  be  superior  in  actual  numbers. 
Even  if  strong  hostile  detachments  penetrate  into  our  trenches 
or  succeed  in  getting  in  rear  of  our  front-line  system,  the  fight 
must  be  carried  on  in  any  circumstances  and  with  all  possible 
means.     If  the  supports  press  forward  at  the  right  time   (see 
p.  17),  it  will  almost  always  be  possible  with  their  help  to 
drive  the  enemy  out  of  the  trenches  again  and  to  take  prisoners. 
At  the  very  least,  a  stubborn  resistance  to  the  last  man  will 
provide  the  necessary  time  for  reserves  .to  be  brought  up  to 
occupy  the  rear  positions,  and  thus  prevent  the  enemy  from 
breaking  through,  as  well  as  the  loss  of  any  artillery. 

7.  The  moral  effect  of  almost  three  days  of  the  most  intense 
preparatory  bombardment  is  naturally  very  great.     The  strain 
on  the  infantry  under  such  conditions  is  quite  terrific.     In  order 
to  render  officers  and  men  capable  of  a  supreme  effort  and  to 
preserve  their   fighting  energy  through   the  exhaustive  strain 
of  days  of  continuous  battle  it  is  necessary  to  provide  in  the 
most  careful  and  farseeing  manner  for  the  bodily  comfort  of 
the  troops.     It  is  also  important  that  the  men  should  not  be 
accommodated  in  the  dugouts  in  small  parties  of  three  or  four, 
but  in  two  or  more  groups  under  responsible  leaders.     This  will 
enhance  the  prospects  of  a  successful  resistance.    Another  essen- 


14          GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES. 

tial  for  insuring  a  feeling  of  confidence  among  the  troops  is 
the  timely  supply  of  all  material  for  trench  warfare  (small-arm 
ammunition,  hand  grenades,  extemporized  obstacles,  sandbags, 
wooden  props,  etc),  and,  above  all,  the  assurance  of  reliable 
artillery  support.  Gas  attacks  proved  ineffectual  wherever  the 
troops  applied  the  means  of  protection  provided  quickly  enough 
and  in  the  proper  manner  and  allowed  the  gas  clouds  to  pass 
over  them.  Hostile  gas  attacks  can  only  achieve  success  when 
the  advancing  cloud  causes  a  panic.  Everything  depends,  there- 
fore, upon  the  troops  being  imbued  with  the  knowledge  that 
hostile  gas  attacks  are  harmless. 

TACTICAL. 

COMMAND. 

8.  Wherever  the  front  line  is  protected  by  a  strong  broad 
obstacle  surprise  attacks  are  impossible.    Even  with  the  assist- 
ance of  gas  an  attack  over  a  good  obstacle  can  not  be  carried 
out  without  artillery  preparation.     The  preparations,  therefore, 
for  an  attack  on  a  large  scale  have  so  far  always  been  recog- 
nizable.    This  enables  the  higher  command  to  bring  up  its  re- 
serves of  men  and  ammunition  in  good  time. 

9.  During  the  battle  itself  the  higher  command  has  the  great- 
est difficulty  in  forming  a  correct  picture  of  the  situation.     For 
this  reason   it   is  essential   that   all   means   of  communication 
(telephones,  light  signals,  cyclists,  mounted  orderlies,  runners, 
etc.)  should  be  provided,  so  that  if  one  or  more  means  of  com- 
munication fail  it  may  still  be  possible  to  pass  on  orders  and 
messages.     Divisional  staffs  must  from  the  outset  detail  officers 
for  the  tactical  observation   of  the  battlefield  from  prepared 
and  well-chosen  posts,  and  must  be  in  communication  with  them 
and  with  the  observation  balloons  by  means  of  telephones. 

10.  The   telephone   connections   forward   from   the   regiment 
and  battalion  were  for  the  most  part  cut.     The  surest  means  of 
communication  proved  to  be  daring,  reliable  men,  who  worked 
their  way  backwards  and  forwards  from  shell   hole  to  shell 
hole.     The  provision  of  some  special  means  of  recognition  (arm 
band)    for  these  men  proved   of  value.     Otherwise  they  were 
often  held  back  by  officers  in  the  front  line  and  used  for  other 
purposes.     Regular  relay  posts  in  the  communication  trenches 
appear  to  have  been  less  useful,  because  these  were  either  killed 


GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES.  15 

or  buried  by  artillery  fire.  Fairly  good  results  were  achieved  in 
certain  places  with  light  signals  (motor  lamps  can  be  used  for 
this  purpose  as  an  improvised  measure). 

11.  The  light  rocket  signals  proved  on  the  whole  satisfactory. 
Light  pistols  should  also  be  kept  handy  in  the  fighting  posts  of 
sector  commanders,  in  order  that  signals  may  be  sent  from  the 
front  line.     Barrage  fire  must,  however,  only  be  called  for  in 
cases  of  absolute  necessity.     Light-pistol  signals  sent  unneces- 
sarily out  of  nervousness  led,  in  certain  cases,  to  such  an  ex- 
penditure of  ammunition  that  artillery  support  failed  at  the 
critical  moment,  owing  to  lack  of  sufficient  ammunition  supply. 
(See  la  No.  161,  Secret,  of  9/10/15.) 

12.  The  connection  between  the  infantry  sector  commander 
and  the  artillery  group  commander,  which  is  so  essential  to  the 
satisfactory  cooperation  of  the  two  arms,  is  best  provided  for  if 
these  two  are  near  enough  to  one  another  for  verbal  communica- 
tion during  the  battle.    When  this  is  impossible,  artillery  officers 
who  are  intimately  acquainted  with  the  whole  sector  must  be 
allotted  to  the  infantry  commanders  and  must  be  in  telephonic 
communication  with  the  artillery  staffs.    It  is  very  advantageous 
if  it  can  be  arranged  that  the  limits  of  each  infantry  sector 
coincide    exactly    with    those    of    the    corresponding    artillery 
group.     Difficult  points  opposite  the  front  line,   for  Instance, 
villages,  or  strips  of  dead  ground  affording  covered  approaches 
to  the  enemy   (copses,  wooded  river  banks,  etc.),  must  never 
form   the  boundaries   of   sectors.     Boundaries   should,    in   the 
first  instance,  be  chosen  with  this  object  in  mind. 

13.  It  has  already  been  laid  down  in  Second  Army  No.  161, 
Secret,   of  1/10/15,   that   the  front   line   must   everywhere   be 
marked  by  boards  painted  diagonally  red  and  white.    In  order 
that  the  trench  positions  must  be  shown  as  soon  as  possible 
after  the  gain  or  loss  of  ground,  the  infantry  should  render 
sketches  to  headquarters  with  the  least  possible  delay.    Similar 
sketches  for  the  use  of  the  artillery  should  be  prepared  and 
sent  in  by  the  artillery  officers  attached  to  the  respective  in- 
fantry  staffs.     This   is   the   sole   means   of  preventing  losses 
amongst  the  infantry  from  our  own  artillery  fire,  and  of  insur- 
ing that  the  enemy's  forces  which  have  penetrated  our  trenches 
are  dealt  with  by  our  artillery. 

14.  The  number  of  spare  maps  available  showing  the  regi- 
mental sectors  (1/10,000  or  thereabouts)  must  be  such  that  all 
the  officers,  down  to  platoon  commanders,  of  newly  arrived  re- 
serves can  be  immediately  provided  with  a  good  trench  map. 


16          GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES. 

15.  The  question  of  careful  training  of  special  officers  and 
other  suitable  individuals    (also  cavalry)    as  guides    (both  by 
day  and  by  night)   to  freshly  arrived  units,  has  already  been 
referred  to  in  the  Pioneer  General's  846/15  of  the  1st  of  August. 

INFANTRY. 

16.  At  many  points  of  the  front  attacked,  and  wherever  the 
breadth  of  the  regimental  sectors  admitted  of  it,  only  four  com- 
panies held  the  front-line  trenches,  each  company,  as  far  as 
can  be  ascertained,  holding  a  sector  of  300-600  meters.     As  a 
rule  the  regiment  had  four  companies  in  support,  the  rest  form- 
ing regimental  or  brigade  reserves,  etc.     In  this  connection  it 
should  be  noted  that  the  billeting  of  supports  in  villages  im- 
mediately behind  the  front  was  a  failure.    The  speedy  collection 
of  the  support  companies,   which  were  accommodated   in  the 
numerous   cellars   of   the   heavily   bombarded   villages,   proved 
impracticable. 

Supports  are  better  kept  (at  any  rate  during  critical  periods) 
in  the  rearmost  trenches  of  the  first-line  system  or  in  the 
intermediate  line;  this  will  at  the  same  time  form  the  best 
means  of  improving  these  defenses. 

17.  The  reserves  at  the  disposal  of  the  corps  headquarters 
were  in  some  cases  very  small,  often  only  one  battalion  per 
division.     These,  too,  were  soon  placed  at  the  disposal  of  the 
divisions.     In  many  cases  portions  of  the  supports  had  already 
been  sent  into  the  front  line  while  the  artillery  preparation  was 
sfill  being  carried  out  in  order  to  replace  losses. 

18.  The  experience  of  the  recent  offensives  emphasizes  the 
advisability  of  a  considerable  distribution  in  depth.     The  avail- 
able front-line  troops  are  insufficient  for  a  close  occupation  of 
the  support  trenches,  but  a  weak  garrison  will  be  enough  to 
bring  the  enemy  to  a  standstill* here  after  he  has  broken  through 
the  first  positions.     The  all-important  point  is  that  the  enemy 
should  be  engaged  from  the  support  positions  as  well  as  from 
the  front  positions.     This  should  be  insured  by  means  of  well- 
placed  machine  guns  and  emergency  garrisons,  mainly  in  the 
neighborhood  of  points  where  the  communication  trenches  run 
from  the  front  positions  into  the  support  line. 

19.  The  front  trench  of  the  first-line  system  must  be  suffi- 
ciently strongly  garrisoned    (but  no  more)    to  make  it  certain 
that,  provided  the  parapet  be  promptly  manned,  a  hostile  attack 


GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES.  17 

will  be  driven  back.  The  better  the  arrangements  are  for 
enfilading  the  front  trenches,  more  especially  by  machine-gun 
fire,  the  smaller  can  be  the  infantry  garrisons. 

20.  Again,  in  the  September  battles,  there  were  several  points 
in  the  line  at  which  the  men  were  surprised  in  their  dugouts. 
For  this  reason  it  has  several  times  been  suggested  that  the 
front  trenches  should  be  held  more  or  less  strongly  by  sentry 
posts.     On  the  other  hand,  it  has  been  proved  that  in  most 
places  the  parapet  was  manned  promptly  enough.     It  is  of  the 
utmost  importance  that  a  good  lookout  should  be  kept,  good 
alarm  arrangements  provided,  suitable  exits  to  dugouts  built, 
and  that  the  alarm  should  be  duly  rehearsed.     (See   Second 
Army,  No.  138,  Secret,  of  Aug.  1.)     Above  all,  however,  every 
group  commander  and  individual  man  must  know  that  the  suc- 
cess or  failure  of  the  defense  depends  entirely  on  the  timely 
manning  of  the  parapet.    All  must  be  made  to  understand  that 
the  moment  the  enemy- enters  our  trenches  he  begins  bombing 
the  dugouts.     The  great  point,  therefore,  is  not  to  lose  a  second, 
but  even  if  the  alarm  is  not  given  in  time  to  hurry  to  the  firing 
line  the  moment  the  artillery  fire  lengthens. 

If,  as  was  suggested,  the  greater  part  of  the  companies  is 
kept  in  the  support  trenches,  the  men  will  come  up  too  late  for 
the  defense  of  the  front  line,  and  the  latter  is  sacrificed.  In  this 
army  the  standing  order  that  the  front-line  trenches  must  in- 
variably be  held  is  to  be  absohitely  adhered  to. 

21.  As  soon  as  an  attack  threatens  the  first  support  line  will 
be  occupied  by  the  supports,  of  which  a  portion  will  defend  the 
trenches  themselves,  particularly  the  entrances  to  communica- 
tion trenches,  and  the  rest  will  form  strong  bombing  parties 
who  will  be  ready  to  advance  in  aid  of  the  front  line. 

22.  The  remaining  available  troops  will  never  suffice  for  a 
simultaneous  occupation  of  the  second  support  line.     Here  there 
will  be  a  few  odd  reserve  companies,  with  a  few  emergency  gar- 
risons at  points  of  special  importance. 

Supports  and  reserves  occupying  the  first  and  second  support 
lines  can  only  properly  fulfill  their  task  if,  from  these  positions, 
also,  as  careful  an  observation  of  the  enemy's  movements  is 
carried  out  as  in  the  front  line. 

23.  For  the  defense  of  the  intermediate  and  main  second  lines 
only  the  corps  or  army  reserves  come  into  consideration.     The 
bringing  up  of  the  last  reserves — namely,  recruit  depots,  cavalry, 

29267°— 18 2 


18  GEEMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES. 

and  train — must  also  be  carefully  prepared   (ammunition,  iron 
rations,  etc.). 

24.  If  the  enemy  breaks  through  at  any  point  it  is  the  duty 
of   the  neighboring  troops  to  take  him   immediately   in  flank 
whether  by  rifle  or  machine-gun  fire  or  by  bombing  parties  from 
traverse   to   traverse,   which   nearly   always   have   the   desired 
effect. 

In  beating  off  an  attack,  as  well  as  in  the  recapture  of  lost 
trenches,  hand  grenades  have  always  played  a  most  prominent 
and  successful  part.  Meo  who  are  not  familiar  with  the  use 
of  hand  grenades  proved  more  dangerous  to  themselves  and 
their  comrades  than  to  the  enemy.  They  threw  their  grenades 
away  at  random  from  sheer  fright  of  the  unfamiliar  weapon. 
All  infantrymen  and  pioneers  must  be  trained  in  bombing  just 
as  thoroughly  as  they  are  in  the  use  of  the  rifle.  An  effort  should 
be  made  to  see  that  every  individual  man  throws  at  least  one 
live  hand  grenade  during  the  course  of  his  training.  During 
the  defense  there  was  too  great  a  tendency  on  the  part  of  the 
men  to  throw  their  grenades  too  soon.  First  of  all  rifles  must 
be  used,  and  not  until  the  enemy  has  approached  quite  close 
will  hand  grenades  be  employed;  it  is  then  that  their  effect  is 
so  good. 

MACHINE  GUNS. 

25.  Machine  guns  which  were  in  position  on  the  parapet  or 
in  the  trenches  during  the  artillery  preparation  were,  of  course, 
destroyed.    As  a  result  of  this  it  was  to  some  extent  considered 
that  machine  guns  were  no  longer  suitable  for  use  in  the  front- 
line trenches.    This  is  a  fallacy.    Machine  guns  must  remain  in 
the  machine  gunners'  own  dugouts  until  the  enemy  attack  is 
launched,  then  quickly  transferred  to  a  convenient  position  on 
the  parapet  without  the  sledges,  which  are  too  heavy  for  work 
in  the  trenches.     Employed  in  this  manner  they  w7ill  achieve 
excellent  results.    It  is  important  that  the  machine-gun  forma- 
tions should  secure  light  improvised  sledges,  pivots,  or  some- 
thing of  the  kind,  and,  apart  from  this,  that  they  should  train 
all  their  men  to  shoot  without  sledges  and  with  sandbag  sup- 
ports.    This  method  of  shooting  must  be  learned.     The  large 
errors  which  occur  when  shooting  in  this  manner  are  of  no 
consequence  when  the  enemy  is  at  assaulting  distance. 

26.  The  number  of  machine  guns  allotted  to  every  regiment 
js  now  so  high  that  a  proportion  of  the  guns  ordinarily  used 


GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES.  19 

in  commanding  positions  in  the  first  and  second  support  lines 
and  firing  over  the  front  line  can  easily  be  employed  as  emer- 
gency guns  in  the  intermediate  and  main  second-line  defenses. 
This  will  not  unduly  reduce  the  fighting  strength  of  the  front 
line.  Machine-gun  formations  (machine-gun  sections,  also 
cavalry  machine-gun  sections)  are  particularly  suitable  for  use, 
as  mobile  reserves  in  the  hands  of  commanders. 

If  ordered  into  action  from  prepared  emplacements  in  either 
the  intermediate  or  main  second  line  these  would  stop  the  fur- 
ther advance  of  an  enemy  who  has  overrun  the  front-line 
system. 

TBENCH    MOETABS. 

27.  Owing  to  their  slow  rate  of  firing,   the   heavy   trench 
mortars  are  not  well  suited  for  beating  off  an  assault.     Their 
limited  range  necessitates  their  coming  into  action  close  behind 
the  front-line  trenches,  where  they  would  nearly  all  be  quickly 
destroyed  or  buried  by  the  hostile  artillery  before  they  could 
change  positions,  a  task  rendered  all  the  more  difficult  by  their 
excessive  weight.     Nevertheless,  their  value  before  an  attack 
in  the  engagement  of  hostile  trench  mortars  and  targets  which 
our  artillery  would  not  dare  to  touch,  owing  to  their  proximity 
to  our  own  front  line,  must  not  be  overlooked.    Their  emplace- 
ments must,  therefore,  be  well  built  with  ample  dugout  accom- 
modation for  the   men  and  ammunition.     Bullet-proof  shields 
must  also  be  provided  for  the  mortars  themselves.     Alternative 
emplacements  must  be  prepared.     Good   results  were  secured 
with    medium    and    light    (also    improvised)    trench    mortars. 
These  are  not  hampered  by  any  want  of  mobility. 

ARTILLERY. 

28.  The  support  of  the  artillery  has  been  described  by  tho 
infantry  in  many  places  as  excellent,  and  especially  where  the 
infantry  and  artillery  commanders  were  in  constant  close  touch 
with  one  another  through  having  command  posts  adjoining.    The 
artillery  only  failed  where  ammunition  was  lacking,  and  this 
was  already  the  case  in  several  places  on  the  evening  after  the 
first  attack. 

29.  The  number  of  rounds  allotted  to  each  field  battery  for 
the  event  of  a  hostile  attack  should  ordinarily  amount  to  2,000 ; 
for   the  light   field   howitzers   and   10-centimeter   guns,   1,500 


20"        GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES. 

rounds  each  per  battery ;  for  heavy  field  howitzers,  200  rounds 
per  gun ;  for  21-centimeter  mortars,  100  rounds  per  gun  will  be 
sufficient.  There  is  no  necessity  to  keep  a  corresponding  num- 
ber of  rounds  constantly  in  readiness  in  the  ammunition  stores, 
especially  for  the  field-gun  batteries.  In  ordinary  circumstances 
stocks  of  1,000  to  1,500  rounds  will  suffice.  But  as  soon  as  signs 
of  a  hostile  attack  are  recognized  the  stocks  of  ammunition 
must  be  made  up  to  the  above-named  figures  and  kept  up  to  this 
level  without  fail  throughout  the  days  of  increased  artillery 
activity  preliminary  to  the  attack.  Deep  dugouts  for  storing 
ammunition  must  be  prepared  everywhere,  including  the  posi- 
tions eventually  intended  for  the  use  of  the  extra  reinforcing 
batteries. 

30.  Wherever  the  battery  emplacements  and  dugouts  for  the 
men  were  well  built,  the  effect  of  the  hostile  heavy  artillery  was 
comparatively  small.    All  the  reports  of  the  Sixth  Corps  agree 
in  stating  that  the  numerically  superior  hostile  artillery  never 
succeeded   in   silencing  our  batteries  for  any  length  of  time. 
It  often  happened,  however,  that  batteries  could  only  make  use 
of  three  of  their  guns  at  a  time,  so  that  their  effectiveness  was 
reduced,  at  any  rate,  in  forming  a  barrage. 

31.  The  majority   of  the  losses  were   sustained  during  the 
bringing  up  of  ammunition.    Firing  was  in  no  way  hindered  by 
gas  shells.    The  gas  was  harmless  and  the  bursting  capacity  of 
the  gas  shells  insignificant. 

32.  Losses  of  materiel  were  not  always  made  good  quickly 
enough.     It  is  essential  that  reserve  materiel  should  be  kept 
close  at  hand.    It  proved  useful  to  employ  one  of  the  reinforcing 
batteries  to  replace  individual  guns  which  had  been  put  out  of 
action.    It  is  more  important  that  batteries  which  have  carried 
out  their  registration  should  be  maintained  at  their  full  strength 
than  that  a  new  battery  should  be  put  in  which  is  unfamiliar 
with  the  various  targets  and  ranges.    The  enemy  often  engaged 
batteries,   which   he   was  particularly   anxious  to   put   out   of 
action,  from  as  many  as  three  different  directions.     The  fact 
that  in  spite  of  his  numerical  superiority  he  was  unable  to 
achieve  the  desired  result  only  goes  to  prove  how  futile  it  is  to 
attempt  the  same  thing  with  weaker  artillery.    And  the  artillery 
of  the  defender  is  always  the  weaker.    During  the  days  of  the 
enemy's  artillery  preparation,   it  will  be  possible,   given  good 
observation,  to  engage  with  heavy  field  howitzers  or  mortars 
such  batteries  as  are  particularly  objectionable  to  our  infantry, 


GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES.          21 

and  at  the  same  time  to  bombard  hostile  observation  posts.  As 
a  general  rule,  however,  as  soon  as  an  intended  hostile  attack  is 
recognized,  the  attention  of  our  artillery  must  be  concentrated 
on  the  enemy's  infantry,  their  preparatory  work,  and  their  dug- 
outs. But  as  soon  as  it  becomes  obvious  that  an  immediate 
attack  is  contemplated,  and  particularly  when  the  assembly  of 
troops  is  reported  in  the  enemy's  trenches,  these  last  must  con- 
stitute the  artillery's  sole  objective  until  the  attack  has  taken 
place  and  been  driven  back  (see  C.  G.  S.  of  30/9/15,  No.  8533r). 
If,  during  the  critical  hours,  fire  were  still  to  be  directed  against 
the  hostile  artillery,  the  barrage  batteries  would  have  too  wide 
a  target  to  deal  with,  and  there  would  be  gaps  in  the  barrage 
which  the  enemy  would  recognize  and  profit  by. 

33.  It  is  desirable  that  each  field  battery  should  be  allotted 
a  sector  of  not  more  than  200  meters  in  breadth  for  barrage 
purposes.     This  is  only  feasible  in  the  case  of  attacks  on  a 
narrow  front  in  the  repulse  of  which  all  the  batteries  in  the 
neighboring  sectors  would  participate.     For  attacks  on  a  wider 
frontage,    each   barrage    sector   will    have   to   be   considerably 
broader  at  first  and  will  only  be  reduced  to  the  desired  breadth 
after  the  extra  reinforcing  batteries  have  been  able  to  come  up. 

34.  In  order  that  light  pistol  and  light  signal  messages  from 
the  front  line  may  be  picked  up,  in  spite  of  smoke  and  gas 
clouds,  it  is  desirable  to  have  elevated  observation  posts  near  the 
batteries. 

35.  The  fact  that,  after  the  enemy  had  pierced  the  front  line 
in  the  Champagne,  a  large  number  of  guns  were  captured  by 
him    renders    special    precautions    necessary.     If   possible,    ar- 
rangements should  be  made  to  protect  all  batteries  by  means  of 
a  continuous  well-built  intermediate  line.     Steps  must  also  be 
taken  that  an  enemy  who  has  broken  through  is  engaged  by  the 
batteries  at  close  range  and  finally  received  with  case  shot. 

36.  Small  caliber  case-shot  guns — for  instance,  the  5.7-centi- 
meter Belgian  gun — will  be  best  employed  in  the  close  defense 
of  rear  positions  or  in  the  vicinity  of  such  batteries  as  are  not 
supplied  with  case  shot,  and  which  are  therefore  incapable  of 
defending  themselves  at  close  quarters.    The  provision  of  special 
gunners  is,  in  the  latter  instance,  unnecessary.     If  the  enemy 
approaches  within  case-shot  range  a  few  of  the  gunners  of  the 
batteries  concerned   can  be  employed   on   the  case-shot   guns. 
Practice  in  firing  with  case  shot  must  be  carried  out. 


22          GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES. 

37.  The  bringing  up  of  guns  of  any  kind  into  the  front-line 
trenches  has  been  proved  a  serious  mistake  ever  since  the  intro- 
duction of  intense  bombardments.     They  are  sure  to  be  de- 
stroyed or  buried.     Guns  which  were  in  the  front  line  near 
Souchez  never  fired  a  single  shot. 

PBEPABATION  OF  DEFENSES. 

38.  The  defenses  on  the  front  of  the  attacks  were  for  the  most 
part  inferior  in  construction  to  those  on  the  second-army  front. 
At  many  points  the  energetic  artillery  work  of  the  enemy  had 
rendered  a  steady  improvement  of  the  trenches  impossible,  par- 
ticularly the  erection  of  strong  wire  entanglements. 

39.  The  front-line  system  everywhere  consisted,  as  far  as  is 
known,  of  a  network  of  trenches  over  which  the  enemy's  shell- 
ing was  about  evenly  distributed.    This  goes  to  prove  that  the 
preparation  of  a  second  support  line  has  its  advantages,  even  if 
the  available  forces  are  insufficient  to  admit  of  its  occupation,  as 
it  encourages  the  enemy  to  scatter  his  artillery  fire  over  a  wider 
area.     Dummy  trenches  served  the  same  purpose  with  equal 
success.    Broad,  deep  fire  trenches  with  unrevetted  interior  slopes, 
broad  berms,  and  strong  traverses  offer  the  best  resistance  to  an 
intense  bombardment.     On  the  whole,  mined  dugouts  about  10 
feet  below  the  surface  have  proved  satisfactory.     The  losses 
from  the  intense  bombardment  were  comparatively  slight.    The 
entrances  to  the  dugouts  were  often  destroyed  or  blocked.    The 
frames  of  these  must,  therefore,  be  well  braced  and  specially 
strong.     Steep   slopes   above  the   entrances   must   be   avoided. 
Very  heavy  shells  (28  centimeter)  penetrated  into  these  dug- 
outs. 

40.  The  wire  protecting  the  front  line  in  certain  corps  sectors 
amounted  to  a  mere  emergency  obstacle,  owing  to  the  enemy's 
persistent  shelling,  and  was  soon  cut.     On  the  other  hand,  good 
entanglements  on  posts  proved  efficient  in  holding  the  enemy 
up  even  after  the  heaviest  bombardment.    In  places  the  obstacles 
in  front  of  back  defenses  had  not  been  destroyed  by  hostile 
shelling;  these  were  extremely  effective.    In  general  the  neces- 
sity has  been  recognized  of  protecting  all  defensive  lines,  even 
the  second  and  third  lines  of  the  various  systems,  with  good 
strong  entanglements  on  posts,  constructed  wherever  possible  in 
several  rows. 


GEKMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES.  23 

41.  To  meet  the  attack  itself,  all  firing  was  done  over  the 
parapet.     Steel   shields    or   loopholes   are   only   necessary   for 
sentries ;  a  few  of  these  will  suffice. 

42.  It  was  often   observed   that   the   French   directed   their 
attacks  more  particularly  against  those  points  in  the  front  line 
into  which  the  long  communication  trenches  ran.    If  they  gained 
possession  of  these  points  they  immediately  tried  to  set  up  their 
machine  guns  there  in  order  to  prevent  German  supports  from 
coming  up,  and  at  the  same  time  cut  off  the  occupants  of  the 
front  trenches  between  any  two  such  points.     This  shows  the 
necessity  of  having  numerous  communication  trenches,  but  of 
avoiding   building   them    straight    from   front   to    rear.      The 
entrances  to  communication  trenches  must  be  so  designed  that 
they  can  be  blocked  immediately  and  defended.     The  zigzag 
form  is  preferable  to  the  straight  line  with  traverses.    The  com- 
munication  trenches,    too,   should   be   broad   and   deep,    with 
sloping  walls  revetted  as  little  as  possible  and  should  be  pro- 
vided in  numerous  places  with  good  recesses  for  defense. 

Front  line:  2 


First  support  line : 
Second  support  line : 


(a)  Wrong  system,     (b)  Correct  system. 

43.  The  reports  of  the  various  units  show  in  particular  that 
traffic  up  to  the  front  line  during  a  battle  can  only  be  properly 
regulated  if  each  battalion  sector  possesses  at  least  one  through 
communication  trench  for  traffic  towards  the  front,  and  another 
for  traffic  towards  the  rear.    In  principle  these  trenches  should, 
in  ordinary  circumstances,  only  be  used  for  traffic  in  one  direc- 
tion.    Wherever  there  was  an  insufficiency  of  communication 
trenches,  which  resulted  in  the  traffic  being  blocked,  reinforce- 
ments were  unable  to  come  up  and  losses  were  increased  be- 
cause the  men,  in  their  endeavors  to  move  forward,  climbed  out 
into  the  open. 

BRINGING  UP  SUPPLIES,  ETC. 

44.  It  Is  most  essential  that  thorough  preparations  should  be 
made  for  bringing  up  supplies  to  the  front  line.    The  following 


24          GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES. 

measures,  based  on  the  experiences  of  regiments  of  the  Sixth 
Corps,  are  recommended : 

The  entire  supply  service  should  be  placed  under  the  charge 
of  an  energetic  officer  or  sergeant  major  in  each  regimental 
sector.  Sufficient  lighting  material  and  rations  for  three  days 
(including  iron  rations  for  each  man)  must  always  be  kept 
ready  in  the  front  line.  The  same  amount  of  supplies  must  be 
stored  in  the  first  and  second  support  lines  as  soon  as  the  sup- 
ports and  reserves  are  brought  up. 

45.  During  times  of  great  nervous  strain  the  men  suffer  far 
more  from  thirst  than  they  do  from  hunger.     Therefore  drink 
should  be  provided  for  before  anything  else — coffee,  tea,  and 
soda  water.     Alcohol  should  only  be  given  in  moderation,  be- 
cause of  the  lassitude  which  ensues.    Tobacco,  cigars,  matches, 
and  chocolate  were  extensively  consumed.     Bacon  and  smoked 
meat   were   often   more  popular  than   tinned   meat,   probably 
because  the  former  could  be  carried  in  the  pocket  and  occa- 
sional bites  taken.     As  a  thirst  quencher  dried  fruit  is  recom- 
mended.    Solidified  alcohol  for  warming  up  tinned  meat  was 
found  useful.     For  the  transport  of  drink  and  food,  large  quan- 
tities of  specially  suitable  barrels  and  baskets  must  be  available. 

46.  It  was  found  necessary  to  post  a  noncommissioned  officer 
in  front  and  in  rear  of  a  ration  party,  otherwise  the  men  went 
astray  and  the  food  did  not  arrive  intact.     Depots  in  rear-line 
trenches  were  found  useful.     Above  all,  it  is  necessary  that  the 
officer  in  charge  of  the  supplies  should  have  a  thorough  knowl- 
edge of  the  line  and  be  kept  well  informed  as  to  the  situation, 
so  that  he  can" be  relied  upon  to  send  up  the  necessary  supplies 
without  waiting  for  requests  from  the  front.     When  communi- 
cations were  cut,  it  sometimes  happened  that  the  troops  were 
subjected  to  terrible  thirst.     Certain  men  state  that  they  had 
nothing  to  drink  for  48  hours.    The  firing  line  was,  for  the  most 
part,  so  thinly  held  that  it  was  necessary  to  avoid  sending  men 
back.     It  is  therefore  necessary  from  the  very  start  to  detail 
special  carrying  detachments. 

47.  The  bringing  up  of  supplies  of  small-arm  ammunition, 
light  and  signal  cartridges,  grenades,  emergency  obstacles,  sand- 
bags, infantry  shields,  entrenching  tools,  etc.,  must  be  regu- 
lated in  a  similar  manner.     Above  all,  the  supply  of  grenades 
must  never  run  short.     Never  wait  until  all  the  front-line  sup- 
plies are  exhausted  and  the  troops  are  in  trouble,  for  then  it  will 
be  too  late. 


GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES.  25 

48.  It  is  recommended  that  a  pioneer  depot  (communication- 
trench  park)   for  each  company  sector  should  be  formed  in  a 
bullet-proof  dugout  somewhere  about  the  second-support  line, 
in  any  case  not  too  far  forward.    The  company  parks  will  draw 
from  regimental  parks,  situated  in  as  central  a  position  as  pos- 
sible ;  these  again  will  draw  from  brigade  or  divisional  parks. 

MEDICAL  SERVICE. 

49.  Motor  ambulances  should  be  sent  as  far  forward  as  pos- 
sible.   Medical  dugouts  should  be  approached  by  ramps  or  steps. 
Steep  steps  are  not  convenient  for  moving  wounded.     , 

(Signed)  v.  BELOW, 

Commanding  Second  German  Army. 


n. 


REPORT  ON  THE 

EXECUTION  OF  THE  RAID  ON  THE  SPION, 
APRIL,  1916. 


[110th  Reserve  Infantry  Regiment,  in  the  field,  Apr.  15, 1916.] 

27 


CONTENTS. 


Page. 

Report  on  the  execution  of  the  raid  on  the  Spion,  April,  1916 .  29 

A 29 

B 29 

C 30 

D 31 

E 33 

F 33 

Deductions 33 

Distribution 35 

Report  on  the  feint  on  the  evening  of  April  11,1916 35 

Capt.  Wagener's  report  on  the  raid  on  the  evening  of  April 

11,  1916 37 

Appendix  A 42 

28 


II. 

REPORT  ON  THE  EXECUTION  OF  THE  RAID 
ON  THE  SPION,  APRIL,  1916. 

[110th  Reserve  Infantry  Regiment,  in  the  field,  Apr.  15,  1916.] 


A. 

1.  By  order  of  fhe  division,  regimental  orders  were  changed  in 
the  following  respects : 

(a)  The  bombardment  of  the  Weisse  Steinmauer  by  Minen- 
werfer  on  the  morning  of  the  day  before  the  raid  was  canceled 
in  order  that  the  enemy's  attention  might  not  be  drawn  unneces- 
sarily to  that  locality. 

( b )  An  additional  medium  Minenwerfer  was  detailed  to  cut  the 
wire  at  the  point  of  entry,  making  altogether  one  heavy  and  three 
medium  Minenwerfer  detailed  for  this  purpose ;  consequently, 
apart  from  the  close-range  weapons  of  the  pioneers  and  the  light 
Minenwerfer  of  the  228th  Minenwerfer  Company,  only  one  me- 
dium Minenwerfer  cooperated  in  the  feint. 

(c)  Stradtmann's  patrol  was  instructed  not  to  leave  the  Hohl- 
weg  at  the  twenty-third  minute,  but  to  wait  for  the  conclusion 
of  the  intense  bombardment  in  order  to  avoid,  at  all  costs,  un- 
necessary losses  from  the  splinters  of  our  own  shell. 

2.  An  increase  in  the  amount  of  "K"  gas  shell  available  and 
the  arrival  of  "  T  "  gas  shell  led  to  changes  in  the  "  number  of 
rounds "    in    Appendix    2.     Furthermore,    a    reduction    in    the 
amount  of  (21  cm.)  mortar  ammunition  available  led  to  altera- 
tions in  the  corresponding  figures  of  Appendices  2  and  4. 

B. 

3.  The  registration  of  the  batteries  already  in  position  began 
on  April  5  and,  as  arranged,  was  concluded  by  the  9th. 

On  the  evening  of  the  8th  one  light  and  one  heavy  battery  of 
the   29th    Reserve    Field   Artillery    Regiment   bombarded    the 

29 


30          GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES. 

enemy's  wire  in  front  of  76y  for  45  minutes  in  order  to  allay 
any  possible  suspicion  aroused  in  the  enemy  in  spite  of  the  pre- 
cautions observed. 

4.  During  the  night  of  April  8-9  one  (21  cm.)  mortar,  and  on 
the  night  of  the  9-10th  two  4-gun  heavy  field  howitzer  batteries 
and  the  1st  Battery,  29th  Regiment,  took  up  the  positions  indi- 
cated by  the  artillery  commander. 

5.  The  heavy,  the  four  medium,  and  the  five  light  Minenwerfer 
of  the  228th  Minenwerfer  Company  took  up  their  allotted  posi- 
tions by  night  between  the  3d  and  7th  of  April. 

The  1st  Reserve  Company,  13th  Pioneer  Battalion,  installed 
two  "Albrecht-Mb'rser  "  on  the  Lehmgrubenhohe  for  bombarding 
the  Nordrondell. 

6.  On  April  9  the  commander  of  the  1st  Reserve  Company, 
13th  Pioneer  Battalion,  decided  that,  apart  from  the  mine  in- 
cluded in  the  project  of  the  raid,  it  would  very  shortly  be  neces- 
sary to  fire  another  mine,  seeing  that  the  enemy  was  working 
only  a  few  yards  away  from  the  head  of  the  gallery.     It  was 
arranged  to  combine  the  latter  with  the  feint  bombardment  to 
be  carried  out  on  the  morning  of  April  10.    As,  however,  the 
enemy  always  showed  most  activity  in  his  gallery  between  6 
and  8  a.  m.,  the  mine  was  to  be  fired  during  these  two  hours 
under  all  circumstances,  with  a  view  to  causing  him  the  greatest 
possible  number  of  casualties.     On  account  of  the  mist  the  feint 
bombardment  to  be  carried  out  in  conjunction  with  the  registra- 
tion of  the  newly  installed  batteries  could  only  commence  at 
11.15  a.  m. 

The  mine  was  fired  at  7.43  a.  m.,  after  the  presence  of  the 
enemy's  miners  had  been  definitely  ascertained  by  means  of 
the  microphone.  The  effect  of  the  mine  was  extraordinarily 
powerful  below  ground ;  a  new  crater,  however,  was  not  formed, 
for  the  mine  chamber  was  105  feet  below  the  surface.  Immedi- 
ately after  the  explosion  our  field  artillery  and  close-range 
weapons  bombarded  the  enemy's  trenches  in  that  neighborhood. 
At  8.05  a.  m.  all  our  close-range  weapons  opened  another  burst 
of  fire. 

C. 

7.  The  feint  bombardment  came  in  consequence  as  a  further 
surprise  to  the  enemy. 

From  9-10.15  a.  m.  the  heavy  and  the  three  medium  Minen- 
werfer registered  the  point  of  entry  and  considerably  damaged 
the  wire,  firing  in  all  8  heavy  and  28  medium  Minenwerfer  shell. 


GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES.  31 

Apparently  one  medium  Minemverfer  shell  penetrated  a  dugout, 
from  which  cries  were  heard. 

8.  At  11.15  a.  m.  the  artillery  feint  bombardment  commenced 
in  accordance  with  "  Orders  for  a  raid  on  the  Spion."     It  was 
carried  out  as  prearranged.    This  alone  caused  the  enemy  an 
appreciable  number  of  casualties,  according  to  the  statements 
of   prisoners.      ( See    Appendix ;    examination    of    Englishmen, 
Z.  D.,  14.  )* 

A  new  crater,  about  66  feet  in  diameter,  was  formed  by  the  ex- 
plosion of  the  mine  Z  on  the  left  flank  of  the  mine  field.  The 
heavy  Minenwerfer  and  the  close-range  weapons  of  the  1st  Re- 
serve Company,  13th  Pioneer  Battalion,  took  part  in  the  feint 
bombardment  to  the  extent  of  a  few  rounds. 

The  five  light  Minenwerfer  had  registered  on  the  enemy's 
trenches  behind  the  craters  from  9.30-10.30  a.  m.  and  fired  261 
rounds  during  the  feint  bombardment. 

9.  From  3.10-5.25  p.  m.  on  the  afternoon  of  April  10  the  four 
medium  Minenwerfer  registered  at  intervals,  with  22  rounds, 
on  the  enemy's  trenches  and  wire  at  76y. 

10.  The  enemy  replied  to  the  feint  bombardment  by  shelling 
our  trenches  in  La  Boisselle  and  toward  Pozieres,  while  a  sec- 
tion of  heavy  caliber  howitzers   (8-inch)  shelled  the  neighbor- 
hood of  the  battalion  command  post  in  La  Boisselle. 

D. 

11.  On  the  morning  of  April  11  it  was  decided  to  commence 
the  operation  at  8  o'clock  that  evening.     Watches  were  com- 
pared afresh  at  7  p.  m. 

Owing  to  the  change  in  the  weather,  the  error  of  the  day  for 
the  artillery  was  considerable;  it  had  to  be  worked  out  by  in- 
dividual batteries  and  allowed  for.  Further,  the  first  five  min- 
utes after  opening  fire  had  to  be  devoted  to  correcting  by 
deliberate  ranging. 

12.  The  whole  operation,  as  far  as  concerns  the  infantry  and 
also  the  artillery  and  pioneers,  was  carried  out  entirely  as  pre- 
arranged.    During  the  whole  period  the  enemy's  artillery  was 
in  complete  uncertainty  as  to  our  point  of  entry.     At  about  8.06 
p.  m.  the  enemy's  artillery  opened  a  feeble  and  aimless  fire  and 
for  a  while  shelled  the  English  front-line  trenches  in  sector  77. 
The  feint  drew  their  fire  to  the  neighborhood  of  the  Blinddarm, 

*  No  copy  of  this  Appendix  was  captured. — Translator. 


32          GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES. 

and  until  shortly  before  8.50  p.  m.  not  a  single  shell  fell  in  the 
neighborhood  of  sap  No.  3. 

Only  at  8.47  p.  m.  did  the  enemy  begin  to  sweep  from  Becourt 
Valley  toward  Besenhecke  with  4.7-inch  shrapnel ;  at  8.51  p.  m. 
the  first  of  the  enemy's  shells  fell  near  our  front-line  trench 
east  of  sap  No.  3. 

13.  Consequently,    the    feint    met   with    entire    success   and 
throughout  the  entire  raid  drew  almost  the  whole  of  the  enemy's 
artillery  fire  and  the  fire  of  several  machine  guns  (see  "Report 
on  the  feint  on  the  evening  of  April  11,  1916,"  p.  17). 

14.  The  course  of  events  with  the  raiding  party  may  be  fol- 
lowed in  Capt.  Wagener's  report  on  the  raid  (see  p.  18). 

15.  The  fire  for  effect  of  the  Minemverfer  on  the  point  of  en- 
try, with  14  heavy  and  70  medium  Minemverfer  shell,  destroyed 
the  enemy's  wire  so  completely  on  a  width  of  44  yards  that  on 
breaking  into  the  enemy's  trench   the  raiding  party   did  not 
notice  when  they  crossed  the  wire  entanglement. 

16.  The  effect  of  our  artillery  fire  on  the  enemy's  personnel  and 
trenches  was  quite  remarkable.    Indeed,  from  the  start,  the  gas 
clouds  from  the  "  T  "  and  "  K  "  gas  shell,  of  which  the  grouping 
was  perfect,  were  blown  back  over  our  lines  by  the  strong  west 
wind,  so  that  all  sentries  and  machine-gun  lookouts  were  obliged 
to  wear  masks.     That  the  gas  completely  confused  and  paralyzed 
the  enemy  was  apparent  from  the  condition  of  prisoners  imme- 
diately after  their  capture  and  from  the  fighting  in  the  enemy's 
position.     The  gas  had  even  such  an  effect  on  our  own  men  that 
the  commander  and  one  man  of  the  1st  patrol,  on  leaving  the 
trenches,  were  violently  sick,  and  another  man  fell  down  over- 
come by  sudden  gas  poisoning.     However,  the  latter  was  on  his 
legs  again  in  a  couple  of  minutes  and  could  not  be  prevented 
from  hurrying  after  his  patrol. 

That  the  resistance  offered  by  the  enemy  in  the  sector  occupied 
by  No.  1  platoon  should  have  been  greater  than  that  met  with 
in  the  sector  held  by  No.  3  platoon,  depended,  in  the  opinion  of 
the  regiment,  not  only  on  the  fact  that  the  commander  of  No.  1 
platoon  showed  conspicuous  smartness  and  bravery  in  encourag- 
ing his  men  to  hold  out,  but  that,  owing  to  the  line  curving  back 
somewhat,  only  a  small  proportion  of  gas  shell  actually  fell  in 
the  trench. 

17.  As  his  batteries  became  free  after  the  artillery  prepara- 
tion of  the  raid,  the  artillery  commander  switched  them  on  to 
those  of  the  enemy's  batteries  which  appeared  to  him  of  most 
importance :  703,  767,  724,  713,  714,  702,  and  707. 


GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES.  33 

On  the  part  of  the  enemy,  4  heavy  and  10  field  batteries  were 
actually  engaged. 

18.  On  the  whole,  the  expenditure  of  ammunition  was  as  laid 
down  in  the  "  Tables  of  Distribution  of  Artillery  Fire  "  for  the 
feint  bombardment  and  for  the  raid  itself. 

The  total  expenditure  amounted  to — 
3,543  field  gun. 
829  light  field  howitzer. 
540,  9-cm.  (gun). 
30,  10-cm  (gun). 
110,  12-cm.  (gun). 
984  heavy  field  howitzer  (including  200  "  K  "  and  178 

"T"  gas  shell). 
25,  21-cm.  (mortar). 

According  to  the  estimate  of  the  29th  Reserve  Field  Artillery 
Regiment,  the  enemy  fired  a  total  of  about  1,500  rounds. 

E. 

19.  The  result  of  the  raid  may  be  gathered  from  Capt.  Wage- 
ner's  report   (see  p.  18),  and  from  the  confirmatory  report  of 
Lieut.  Boening. 

The  following  were  captured :  Twenty-four  unwounded  and 
five  wounded  Englishmen.  In  addition,  1  Lewis  machine  gun, 
1  rifle  with  telescopic  sights,  and  20  ordinary  rifles,  as  well  as  a 
large  number  of  steel  helmets,  belts  with  ammunition  pouches, 
packs,  haversacks,  and  gas  helmets. 

Our  casualties  are :  One  man,  slightly  wounded  in  the  fore- 
head by  a  hand  grenade  splinter,  who  was  bandaged  in  the  ad- 
vanced dressing  station  and  immediately  rejoined  the  raiding 
party.  All  other  injuries  sustained  by  Dumas'  patrol  in  the 
course  of  the  fighting  are  quite  negligible  and  can  not  be  con- 
sidered as  wounds. 

F. 

DEDUCTIONS. 

20.  The  regiment  of  Royal  Irish  Rifles  created  a  most  favor- 
able impression,  both  as  regards  the  physique  of  the  men  and 
their  mode  of  repelling  an  assault.     But  for  the  effect  of  gas 
shell  it  would  not  have  been  possible  to  clear  the  section  of 
trench  held  by  one  entire  company  and  the  flank  of  the  com- 
pany on  its  left,  so  thoroughly  that  not  an  Englishman  remained 
alive  in  the  trench. 

29267° — 18 3 


84  GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES. 

Consequently,  the  regiment  attaches  the  greatest  importance 
to  a  bombardment  with  gas  shell,  but  considers  it  necessary 
that  the  enemy  should,  at  the  same  time,  be  shelled  with  H.  E. 
shell,  in  addition,  in  the  event  of  strong  bodies  of  troops  not 
being  available  for  the  subsequent  assault. 

In  an  operation  like  that  of  the  evening  of  the  llth,  which 
was  to  be  carried  out  with  the  lowest  effectives  possible,  it 
was  essential  that  the  enemy  should  have  already  suffered  ap- 
preciable losses  from  our  artillery,  so  that  the  patrols  were  not 
confronted  by  strong  compact  detachments  but  only  by  isolated 
groups,  whose  morale  had  suffered  by  the  sight  of  their  dead 
and  severely  wounded  comrades  around  them. 

21.  The  artillery  was  most  successful  in  mastering  the  flank- 
ing defences,  but  the  regiment  considers  that  the  more  gas  shell 
are  employed  the  easier  this,  too,  will  be. 

22.  The  present  experience  shows  that  there  is  no  risk  of 
endangering  one's  own  position  and  one's  own  raiding  party, 
for  the  wind  could  not  be  more  unfavorable  than  it  was  in  this 
case.     In  the  most  unfavorable  circumstances  the  raiding  party 
would  have  to  advance  close  up  to  the  enemy's  trench,  wearing 
gas  masks,  and  remove  them  when  on  the  point  of  breaking 
in.-   In  any  case  an  attack  with  gas  masks  on  would  appear  to  be 
scarcely  feasible.    However  well  the  masks  are  fitted  and  how- 
ever thoroughly  the  men  are  practiced,  the  mask  hinders  a  gen- 
eral survey  and  makes  it  impossible  to  pick  up  one's  bearings, 
which  the  patrol  commander  must  do  of  necessity.     In  addition 
it  overstrains  the  lungs,  which  are  already  severely  tried  by 
running  and  by  the  impression  caused  by  passing  events. 

23.  If  the   enemy's   front-line   trench   has  been  successfully 
cleared  on  a  width  of  150  to  200  yards,  as  in  the  present  case, 
and  if  the  enemy  has  not  up  to  that  moment  opened  a  barrage 
on  the  point  of  exit,  then,  in  the  opinion  of  the  regiment,  a  far- 
ther advance  into  the  enemy's  second-line  trenches  offers  no 
great  difficulty.     It  is  only  necessary  for  fresh  assaulting  parties 
to  be  launched  and  for  the  necessary  arrangements  with  the 
artillery  to  be  made  in  good  time. 

In  the  opinion  of  the  patrol  commanders,  no  further  obstacle 
would  have  been  encountered  had  fresh  patrols  advanced  in  and 
parallel  to  the  communication  trenches  and  cleared  out  the 
Weisse  Steinmauer  position. 

The  regiment  is  also  of  opinion  that,  without  a  doubt,  a  further 
inroad  into  the  enemy's  third  trench  and  into  his  last  positions  in 
the  Labyrinth  could  have  been  achieved  with  inconsiderable  loss. 


GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES.          35 

24.  After  the  raid  Lieut.  Boening,  one  of  the  participants, 
acting  under  regimental  orders,  examined  the  English  prisoners 
on  prearranged  points  and  brought  to  light  many  details  of 
especial  importance  to  the  regiment.  For  this  reason  the  regi- 
ment considers  it  desirable  that,  in  all  cases,  prisoners  should 
be  examined  by  officers  with  personal  knowledge  of  what  is  of 
importance  for  the  regiment  to  know,  and  that  the  majority  of 
prisoners  should  only  be  taken  away  after  this  examination. 
(Signed)  FBHR.  v.  VIETINGHOFF, 

Colonel  and  Regimental  Commander. 

Distribution. 

28th  Reserve  Division , 1 

56th  Reserve  Infantry  Brigade 1 

29th  Reserve  Field  Artillery   Regiment 1 

Ersatz  Abteilung,  76th  Field  Artillery  Regiment 1 

I  Abteilung,  29th  Reserve  Field  Artillery  Regiment 1 

109th  Reserve  Infantry  Regiment 1 

lllth  Reserve  Infantry  Regiment r 1 

1st  Reserve  Company,  13th  Pioneer  Battalion 1 

228th  Minenwerfer  Company 1 

110th  Reserve  Infantry  Regiment : 

Headquarters _  2 

3  battalions 3 

12  companies 12 

Labor  company 1 

1st  Machine  Gun  Company 1 

2d  Machine  Gun  Company 1 

55th  Machine  Gun  Section 1 

Capt.  Wagener 2 

Reserve  __  5 


37 
REPORT  ON  THE  FEINT  ON  THE  EVENING  OF  APRIL  11.  1916. 

[110th  Reserve  Infantry  Regiment,  in  the  field,  Apr.  15,  1916.] 

1.  The  feint  fulfilled  its  object  in  every  way. 

2.  From  April  5  onward,  the  artillery  repeatedly  shelled  the 
trenches  and  wire  at  76y.     In  particular,  on  the  evening  of 
April  8  the  wire  at  76y  was  shelled  continuously  for  45  minutes 
by  the  heavy  and  light  artillery.     In  the  same  way  the  close- 
range  weapons  of  the  1st  Reserve  Company,  13th  Pioneer  Bat- 


36  GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES. 

talion,  kept  up  daily  a  deliberate  bombardment  with  "  Erd- 
morser  "  and  Minenwerfer  on  the  whole  extent  of  the  wire  be- 
tween La  Boisselle  Cemetery  and  the  Galgen.  A  machine  gun, 
posted  every  night  in  the  Blinddarm,  prevented  the  enemy  from 
repairing  the  wire. 

On  April  10,  from  3.10  to  5.25  p.  m.,  a  medium  Minenwerfer 
of  the  228th  Minenwerfer  Company  registered  on  the  wire  and 
the  position  at  76y  with  22  rounds,  so  that  by  this  time  the  wire 
there  had  been  in  great  measure  destroyed. 

3.  On  April  4  I  posted  the  dummies,  which  had  been  previ- 
ously prepared,  in  the  Blinddarm  and  between  the  Blinddarm 
and  the  southwest  corner  of  La  Boisselle.    The  dummies  were 
arranged  in  three  groups,  which  were  fastened  on  to  laths,  op- 
erated by  strings  leading  to  dugouts,  thus  insuring  the  safety 
of  the  men  operating  them,  even  in  the  event  of  the  heaviest 
enemy  fire. 

4.  On  the  evening  of  April  11  the  artillery  opened  fire  at  8 
p.  m.  as  arranged,  supported  by  the  close-range  weapons  of  the 
1st   Reserve   Company,    13th   Pioneer    Battalion,    and   by    one 
medium  Minenwerfer  of  the  228th  Minenwerfer  Company. 

At  8.14$  p.  m.  the  mine  "A"  was  fired  at  the  right  extremity 
of  the  mine  field.  A  column  of  flame  shot  up  to  an  extraordi- 
nary height  and  stones  of  appreciable  size  were  scattered  to  a 
distance  of  330  yards.  The  crater  formed  is  quite  shallow,  but 
has  a  diameter  of  50  feet. 

Whereas  at  8.06  p.  m.  the  enemy's  artillery  was  already  aim- 
lessly shelling  the  English  front-line  trenches  in  sector  77  and 
then  the  trenches  in  the  southwest  corner  of  La  Boisselle,  im- 
mediately after  the  explosion  it  concentrated  on  the  positions 
adjoining  the  mine  and  on  the  Blinddarm.  At  this  moment  the 
heavy  artillery  opened  on  the  Blinddarm,  the  majority  of  the 
shells  being  blind. 

At  8.15  p.  m.  our  artillery  ceased  their  intense  bombardment 
of  the  English  front-line  trenches ;  30  seconds  later  I  gave  the 
order  for  the  dummies  to  be  exposed  above  the  parapet  of  the 
Blinddarm.  The  dummies  between  the  Blinddarm  and  the 
southwest  corner  of  La  Boisselle  could  only  be  hoisted  a  few 
minutes  later,  because  they  were  partly  covered  with  stones 
from  the  mine  explosion.  Immediately  the  dummies  appeared,  a 
brisk  fire  was  opened  by  two  of  the  enemy's  machine  guns,  one 
in  the  neighborhood  of  the  Scheere  and  the  other  near  the  Gal- 
gen.  The  machine  gun  in  the  Galgen  fired  less  on  the  Blind- 


GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES.  37 

darm  itself  than  on  the  depression  in  front  of  the  enemy's 
wire. 

A  few  minutes  later  the  dummies  disappeared,  but  on  reap- 
pearing were  greeted  afresh  with  intense  fire.  Five  dummies 
were  hit  by  bullets  from  rifles  or  machine  guns ;  nearly  all  were 
more  or  less  knocked  about  by  shell  fire  or  fragments  of  stone ; 
one  was  torn  off  the  lath  by  a  shell. 

At  8.25  p.  m.,  when  our  artillery  and  Minenwerfer  again 
opened  a  terrific  fire  on  the  enemy's  trenches,  the  enemy's  ma- 
chine guns  immediately  ceased  fire,  while  the  artillery  con- 
tinued firing  until  about  9  p.  m. 

The  expenditure  of  ammunition  by  the  close-range  weapons 
was  as  follows : 

Rounds. 

Lanz  Minenwerfer 204 

Erdmorser 26 

Albrecht  Morser 57 

1  medium  Minenwerfer  of  228th  Minenwerfer  Company 48 

5  light  Minenwerfer  of  228th  Minenwerfer  Company 474 

5.  I  am  under  the  impression  that  the  enemy  was  completely 
deceived  by  the  feint  attack. 

(Signed)  BACHMANN, 

Second  Lieutenant. 

CAPT.  WAGENER'S   REPORT   ON   THE   RAID   ON   THE  EVENING   OF 
APRIL  11.  1916. 

[In  the  field,  Apr.  12,  1916.] 

At  4  p.  m.  the  raiding  party  marched  from  Martinpuich 
through  Pozieres,  then  by  the  Lattorf  Graben — Regiment- 
strichter — Krebs  Graben  to  the  appointed  dugouts  on  the  left 
of  sap  No.  3,  where  the  evening  meal  was  found  ready  pre- 
pared. 

At  8  p.  m.  the  artillery  preparation  commenced  as  pre- 
arranged. Shortly  after  fire  was  opened,  the  whole  of  the 
enemy's  position  from  Windmuhle  to  Besenhecke  was  wrapped 
in  grayish-white  smoke,  which  the  wind  drove  back  over  sap 
No.  3  into  our  lines. 

By  8.10  p.  m.  it  was  impossible  to  remain  in  our  trench  east 
of  sap  No.  3  without  wearing  a  gas  mask.  This  was  still  the 
case  at  8.20  p.  m.,  when  the  patrols  moved  forward  from  their 


38  GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES. 

dugouts  to  the  Hohlweg,  in  the  following  order :  Stradtmann, 
Dumas,  Bohlefeld,  and  Freund.  Lieut.  Boening  followed  close 
behind  Lieut.  Stradtmann. 

By  8.25  p.  m.  the  party  was  posted  ready  in  the  Hohlweg. 
The  clouds  of  gas  and  smoke,  however,  still  hung  so  thick  over 
the  enemy's  trenches  that  it  was  impossible  to  distinguish 
whether  our  own  shells  were  still  falling  on  the  point  of  entry 
or  whether  our  artillery  had  already  lengthened  their  range. 

At  8.27  p.  m.  Lieut.  Stradtmann  received  the  order  to  advance 
to  the  attack  with  his  patrol.  Lieut.  Boening,  with  the  six 
stretcher  bearers,  left  the  Hohlweg  simultaneously  and  in  rear 
of  Stradtmann's  patrol,  and  posted  connecting  files,  whose  posi- 
tions were  marked  by  red  signal  lamps  shaded  to  the  front  and 
to  the  sides. 

At  8.28  p.  m.  Dumas'  and  Bohlefeld's  patrols  advanced.  Fol- 
lowing the  line  of  connecting  files,  they  reached  the  point  of 
entry,  to  find  that  Stradtmann's  patrol  was  already  in  posses- 
sion of  16  yards  of  trench,  and  had  captured  three  prisoners. 
The  latter  had  come  out  of  their  dugouts  just  as  Lieut.  Stradt- 
mann appeared  in  front  of  the  enemy's  trench.  They  carried 
hand  grenades  and  rifles  with  bayonets  fixed,  but  were  immedi- 
ately disarmed  by  Lieuts.  Boening  and  Stradtmann. 

Dumas'  patrol  immediately  turned  to  the  left  down  the 
trench,  and  in  a  few  steps  came  upon  a  half-destroyed  machine- 
gun  emplacement.  Reservist  Nadolny,  of  Stradtmann's  patrol, 
was  already  occupied  in  digging  out  the  buried  machine  gun. 
Lieut.  Dumas  penetrated  farther  along  the  enemy's  trench,  and 
soon  reached  the  communication  trench  which  runs,  roughly, 
along  the  dividing  line  between  target  sectors  79  and  80,  to- 
ward the  Weisse  Steinmauer.  At  this  point  a  large  dugout  had 
been  wrecked,  apparently  by  a  direct  hit.  Lieut.  Dumas  had 
previously  sent  three  men  of  his  patrol  along  behind  the  enemy's 
trench ;  they  reached  the  communication  trench  about  11  yards 
behind  the  front-line  trench.  A  few  Englishmen,  who  came  out 
of  this  communication  trench,  endeavored  to  reach  the  parados 
of  the  front-line  trench,  whence  they  evidently  intended  to  de- 
fend it.  They  were,  however,  surprised  by  our  three  men  and 
bayoneted. 

Meanwhile,  Lieut.  Dumas,  with  the  rest  of  his  men,  forced 
his  way  farther  along  the  trench,  and  just  north  of  Besenhecke 
reached  the  communication  trench  which  leads  to  the  brown 
prolongation  of  the  Weisse  Steinmauer  (white  stone  wall). 


GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES.  39 

They  passed  another  wrecked  dugout,  in  which  dead  bodies 
were'  seen.  Adjoining  the  above-mentioned  communication 
trench,  another  large  dugout  was  found,  which  the  patrol  in- 
tended to  clear.  As,  however,  a  number  of  Englishmen  ad- 
vanced upon  Dumas'  patrol  from  the  communication  trench 
and  alongside  it,  a  melee  ensued  with  grenades,  rifles,  and 
pistols,  In  the  course  of  which  the  enemy,  after  suffering  evi- 
dent loss,  either  retreated  or  surrendered,  while  none  of  Du- 
mas' patrol  received  wounds  of  any  account. 

Meanwhile,  Lieut.  Bohlefeld  advanced  along  the  enemy's 
trench  to  the  right  of  the  point  of  entry,  and  in  a  few  yards 
came  to  three  large  dugouts,  of  which  one  was  wrecked  and 
full  of  dead  and  wounded.  At  his  summons,  the  enemy  came 
out  of  the  others  and  surrendered  without  more  ado.  Lieut. 
Bohlefeld  sent  back  the  prisoners  and  asked  for  reinforcements 
in  order  to  clear  the  dugouts,  undertaking,  meanwhile,  to  hold 
the  enemy's  trench  with  two  men. 

At  8.30  p.  m.,  as  no  noise  came  from  the  point  of  entry  or 
from  the  right  of  the  same,  while  from  a  point  some  65  yards 
to  the  left  shots  and  reports  of  grenades  could  be  heard,  I  or- 
dered Vice-Sergt.  Maj.  Elb  to  advance  with  five  men  and  re- 
inforce Dumas'  patrol.  Lieut.  Erb,  the  regimental  adjutant, 
attached  himself  to  this  party.  He  was  wearing  an  oxygen- 
breathing  apparatus  and  had  been  waiting  in  the  Hohlweg. 
Shortly  after  the  sounds  of  fighting  ceased  on  the  left,  and  the 
first  batch  of  prisoners  was  brought  back  from  the  enemy's 
trench.  I  had  come  to  the  conclusion  that  we  had  the  upper 
hand  everywhere,  especially  on  the  right,  and  with  a  view  to 
exploiting  fully  our  success,  I  ordered  Lieut.  Freund  to  cross 
the  enemy's  trench  at  the  point  of  entry  with  15  men  of  the 
supports,  and  to  attack  the  Spion  from  the  rear.  At  the  same 
time,  I  sent  forward  Vice-Sergt.  Maj.  Wolfle  with  four  men  to 
reinforce  Lieut.  Bohlefeld. 

In  order  to  have  a  reserve  in  hand  for  meeting  all  eventual- 
ities, I  ordered  up  the  commanders  of  the  two  groups  on  the 
flank  of  the  12th  Company,  which  was  stationed  immediately  to 
the  right  of  sap  No.  3.  The  groups  had  been  warned  in  the  after- 
noon and  given  the  necessary  instructions.  Whilst  Vice-Sergt. 
Majs.  Elb  and  Wolfle,  with  their  men,  went  in  search  of  Dumas' 
and  Bohlefeld's  patrols,  Lieut.  Freund  dashed  across  the  enemy's 
trench  at  the  point  of  entry  and  followed  it  along  to  the  right 
as  far  as  the  communication  trench  which  leads  into  the  front- 


40  GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES. 

line  trench  near  the  Spion.  Freund's  patrol  leaped  into  the 
enemy's  front-line  trench  on  both  sides  of  the  communication 
trench,  captured  10  men  almost  without  a  struggle,  and  secured 
several  rifles  and  articles  of  equipment.  A  few  Englishmen 
who  offered  resistance  were  bayoneted ;  Volunteer  Herrmann, 
of  the  7th  Company,  and  Lance  Corpl.  Haufler,  of  the  4th  Com- 
pany, particularly  distinguished  themselves.  A  few  English- 
men attempted  to  get  away,  but  were  shot  dead. 

Volunteer  Herrmann  further  discovered  an  extemporized 
trench  mortar.  The  latter  could  not  be  carried  off,  however,  as 
it  was  securely  built  in.  Vice-Sergt.  Maj.  Wolfle,  who  arrived 
on  the  scene  shortly  after,  destroyed  the  trench  mortar  as  well 
as  he  could  with  hand  grenades  and  pistol  shots. 

Bb'hlefeld's  reinforced  patrol  had  accompanied  the  advance  of 
Freund's  patrol  along  the  trench,  and  came  across  three  or  four 
more  wrecked  dugouts,  which  were  filled  with  dead.  Indivi- 
duals standing  about  in  the  trench  were  killed  by  the  patrol  or 
made  prisoners.  During  this  affair  Under  Officer  Nossler,  of  the 
llth  Company,  repeatedly  distinguished  himself. 

Whilst  our  party  was  breaking  into  the  enemy's  trenches  or 
perhaps  even  before,  a  party  of  the  enemy,  approximately  25  to 
30  strong,  succeeded  in  getting  away  from  the  front-line  trench 
and  making  their  way  back  to  the  AVeisse  Steinmauer,  but  were 
again  driven  back  by  our  artillery  fire,  and  now  came  running 
toward  Stradtmann's  patrol.  The  latter,  apprehending  a  coun- 
ter attack,  opened  fire.  Ersatz  Reservist  Walzer,  of  the  llth 
Company,  followed  by  Under  Officer  Staiger,  of  the  10th  Com- 
pany and  others,  raised  a  cheer  and  charged  the  Englishmen, 
bayoneting  two  of  them.  Those  who  did  not  put  up  their  hands 
and  surrender  were  killed. 

Lieut.  Erb  had  soon  caught  up  to  Dumas'  patrol  and  took  part 
in  the  subsequent  fighting,  which  was  practically  continuous  for 
almost  every  one  of  the  enemy  offered  resistance.  With  hand 
grenade  and  pistol,  Dumas'  patrol  killed  more  than  20  of  the 
enemy  besides  wounding  a  large  number.  In  this  fighting 
Volunteer  Hees,  of  the  6th  Company,  particularly  distinguished 
himself.  Always  to  the  fore,  he  alone  accounted  for  several 
Englishmen.  On  our  side  only  one  man  was  slightly  wounded. 

In  consequence  of  the  events  described  above,  Dumas'  patrol 
remained  in  the  enemy's  trench  considerably  longer  than  in- 
tended. When  all  the  other  patrols  had  returned  to  the  Hohl- 
weg,  the  Dumas-Erb  patrol  was  still  missing. 


GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES.  41 

Hereupon,  Lieuts.  Boeniug  and  Stradtmann,  with  several  non- 
commissioned officers  and  men,  went  back  to  the  enemy's  lines 
and  searched  the  trench  to  the  left  until  they  met  the  Dumas- 
Erb  patrol  on  its  way  back.  Here  again  Under  Officer  Mossier, 
of  the  llth  Company,  110th  Reserve  Infantry  Regiment,  dis- 
tinguished himself. 

At  8.50  p.  m.  the  last  men  of  the  entire  party  had  returned  to 
the  Hohlweg  and  went  back  to  their  dugouts. 

At  8.51  p.  m.  the  first  shell  fell  on  the  front-line  trenches  east 
of  sap  No.  3. 

At  8.57  p.  m.  the  artillery  commander  was  informed  that  the 
artillery  fire  could  be  gradually  broken  off. 

At  9  p.  m.  a  heavy  battery  near  Albert  dropped  a  few  shells 
near  sap  No.  3. 

At  9.05  p.  m.  the  conclusion  of  the  operation  was  reported. 

The  following  were  captured :  Twenty-four  unwouuded  and 
five  wounded  prisoners,  1  Lewis  gun,  1  rifle  with  telescopic  sights, 
20  ordinary  rifles,  and  a  large  number  of  steel  helmets,  belts 
with  ammunition  pouches,  packs,  haversacks,  and  gas  helmets. 

Our  casualties  consisted  of  one  man  slightly  wounded  in  the 
forehead  by  a  splinter  from  a  hand  grenade.  He  was  bandaged 
in  the  advanced  dressing  station  and  immediately  returned  to 
the  patrol. 

Forty  copies,  as  appendices  to  the  report  of  the  110th  Reserve 
Infantry  Regiment  on  the  raid  of  April  11,  1916. 

( Signed )  WAGENEK, 

Captain  and  Company  Commander. 


GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES. 


•".7  s  S  M  >,  ex  *4 

Sg^-Sfe  .SS    • 

ijrfhfcgj  filfs 

553SSU.S  138£ 


a. 


JS-3        -3 


X  X 


*  o>    •      o 

3  s3    a 

jS  •       w 

3*1    ? 

H  M          « 


H 

S 

fe 

H 

^ 

05 

| 

S 

h 

cc 

O 

5 

•r. 

S 

1 

- 

S 

'S 

H 

H 

• 

S   5 


ft  fi  Q 


ft  fl 


n         «w 


GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES. 


43 


.3       5 

•«       "2 
0       g 

1       1 
1      1 

minute.  The  212th 
ounds. 

HEX 

0                  O                  O 

p.          p,          p. 

p        t>        p 

5       « 

i  P 

first  to  the  thirtietl 
r  on  23  with  a  few  r 

ft        ft        K 

$  fc>i 

03        4^"*"* 

S£ 

§        §        I 
iii 

j  1|!  . 

o_ 

«       «       ffl 

fl      °  ra5      "* 

.11 

it             JE             S 

*  ill  I 

ll 

ft             ft             W 

w    |>    fcl|    .g 

^ 

o         3         2 

5    8    u  o,9    •§ 

*      ,3       cS«?       * 

«  ^  a|s  o 

S 
II 

3    'i^ft 

.     7;  o-O      9 

H 

'•      SB'S     "" 

1     ill 

.M         HjJ)** 

o 

I     III 

P  |  £ 

55 

gig 

£*    w-S  9 

^r~*  ^~*  ^r~* 

8 

jj| 

r- 

0                  0 

•§*      1 

53 

m. 

EXPERIENCES  OF 

THE  FOURTH  GERMAN  CORPS 

IN  THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  SOMME 

DURING  JULY,  1916 

45 


CONTENTS. 


I.  English  tactics:  Page. 

1.  Infantry 49 

2.  Artillery 49 

3.  Cavalry 50 

II.  Organization: 

4.  Allotment  of  special  formations  for  the 

battle 50 

5.  Increasing  the  staffs 51 

6.  Corps  headquarters 51 

7.  Drafts  in  reserve  for  the  infantry  com- 

panies    51 

8.  Infantry  pioneer  companies 51 

9.  Increase  in  machine  guns 52 

III.  Training: 

10.  Training 52 

IV.  Lessons  from  the  fighting: 

A.  Construction  of  positions  and  the  defense— 

11.  Infantry  positions 53 

12.  Artillery  positions 54 

13.  Battle  headquarters 54 

14.  Relief  of  Infantry  and  pioneers 54 

15.  Engagement  and  relief  of  the  Artillery.  55 

16.  Distribution  of  the  Infantry 56 

17.  Organization  of  the  Artillery 57 

18.  Reserves  of  personnel  and  materiel  for 

the  Artillery 57 

19.  Artillery  barrage  fire 57 

20.  Barrage  fire  of  Infantry  and  snipers. . .  58 

21.  Action  to  be  taken  during  continuous 

heavy  shelling 58 

22.  Employment  of  "Green  Cross"   (gas) 

shell 59 

23.  Bomb  throwers  and  trench  mortars 59 

24.  Strong  points 60 

25.  Retired  Infantry  positions  and  switch 

lines 60 

26.  Retired  Artillery  positions 61 

46 


CONTENTS.  47 

IV.  Lessons  from  the  fighting — Continued.  Page. 

B.  Attack— 

27.  Method  of  attack  and  time  required...  61 

28.  Approach  march  and  deployment 62 

29.  Methodical  attack 62 

30.  Assaulting  parties 63 

31.  Attacks  in  woods 63 

32.  Procedure  after  a  successful  attack 63 

C.  Cooperation  of  Infantry  and  Artillery — 

33.  Communications  between  commanders.  63 

34.  Communications  in  the  front  line 64 

V.  Means  of  communication: 

35.  Telephone  communications 65 

36.  Wireless  communications 66 

37.  Runners 66 

38.  Motorcycles  and  bicycles 66 

39.  Light-signaling  lines 66 

40.  Light-pistol  signals 67 

41.  Balloon  and  aeroplane  observation 67 

42.  Antiaircraft  measures 68 

43.  Special  reporting  detachments 69 

VI.  Arms: 

44.  Small  arms 69 

45.  Machine  guns 70 

46.  Hand  grenades 70 

47.  Guns 71 

VII.  Ammunition: 

48.  Various  kinds  of  ammunition 71 

49.  Expenditure  of  ammunition 72 

50.  Ammunition  supply .' 73 

VIII.  Engineer  stores: 

51.  Pioneer  park  detachment 74 

52.  Pioneer  parks  and  the  supply  of  engi- 

neer stores 75 

IX.  Clothing  and  equipment: 

53.  Steelhelmets 76 

54.  Jackets  and  footgear 76 

55.  Packs 76 

56.  Water  bottles...  76 


48  CONTENTS. 

IX.  Clothing  and  equipment — Continued.  Page. 

57.  Entrenching  tools 76 

58.  Hand  stereotelescopes 76 

59.  Maps 77 

60.  Illuminating  material 77 

X.  Horses  and  vehicles: 

61.  Horses  and  vehicles 77 

XI.  Food  supply: 

62.  Rations 78 

63.  Canteen  stores 78 

64.  Ration  supply 78 

65.  Carrying  up  rations 79 

XII.  Medical  services: 

66.  Reliefs 79 

67.  Motor  ambulances 79 

68.  Stretcher  bearers 80 

69.  Communication  between  medical  units.  80 

XIII.  Billeting  and  traffic  behind  the  front: 

70.  Billeting 80 

71.  Military  police 80 

72.  Road  traffic 81 

XIV.  Railways: 

73.  Railway  buildings 81 

74.  Detraining  personnel 82 


III. 

EXPERIENCES  OF  THE  FOURTH  GERMAN 
CORPS  IN  THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  SOMME 
DURING  JULY,  1916. 


I.  ENGLISH  TACTICS. 

1.  JNFANTBY. 

The  English  infantry  has  undoubtedly  learned  much  since  the 
autumn  offensive.  It  shows  great  dash  in  the  attack,  a  factor 
to  which  immense  confidence  in  its  overwhelming  artillery  prob- 
ably greatly  contributes.  The  Englishman  also  has  his  physique 
and  training  in  his  favor.  Commanders,  however,  in  difficult 
situations  showed  that  they  were  not  yet  equal  to  their  tasks. 
The  men  lost  their  heads  and  surrendered  if  they  thought  they 
were  cut  off.  It  was  most  striking  how  th'e  enemy  assembled 
and  brought  up  large  bodies  of  troops  in  close  order  into  our 
zone  of  fire.  The  losses  caused  by  our  artillery  fire  were  conse- 
quently large.  One  must,  however,  acknowledge  the  skill  with 
which  the  English  rapidly  consolidated  captured  positions. 

The  English  infantry  showed  great  tenacity  in  defense.  This 
was  especially  noticeable  in  the  case  of  small  parties,  which, 
when  once  established  with  machine  guns  in  the  corner  of  a 
wood  or  a  group  of  houses,  were  very  difficult  to  drive  out. 

Generally  speaking,  however,  our  infantry  returned  from  the 
fight  filled  with  the  conviction  that  it  was  superior  to  the  English 
infantry. 

2.  ARTILLERY. 

Particularly  noticeable  was  the  high  percentage  of  medium 
and  heavy  guns  with  the  artillery,  which,  apart  from  this,  was 
numerically  far  superior  to  ours.  The  ammunition  has  appar- 
ently improved  considerably, 


29267°— 18- 


49 


60          GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES. 

All  our  tactically  important  positions  were  methodically  bom- 
barded by  the  English  artillery,  as  well  as  all  known  infantry 
and  battery  positions.  Extremely  heavy  fire  was  continuously 
directed  on  the  villages  situated  immediately  behind  the  firing 
line,  as  well  as  on  all  natural  cover  afforded  by  the  ground. 
Registration  and  fire  control  were  assisted  by  well -organized 
aerial  observations.  At  night  the  villages  also  were  frequently 
bombed  by  aeroplanes. 

3.    CAVALEY. 

The  frontal  attacks  over  open  ground  against  a  portion  of  our 
unshaken  infantry,  carried  out  by  several  English  cavalry  regi- 
ments, which  had  to  retire  with  heavy  losses,  give  some  indica- 
tion of  the  tactical  knowledge  of  the  higher  command. 

II.  ORGANIZATION. 

4.    ALLOTMENT   OF    SPECIAL   FORMATIONS    FOR   THE   BATTLE. 

The  reports  on  the  experience  gained  in  fhe  Battle  of  the 
Somme  submitted  to  corps  headquarters  unanimously  agree  as 
to  the  necessity  for  an  increased  allotment  of  weapons,  means 
of  communication  and  transport  of  all  kinds,  such  as  Flammen- 
werfer,  antiaircraft  sections,  antiaircraft  machine  guns,  captive 
balloons,  reconnaissance  and  battle  planes,  double  telephone  sec- 
tions, motor  lorries,  horse-drawn  vehicles,  motorcycles,  bicycles, 
light-signaling  detachments,  wireless  stations,  etc.  The  heavy 
fighting  has  undoubtedly  proved  the  great  value  and  the  necessity 
for  the  allotment  of  all  these  means  of  warfare.  On  the  other 
hand,  it  is  not  considered  possible  to  allot  all  these  permanently 
to  and  as  part  of  the  war  establishment  of  divisions  and  corps 
on  as  large  a  scale  as  is  required. 

It  is  therefore  necessary  to  hold  ready  in  reserve  for  large 
operations  sufficient  numbers  of  additional  units  of  the  above- 
mentioned  description,  under  army  or  general  headquarters,  just 
as  is  done  in  the  case  of  heavy  artillery,  battle-plane  squadrons, 
and  pioneer  formations,  and  to  place  them  at  the  disposal  of 
new  corps  ^brought  up  for  the  battle. 

In  this  memorandum  a  permanent  increase  in  personnel  and 
materiel  has  only  been  asked  for  on  the  scale  considered  neces- 
sary for  the  normal  conditions  of  trench  warfare. 


GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES.  51 

5.  INCREASING  THE  STAFFS. 

The  composition  of  the  staffs  of  the  higher  commands,  which 
have  been  reduced  during  the  war,  proved  inadequate  in  actual 
fighting.  It  is  necessary  to  detail  to  staffs,  as  soon  as  the  nature 
of  the  tasks  is  known,  a  sufficient  number  of  orderly  officers  and 
intelligence  and  liaison  officers.  The  orderly  officers  are  at  the 
disposal  of  the  commander  concerned,  chiefly  for  the  collection 
of  intelligence  in  the  front  line. 

6.  COKPS  HEADQUARTERS. 

The  staffs  of  the  Fourteenth  Reserve  Corps  and  the  Fourth 
Corps  were  quartered  for  several  days  in  the  same  building. 

They  had  to  share  the  available  telephone  communications 
during  that  time.  This  caused  difficulties,  which  were  particu- 
larly felt  during  critical  periods  in  the  fighting,  when  all  branches 
of  both  staffs  were  working  at  extremely  high  pressure  at  the 
same  time. 

7.  DRAFTS  IN  RESERVE  FOR  THE  INFANTRY  COMPANIES. 

In  the  fifth  division  a  fourth  platoon  was  formed  in  the  in- 
fantry companies.  At  first  these  reinforcements  for  replacing 
casualties  were  kept  back  with  the  first-line  transport  (field 
kitchens).  They  were  sent  forward  only  when  the  losses  of 
the  three  other  platoons  made  reinforcements  necessary.  When 
they  went  forward  the  fourth  platoon  took  with  it  all  that  had 
been  found  necessary  in  the  particular  fighting  (hand  grenades, 
entrenching  tools,  rations,  etc.).  This  arrangement  proved  very 
successful. 

8.  INFANTRY  PIONEER  COMPANIES. 

The  infantry  pioneer  companies  of  each  iafantry  regiment  of 
the  corps  proved  of  great  value.  Full  use,  however,  was  not 
made  of  their  special  training,  as  the  fighting  provided  them 
with  more  urgent  work.  These  companies,  which  consisted  of 
men  of  experience  and  accustomed  to  work  together,  proved 
most  valuable  in  the  many  difficult  and  unexpected  problems 
which  continually  faced  the  regiments — for  instance,  in  the 
provision  of  the  front-line  trenches  with  the  materiel  neces- 
sary for  carrying  on  the  fight. 


52          GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES. 

9.  INCREASE  IN   MACHINE  GUNS. 

A  wish  is  generally  expressed  for  an  increase  in  the  number  of 
machine  guns.  Their  value  in  defense  has  again  been  shown, 
particularly  in  those  cases  where  gaps  in  our  position  caused 
by  a  long  continued,  concentrated,  heavy  artillery  fire  could 
not  be  filled. 

Machine-gun  reserves,  with  the  necessary  men,  ought  un- 
doubtedly to  be  provided  for  every  regiment,  brigade,  and  divi- 
sion. On  the  whole,  it  is  considered  to  be  very  desirable  to 
have  at  least  30  machine  guns  for  every  infantry  regiment. 

III.  TRAINING. 

10.    TRAINING. 

The  instructions  based  on  our  previous  experience  in  defense 
and  attack  all  took  for  granted  a  carefully  constructed  trench 
system.  The  troops  on  the  Somme  found  practically  no  trenches 
at  all. 

The  front  line,  and  the  ground  for  a  considerable  distance 
behind  the  fighting  front,  was  kept  under  fire  by  the  enemy's 
artillery;  this  fire  was  almost  continuous  and  of  a  volume 
never  before  experienced.  Several  lessons  for  the  training  of 
the  troops  were  learned  as  the  result  of  this  bombardment ;  the 
most  important  ones,  on  which  all  the  troops  are  agreed,  are 
the  following : 

Every  individual  must  be  trained  to  the  highest  possible  de- 
gree of  self-reliance,  so  that  he  may  know  how  to  act  during  the 
critical  periods  of  his  own  or  the  enemy's  attacks,  when  he  must 
generally  be  left  to  his  own  resources  and  is  beyond  the  control 
of  his  superiors. 

Crossing  ground  which  is  being  heavily  shelled. 

Training  of  the  infantry  in  establishing  relays  of  runners. 

Increase  in  the  personnel  trained  in  the  use  of  our  own  and 
captured  machine  guns  (oQcers  and  men). 

Training  in  the  use  of  all  kinds  of  German  hand  grenades. 

Training  as  many  men  as  possible  in  the  use  of  the  enemy's 
hand  grenades. 

Attacks  by  sectors  according  to  time-table,  following  close  up 
to  our  barrage.  Formations  organized  in  as  great  depth  as 
possible  to  be  able  to  cope  with  surprises.  The  absolute  neces- 


GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES.  53 

sity  of  this  has  again  been  proved  in  attacking  in  wooded  coun- 
try with  a  restricted  range  of  vision. 

Rapid  execution  of  counter  attacks  over  open  ground  under 
different  conditions.  Bombers  in  front,  skirmishers  about  10 
meters  behind  them,  a  number  of  small  bodies  in  support  slightly 
farther  in  rear.  In  wooded  country  these  move  in  file,  other- 
wise in  extended  order. 

Training  in  the  rapid  preparation  of  shell  holes  for  defense 
and  in  digging  trenches  by  small  parties  in  captured  ground. 
Marching  in  file  to  form  up  on  the  tracing  tape. 

The  employment  of  improvised  materials  in  constructing  de- 
fenses if  prepared  materials  are  not  available. 

IV.  LESSONS  FROM  THE  FIGHTING. 

A.  CONSTRUCTION  OF  POSITIONS  AND  THE  DEFENSE. 

11.  INFANTBY  POSITIONS. 

Narrow  trenches  with  steep  sides  again  proved  very  disad- 
vantageous and  caused  considerably  more  casualties  (men  being 
buried)  than  shallower  trenches  with  a  wide  sole.  This  result 
is  due  to  the  fact  that  the  splinter  effect  of  the  majority  of 
English  shells  is  not  as  good  as  their  destructive  effect.  One 
regiment  is  of  opinion  that  the  garrison  is  better  protected  if 
the  men  lie  down  or  crouch  at  the  bottom  of  the  trench  without 
any  further  cover  than  it  is  if  the  so-called  "  rabbit  holes  "  are 
used. 

A  cover  trench  roughly  parallel  to  the  front  fire  trench  is  not 
sound.  Such  trenches  are  destroyed  by  the  enemy's  fire  at  the 
same  time  and  in  exactly  the  same  way  as  the  actual  fire 
trenches.  To  obviate  this,  trenches  sited  more  in  accordance 
with  the  ground,  and  consequently  with  a  certain  irregularity 
of  trace,  are  recommended  instead  of  the  formal  type  of  cover 
trench  hitherto  in  vogue. 

The  Lochmann  wire  entanglement  ("carpet"  entanglement) 
has  not  proved  satisfactory,  as  its  transport  Is  too  difficult.  A 
better  method  is  that  of  screw  posts  and  barbed  wire,  which  is 
cut  up  into  20  to  30  meter  lengths  under  cover,  and  then  fastened 
to  the  posts. 

Curved  sheet-iron  frames  are  considered  a  suitable  substitute 
for  timber  frames,  as  their  elasticity  frequently  enables  them  to 
keep  out  heavy  shells. 


64          GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES. 

12.   ARTILLERY   POSITIONS. 

The  English  custom  of  shelling  villages  heavily  led  to  the 
adoption  of  the  principle  that  batteries  should  never  be  sited  in 
the  villages  themselves,  but  at  least  100  meters  away.  In  this 
manner  the  casualties  of  the  artillery  were  considerably  dimin- 
ished. 

The  employment  of  steep  slopes  for  battery  positions  must 
also  be  discarded  for  similar  reasons.  When  not  possible  to 
site  batteries  alongside  existing  fire  trenches,  etc.,  which  are  not 
in  use,  it  has  been  found  best,  having  regard  to  English  methods 
of  fighting,  to  select  sites  for  batteries  in  open  country  which  is 
merely  concealed  from  direct  observation.  The  main  essential  is, 
of  course,  that  such  positions  in  the  open  should  be  immediately 
concealed  from  aeroplane  observation.  Wire  netting,  tent 
squares,  etc.,  covered  with  material  found  on  the  surface  of  the 
ground  around  the  position  have  proved  useful.  As  material  for 
the  construction  of  dugouts  arrived  a  greater  degree  of  security 
was  attained. 

13.  BATTLE  HEADQUARTERS. 

Battle  headquarters,  also,  when  the  artillery  fire  is  so  heavy, 
should  not  be  sited  in  villages,  on  steep  slopes,  or  at  other  points 
which  stand  out  conspicuously  on  the  ground  or  on  the  map. 
In  cases  where  the  existing  telephone  system  necessitated  the 
utilization  of  such  unsuitable  points  as  battle  headquarters,  it 
resulted  in  frequent  interruptions  in  personal  and  telephone 
traffic  by  artillery  fire  and  overcrowding  in  the  few  available 
cellars  in  the  villages. 

Staffs  when  going  into  their  battle  headquarters  must  see 
that  there  are  as  many  clear  signboards  as  possible  to  indicate 
the  way  to  them.  Owing  to  lengthy  searches  for  battle  head- 
quarters, many  casualties  have  occurred  which  might  have  been 
avoided. 

14.  RELIEF  OF  INFANTRY  AND  PIONEERS. 

When  troops  are  relieved  in  the  trenches  it  is  of  the  utmost 
importance  that  the  outgoing  troops  are  careful  in  handing  over 
the  position.  Whenever  the  tactical  conditions  permit,  this 
should  take  place  on  the  spot,  the  various  commanders  and  sub- 
ordinate commanders  meeting  together  for  the  purpose.  At  any 
rate,  it  is  absolutely  essential  that  the  incoming  troops  should 
be  thoroughly  informed  as  to  the  tactical  situation,  by  means  of 


GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES.  55 

personal  conferences  between  the  outgoing  and  incoming  com- 
manders, with  the  assistance  of  maps  and  sketches,  which  will 
be  taken  over  by  the  latter.  A  perfectly  clear  picture  must  be 
given  of  the  state  of  the  positions,  etc.,  particularly  of  their 
weak  points,  and  also  of  any  work  which  it  had  been  intended  to 
carry  out,  the  degree  of  importance  attached  to  it  being  specified. 

In  order  that  a  relief  may  be  properly  carried  out,  it  is  also 
necessary  that  the  commanders  of  the  incoming  troops  should 
acquaint  themselves,  by  daylight,  with  the  lie  of  the  ground ;  it 
may  be  necessary  to  send  them  on  ahead  in  motor  cars.  The 
troops,  too,  must,  if  possible,  be  able  to  gain  a  general  idea  of 
the  position  while  it  is  still  daylight.  Reliefs  must,  therefore, 
unless  there  are  cogent  reasons  against  it,  be  begun  at  dusk  and 
completed  during  the  early  hours  of  the  night. 

If  it  is  impossible  to  give  the  incoming  troops  an  idea  of  the 
ground  beforehand,  then  detachments  of  the  outgoing  troops 
must  be  left  behind  in  the  trenches.  It  is  very  important  that 
the  junction  points  with  other  troops  should  be  absolutely  clearly 
indicated,  as  these  are  so  easily  forgotten  when  reliefs  are  car- 
ried out  under  heavy  fire. 

Losses  on  the  march  up  to  the  trenches  can  be  minimized  if 
the  stretches  of  ground  which  are  under  fire  are  crossed  in  as 
small  parties  as  possible.  One  infantry  brigade  recommends 
that  the  relief  be  carried  out  by  platoons,  at  short  intervals  of 
time,  and  considers  that  the  troops  should  move  up  in  file.  No 
hard  and  fast  rules  can  be  laid  down.  The  choice  of  the  forma- 
tion in  which  the  troops  are  to  move  will  always  depend  on  the 
nature  of  the  ground. 

When  troops  which  are  advancing  are  to  be  relieved,  as  much 
engineer  and  constructional  material  as  possible  must  be  taken 
with  the  relieving  troops.  In  all  cases  the  men  must  carry  as 
many  large  entrenching  tools  as  they  can. 

ir>.    ENGAGEMENT   AND   RELIEF   OF   ARTILLERY. 

The  same  principles  hold  good  for  the  relief  of  batteries  as 
for  infantry.  If  the  tactical  situation  is  such  that  reinforcing 
batteries  have  to  be  brought  up  at  night,  without  having  had  time 
to  reconnoiter  by  day,  then  the  want  of  knowledge  of  the  ground 
must  at  least  be  counterbalanced  by  getting  into  touch  as  soon 
as  possible  with  the  artillery  already  in  position,  and  by  making 
the  fullest  possible  use  of  the  knowledge  of  the  ground  which 


66          GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES. 

that  artillery  possesses.  If  the  reenforcements  come  under  the 
orders  of  artillery  commanders  who  are  already  in  command  in 
the  sector,  the  staffs  and  officers  already  engaged  must,  as  soon 
as  it  is  known  that  reinforcing  batteries  are  to  be  brought  up, 
be  detailed  to  reconnoiter  battery  positions  for  the  commanders 
who  have  not  yet  arrived.  The  officers  who  carry  out  these 
reconnaissances  must  then  be  allotted  as  guides  to  the  new 
batteries  when  these  move  up  into  position. 

16.  DISTRIBUTION    OF  THE  INFANTRY. 

One  of  the  most  important  lessons  drawn  from  the  battle  of 
the  Somme  is  that,  under  heavy,  methodical  artillery  fire,  the 
front  line  should  be  only  thinly  held,  but  by  reliable  men  and  a 
few  machine  guns,  even  when  there  is  always  a  possibility  of  a 
hostile  attack.  When  this  was  not  done  the  casualties  were  so 
great  before  the  enemy's  attack  was  launched  that  the  possibility 
of  the  front  line  repulsing  the  attack  by  its  own  unaided  efforts 
was  very  doubtful.  The  danger  of  the  front  line  being  rushed 
when  so  lightly  held  must  be  overcome  by  placing  supports  (in- 
fantry and  machine  guns),  distributed  in  groups  according  to  the 
ground,  as  close  as  possible  behind  the  foremost  fighting  line. 
Their  task  is  to  rush  forward  to  reinforce  the  front  line  at  the 
moment  the  enemy  attacks,  without  waiting  for  orders  from  the 
rear.  In  all  cases  where  this  procedure  was  adopted  we  suc- 
ceeded in  repulsing  and  inflicting  very  heavy  losses  on  the 
enemy,  who  imagined  that  he  had  merely  to  drop  into  a  trench 
filled  with  dead. 

The  essential  conditions  for  success  are,  therefore,  that  the 
various  formations  should  be  organized  in  depth,  but  that  their 
units  should  be  employed  side  by  side.  Only  in  this  way  is  it 
possible  to  insure  that  a  counter  attack  in  sufficient  strength  and 
with  unmixed  units  can  be  made,  if  the  enemy  has  succeeded  in 
penetrating  the  line,  an  occurrence  which  can  not  always  be 
avoided  when  the  artillery  fire  is  so  heavy. 

Even  the  company  commander  must,  in  any  circumstances, 
neglect  to  provide  himself  with  a  reserve  consisting  of  a  few 
groups,  and,  if  possible,  of  machine  guns  as  well.  The  subsector 
commanders  must  also  have  at  all  times  sufficient  troops  at  their 
disposal  to  be  able  at  once  to  drive  the  enemy  out,  by  means  of 
a  counter  attack,  should  he  succeed  in  penetrating  into  the  posi- 
tion. It  is  self-evident  that  regimental  and  higher  commanders 


GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES.  57 

must  have  complete  units  at  their  disposal  as  a  reserve.  The 
more  troops  that  are  held  in  reserve  the  better.  A  considerably 
greater  allotment  of  machine  guns  by  army  headquarters  when 
troops  are  moved  to  the  battle  front  is  absolutely  necessary,  as 
this  will  enable  infantry  to  be  held  in  reserve  on  a  sufficiently 
large  scale.  The  great  advantage  offered,  by  the  increased  possi- 
bility of  exchanging  the  garrison  of  the  front  line  with  the  re- 
serves is  perfectly  obvious. 

17.  ORGANIZATION  OF  THE  ARTILLERY. 

The  formation  of  corps  artillery  was  ordered  by  army  head- 
quarters with  the  object  of  avoiding,  at  any  rate  as  far  as  the 
more  permanent  heavy  artillery  was  concerned,  the  frequent 
changes  in  command,  due  to  the  frequent  changes  of  the  field 
artillery  brigades.  From  the  experience  now  gained,  it  seems 
advisable  to  place  a  few  heavy  batteries  under  the  commanders 
of  the  divisional  artillery,  in  order  to  enable  them  to  carry  out 
all  the  tasks  allotted  to  them  as  rapidly  as  possible. 

1  8.  RESERVES  OF  PERSONNEL  AND  MATERIEL  FOR  THE  ARTILLERY. 

The  supply  of  fresh  guns  was  usually  carried  out  rapidly. 
Nevertheless,  it  is  very  desirable  that  each  field  artillery  brigade 
should  retain  a  few  guns,  with  their  detachments,  to  act  as  a  re- 
serve. Possibly  it  might  be  sound  only  to  engage  two  of  the 
three  batteries  of  an  Abteilung  at  first,  and  to  retain  one  in 
reserve  to  replace  casualties.  Heavy  batteries  of  four  guns 
should  only  have  three  of  their  guns  in  position  during  such 
critical  fighting,  in  order  to  have  a  reserve  available  for  imme- 
diate use. 

19.   ARTILLERY   BARRAGE   FIRE. 

It  was  found  very  difficult  to  form  a  continuous  barrage,  with- 
out gaps,  in  front  of  our  own  lines,  owing  to  the  occasional 
uncertainty  as  to  the  position  of  our  front  line,  which  was  con- 
tinually changing  during  the  fighting,  the  frequent  changing  of 
batteries,  the  regrouping  of  the  artillery,  which  was  often  neces- 
sary, the  bad  conditions  for  observation,  the  permanent  inter- 
ruption of  the  telephone  communications,  and  the  practically 
continuous  heavy  fire  which  was  maintained  behind  our  front 
line. 


68          GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES. 

Whenever  we  were  successful  in  establishing  such  a  barrage 
in  a  comparatively  short  time,  it  was  entirely  due  to  the  forward 
artillery  observation  officers.  The  only  means  of  communication 
which  these  officers  possessed,  as  a  rule,  were  light  pistols  and 
runners.  By  full  use  of  these  means  it  was  possible  to  carry 
out  an  approximate  registration.  The  method  employed  was  for 
the  battery,  at  the  exact  time  previously  agreed  upon,  to  open 
fire  with  a  definite  number  of  rounds  on  a  point  which  was  easy 
to  observe.  The  fall  of  the  shell  relative  to  this  point  served 
as  the  basis  of  the  registration  for  the  barrage  in  front  of  a 
specified  sector.  It  was  necessary  to  supplement  these  observa- 
tions by  means  of  personal  verbal  reports.  It  was  found  specially 
useful  for  the  artillery  observation  officers  who  relieved  each 
other  to  go  forward  twice  a  day.  This,  unfortunately,  led  to 
heavy  casualties  among  artillery  officers,  but  saved  the  infantry 
many  losses.  (Regarding  the  action  of  the  artillery  observation 
officers  during  an  attack,  see  Par.  IV,  ch.  34.) 

In  cases  where  it  was  not  possible  to  register  for  the  barrage 
in  the  ordinary  manner,  the  employment  of  various  natures  of 
shell  (time  shrapnel,  time  H.  E.  shell  and  percussion  H.  E. 
shell),  fired  at  various  ranges,  proved  to  be  a  useful  expedient 
for  a  barrage.  The  different  effects  of  the  various  natures  of 
shell  at  any  rate  caused  the  fire  to  be  distributed  in  depth  and 
breadth  over  a  considerable  area.  The  disadvantage  of  this 
method  is  the  large  expenditure  of  ammunition  incurred,  with- 
out which  the  desired  effect  can  not  be  obtained. 

20.  BARRAGE  FIRE  OF  INFANTRY  AND   SNIPERS. 

Over  ground  which  can  not  be  observed  and  at  night  the  un- 
aimed  but  horizontal  barrage  fire  of  infantry  and  machine  guns, 
during  and  immediately  after  critical  periods,  affords  rest  and 
protection  to  troops,  who  are  probably  shaken  for  the  moment, 
and  not  only  scares  the  enemy  but  inflicts  losses  on  him. 

The  excellent  results  obtained  from  selected  snipers  posted  at 
good  viewpoints,  in  trees,  etc.,  are  particularly  emphasized  by 
one  regiment. 

21.    ACTION    TO    BE    TAKEN    DURING    CONTINUOUS    HEAVY    SHELLING. 

It  has  been  found  to  be  a  good  plan,  during  the  continuous 
heavy  bombardment  of  incomplete  front-line  positions,  for  the 
garrison  to  advance  100-200  meters  and  to  lie  down  in  the  open 
without  any  cover. 


GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES.  69 

It  is  advisable  for  a  battery,  the  position  of  which  has  been 
discovered  by  the  enemy,  not  to  change  its  position  in  such 
circumstances  but  to  increase  its  cover  as  much  as  possible,  as 
every  new  battery  position  is  soon  discovered  when  the  enemy's 
aerial  activity  is  so  great.  Further,  frequent  changes  of  posi- 
tion, involving  new  digging-in  and  the  removal  of  the  ammuni- 
tion during  the  same  night  if  possible,  are  beyond  the  strength 
of  the  detachments  which  has  already  been  taxed  by  continuous 
firing. 

22.   EMPLOYMENT   OF   "  GBEEN   CROSS"1    (GAS)     SHELL. 

The  wish  expressed  in  many  quarters  that  the  question  of 
firing  with  "green  cross"  (gas)  shell  should  be  left  to  the 
artillery  commanders  of  divisions,  with  a  view  to  taking  better 
advantage  of  the  tactical  situation,  could  not  be  acceded  to,  as 
the  employment  of  this  ammunition  depends  too  much  on  the 
nature  of  the  ground  and  weather  conditions,  which  can  only  be 
fully  appreciated  by  experts,  and  these  were  all,  in  the  case  in 
question,  at  the  army  group  headquarters. 

It  is,  however,  sound,  if  sufficient  field  artillery  is  available, 
to  allot  permanently  several  batteries  for  the  purpose  of  firing 
with  "  green  cross "  ammunition  so  as  to  avoid  taking  away 
batteries  for  firing  with  it  from  the  divisional  artillery  com- 
manders, without  previous  notice,  at  a  time  when  their  services 
are  being  relied  on  for  the  execution  of  other  tasks.  During  the 
periods  when  it  is  not  possible  to  fire  with  "  green  cross  "  ammu- 
nition (for  instance,  almost  always  during  the  day  time),  the 
batteries  will  be  at  the  disposal  of  artillery  commanders  as  rein- 
forcements. 

According  to  apparently  reliable  information,  the  effect  of 
the  "  green  cross  "  ammunition  was  good. 

23.   BOMB   THROWERS   AND   TRENCH    MORTARS. 

The  "  Priester  "  bomb  thrower  again  proved  itself  to  be  a  very 
effective  weapon  in  the  fighting  on  the  Somme. 

Trench  mortars,  at  least  the  light  pattern,  should  be  brought 
up  into  position  at  the  earliest  possible  moment,  even  if  the 
trenches  are  bad  or  if  there  are  no  trenches  at  all.  They  must 
not  be  held  in  reserve  for  fear  of  possible  losses. 

1  The  exact  nature  of  this  ammunition  is  not  known,  but  the  expres- 
sion "green  cross"  probably  refers  to  some  form  of  gas  shell. —  (Trans- 
lator.) 


60          GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES. 

24.    STRONG    POINTS. 

The  preparation  for  subsequent  defense  of  villages  and  other 
strong  points  afforded  by  the  form  of  the  ground  behind  the 
front  line  can  not  be  begun  too  soon.  Villages  Should  be  divided 
into  sectors  for  purposes  of  defense,  and  should  be  provided 
with  -garrisons,  however  small  these  may  be,  and  machine  guns. 
Supports  and  reserves  must  not  be  quartered  in  the  villages  close 
to  the  line  owing  to  the  particularly  heavy  shelling  to  which 
these  are  exposed.  The  boundary  of  a  sector  should  never 
run  through  a  village. 

25.   KETIRED  INFANTRY  POSITIONS   AND   SWITCH   LINES. 

The  first  necessities  for  retired  positions  and  the  extremely 
important  diagonal  switch  lines  are  entanglements,  dugouts, 
and  communication  trenches.  The  number  of  these  positions 
should  be  increased  by  continual  work  and  by  making  the  fullest 
possible  use  of  all  available  forces.  It  is  always  possible  to 
dispense  with  digging  the  fire  trench,  which  can  be  comparatively 
quickly  constructed.  This  point  must  also  be  kept  in  mind  from 
the  start  when  constructing  retired  positions  in  quiet  sectors. 

In  view  of  the  experience  gained  the  following  scheme  appears 
to  provide  the  most  practical  organization  for  the  construction 
of  retired  positions  and  communication  trenches  while  fighting 
is  in  progress : 

In  the  front-line  area  (the  rearward  limits  of  which  vary 
according  to  the  circumstances)  the  work  will  be  done  by  the 
divisions.  A  responsible  commander  and  a  party  of  pioneers, 
who  do  not  change  when  the  division  is  relieved,  will  be  allotted 
to  each  of  these  positions,  etc.,  to  assist  the  divisions.  The 
working  parties  detailed  by  the  divisions  will  be  under  the  com- 
mand of  officers  from  those  divisions,  who  are  responsible  for 
the  quantity  of  work  that  is  done.  Particular  conditions  may 
make  it  necessary  to  attach  working  parties  to  the  divisions  to 
prepare  positions,  the  rapid  construction  of  which  is  of  great 
importance.  These  must  be  detailed  from  troops  not  intended 
to  take  part  in  the  fighting,  otherwise  they  must  be  provided 
from  the  divisional  reserves.  It  is  an  established  principle  that 
any  detachment  of  troops  which  is  holding  a  position  in  the  rear 
must  work  at  strengthening  it. 

The  supervision  of  the  labor  formations  working  at  night  re- 
quires much  personnel.  It  is  better  to  avoid  the  use  of  labor 


GEKMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES.  61 

formations  in  the  construction  of  positions  which,  though  only 
occasionally,  are  under  heavy  fire. 

Special  officers  must  be  detailed  for  the  construction  of  posi- 
tions, etc.,  required  in  the  area  behind  the  lines.  These  will  be 
immediately  under  the  orders  of  the  army  group  or  of  army 
headquarters.  In  order  to  furnish  the  necessary  labor,  pioneer 
and  labor  companies  must  be  permanently  allotted  to  them,  as 
well  as  reliefs  of  other  available  troops  and  the  necessary  trans- 
port for  bringing  up  materials. 

26.   RETIRED  ARTILLERY  POSITIONS. 

Experience  has  shown  that  the  important  point  in  the  construc- 
tion of  artillery  positions  behind  the  lines  is  to  begin  with  the 
construction  of  observation  posts,  cable  trenches,  and  communi- 
cation trenches.  Battery  positions  can  be  constructed  by  a  bat- 
tery in  one  night,  if  necessary,  provided  that  the  materials  are 
available. 

B.  ATTACK. 

27.    METHOD  OF  ATTACK  AND  TIME  REQUIRED. 

Insufficiently  prepared  attacks  and  counter  attacks  nearly  al- 
ways fail  through  being  too  hurried. 

The  greatest  care  must  be  taken  to  differentiate  between 
counter  attacks,  which  are  undertaken  immediately  after  the 
loss  of  a  length  of  trench,  or  of  any  other  section  of  ground, 
with  reserves  which  are  on  the  spot,  and  those  which  are  ordered 
by  a  higher  commander  and  for  which  the  reserves  of  a  higher 
formation  must  be  brought  up. 

In  the  latter  case  the  full  time  necessary  for  the  preparation 
of  the  attack  and  the  disposition  of  troops  in  the  front  line  is 
frequently  not  sufficiently  considered.  In  this  respect  it  is  to  be 
noted  that  the  transmission  of  orders  to  the  front  line  occupies 
more  time  than  is  often  supposed ;  the  telephone  lines  are  de- 
stroyed, and  messengers  can  only  work  their  way  slowly  through 
the  enemy's  barrage.  Even  if  the  order  has  reached  the  front 
line,  it  requires  some  time  to  circulate  it  and  explain  the  method 
of  carrying  out  the  attack  and  its  objective  to  the  troops,  dis- 
tributed as  they  are  in  groups.  Similar  difficulties  arise  in  the 
case  of  reserves  which  have  been  brought  up.  They  advance 
slowly  across  country  with  which  they  are  generally  unac- 


62          GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES. 

quainted,  and  which  lies  under  heavy  fire.  The  commanders 
of  the  reserves  have  to  form  an  idea  of  the  tactical  situation, 
and  for  this  purpose  are  obliged  to  get  into  communication  with 
commanders  already  in  the  front  line.  This  all  requires  time 
and  creates  friction,  both  of  which  are  increased  at  night  and 
in  country  where  the  view  is  restricted  (village  or  wood). 

In  the  case  of  counter  attacks,  which  are  to  be  carried  out 
with  the  aid  of  strong  reserves,  a  thorough  artillery  preparation 
is  necessary.  This,  too,  requires  time.  The  experience  of  the 
battle  of  the  Somme  has  again  and  fully  confirmed  the  long- 
established  principle : 

A  counter  attack  must  either  follow  immediately,  and  the  deci- 
sion to  counter  attack  must  come  from  the  front  line  and  the 
forces,  for  it  must  be  ready  to  hand  before  the  enemy's  attack 
is  entirely  finished,  or  the  counter  attack  must  be  methodically 
and  thoroughly  prepared  by  the  artillery  and  carried  out  with 
reserves  who  have  been  instructed  as  to  the  tactical  situation 
and  the  nature  of  the  ground. 

//  counter  attacks  which,  on  account  of  the  situation,  ought  to 
be  methodically  prepared  are  hurried,  they  cost  much  blood  and 
ca.use  the  troops  to  lose  their  trust  in  their  leaders  if  they  fail, 
which  nearly  always  happens  in  such  a  case. 

28.    APPROACH    MARCH   AND   DEPLOYMENT. 

Before  bringing  up  troops  into  the  zone  of  the  enemy's  artil- 
lery fire,  the  commander  must  obtain  a  clear  idea,  by  means  of 
clever  scouts  and  by  his  own  observation,  how  the  enemy's  fire 
is  distributed  over  the  ground  to  be  crossed.  When  selecting  the 
route,  areas  which  are  hardly  or  not  under  fire  will  be  taken 
into  consideration  rather  than  the  nature  of  the  ground  and 
the  cultivation.  Depressions  and  sunken  roads  which  are  in- 
visible to  the  enemy  are,  as  a  rule,  under  such  heavy  barrage 
fire  that  it  is  not  advisable  to  make  use  of  them.  Villages  which 
lie  in  the  enemy's  zone  of  fire  are  to  be  avoided  on  principle. 

29.    METHODICAL   ATTACK. 

An  advance  to  the  assault  with  a  simultaneous  lifting  of  our 
own  artillery  fire  has  proved  extremely  successful  in  the  attack. 
This  was  also  the  case  when  a  definite  rate  of  advance  for  the 
infantry  was  settled  and  our  artillery  fire  was  lifted,  step  by 
step,  in  accordance  with  this,  on  a  prearranged  time  table.  Only 


GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES.  63 

in  cases  where  the  infantry,  through  lack  of  practice  in  this  new 
method  of  attack,  pushed  right  through,  was  the  progress  of  the 
attack  checked. 

30.   ASSAULTING  PARTIES. 

The  detailing  of  assaulting  parties  in  an  attack  has  proved 
very  useful.  Their  chief  advantage  lay  in  the  freshness  of  the 
specially  selected  personnel  who  had  not  been  engaged  in  pre- 
vious fighting.  The  careful  training  beforehand  of  the  assault- 
ing parties  resulted  in  these  troops  proving  themselves  quite 
equal  to  all  tasks  which  fell  to  their  lot  in  village  or  wood  fight- 
ing. They  felt  that  they  were  a  body  of  elite  troops,  which 
indeed  they  proved  themselves  to  be. 

31.    ATTACKS  IN   WOODS. 

When  attacking  in  a  wood,  it  is  preferable,  instead  of  the 
usual  skirmish  lines  following  one  after  the  other,  to  employ 
small  assaulting  columns  following  a  single  line  of  Assault. 

The  employment  of  small  Flammenwerfer  in  wooded  country 
which  is  full  of  obstacles  and  in  which  there  is  no  extended  view 
suffers  in  an  attack  with  a  distant  objective  under  the  disad- 
vantage of  the  heavy  weight  of  the  apparatus.  It  is  better  to 
use  the  Flammenwerfer  from  a  well-prepared  assaulting  position 
and  against  well-defined,  close  objectives  which  have  been  pre- 
viously reconnoitered. 

The  "  Priester  "  bomb  throwers  have  been  successfully  used  to 
clear  out  shell  holes  which  could  not  be  reached  with  hand 
grenades. 

32.    PROCEDURE  AFTER  A  SUCCESSFUL  ATTACK. 

In  order  to  be  able  to  entrench  rapidly  and  hold  captured 
ground,  carrying  and  working  parties  (see  also  Par.  XI,  65) 
must  follow  the  assaulting  troops,  under  the  leadership  of  ener- 
getic officers. 

C.  COOPERATION  OF  INFANTRY  AND  ARTILLERY. 

33.    COMMUNICATIONS    BETWEEN    COMMANDERS. 

When  the  corps  was  put  into  the  battle  the  units  of  the 
troops  already  engaged  were  very  much  mixed.  The  arrange- 
ments for  artillery  command  were  not  sufficiently  clear  in  all 
cases. 


64          GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES. 

The  bringing  up  of  new  divisions  had,  on  account  of  the 
tactical  situation,  to  take  place  as  quickly  as  possible  and  in 
the  dark.  Necessary  reliefs  and  movements  of  troops  were 
taking  place  almost  daily. 

Owing  to  ajl  these  circumstances  and  to  faulty  telephone 
communications  it  was  very  difficult  to  establish  touch  between 
infantry  and  artillery.  In  many  places  it  was  a  long  time 
before  touch  was  obtained,  greatly  to  the  disadvantage  of  our 
infantry,  which  was  heavily  engaged.  The  greater  the  difficul- 
ties in  establishing  this  absolutely  necessary  touch  between 
infantry  and  artillery  the  greater  must  be  the  efforts  of  both 
sides  to  secure  communication.  The  best  means  to  this  end  is 
for  the  infantry  regimental  commander  and  the  artillery  group 
commander  to  be  near  each  other.  If  this  is  impossible  their 
posts  must  be  connected  by  telephone  as  soon  as  possible,  in 
order  that  there  may  be  continuous  exchange  of  important 
information.  One  artillery  liaison  officer  of  each  of  the  groups 
in  question  (in  certain  circumstances  several  groups)  must 
remain  continuously  with  the  infantry  regimental  commander. 

34.    COMMUNICATIONS    IN    THE    FRONT    LINE. 

The  number  and  position  of  artillery  observation  officers  (see 
also  Par.  IV,  A  19)  depend  on  the  tactical  situation  and  the 
ground.  They  must  be  connected  with  the  subsector  (bat- 
talion) commanders  in  front  of  whose  sector  their  artillery  is 
working,  in  order  to  be  able  to  receive  and  forward  rapidly  all 
requests  and  messages  which  come  from  the  front  line.  In  an 
attack  artillery  observation  officers  must  be  sufficiently  far 
forward  to  be  able  to  observe  our  own  front  line  continuously. 
It  is  not  usually  sound  for  them  to  remain  in  the  foremost 
firing  line.  In  country  with  a  restricted  view,,  as  was  the  case 
in  Delville  Wood  and  Longueval  village,  our  own  front  line 
could  only  be  seen  by  the  artillery  observation  officers  if  they 
followed  immediatey  behind  the  foremost  line.  There  still 
remain,  of  course,  the  difficulties  of  sending  back  important 
messages  as  rapidly  as  possible,  especially  those  with  reference 
to  shells  which  fall  short  and  so  endanger  our  own  infantry. 
These  difficulties  can  be  overcome  by  means  of  signals  with 
light  pistols  and  by  orderlies  (relays),  if  proper  arrangements 
are  previously  made,  and  the  most  reliable  officers  and  orderlies 
(cyclists)  are  detailed  for  the  responsible  task  of  artillery 
observation  and  for  the  delivery  of  messages  during  an  attack. 


GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES.  65 

It  may  nevertheless  happen  that  events  on  the  battle  field, 
especially  if  the  fire  is  as  heavy  as  that  in  Delville  Wood  and 
Longueval,  may  prevent  important  messages  from  the  artillery 
observers  from  reaching  the  fire  commander  sufficiently  quickly. 
One  regiment,  therefore,  has  made  the  very  valuable  sugges- 
tion that  artillery  information  centers  should  be  pushed  for- 
ward as  an  additional  safeguard.  Battalions  and  companies 
should  be  informed  of  the  position  of  these  centers,  so  that  the 
result  of  their  observation  and  their  requests  can  be  sent  there 
as  well  as  to  the  normal  centers. 

V.  MEANS  OF  COMMUNICATION. 

35.    TELEPHONE  COMMUNICATIONS. 

The  existing  telephone  system  proved  totally  inadequate  in 
consequence  of  the  development  which  the  fighting  took.  This 
was  aggravated  by  the  division  of  the  sector  hitherto  held  by 
Stein's  army  group  into  two  separate  army  groups,  which  re- 
quired the  provision  of  several  new  lines.  The  conditions  here 
were,  therefore,  particularly  unfavorable.  But  in  trench  war- 
fare difficult  conditions  must  always  be  reckoned  with  in  this 
relation.  It  is  therefore  considered  necessary  to  allot  a  double 
telephone  section  to  each  division  to  reinforce  the  corps  tele- 
phone detachment,  and  to  extend  the  existing  lines  by  means  of 
the  stores  in  reserve,  as  soon  as  the  division  arrives  in  the 
front  line.  The  shortage  of  lines  which  was  discovered  to  exist 
reacted  most  disadvantageously  on  the  communication  between 
the  infantry  and  the  artillery,  and  could  only  be,  by  degrees, 
made  good. 

It  is  advisable  as  far  as  possible  to  avoid  erecting  lines 
through  villages,  as  they  are  subject  to  a  heavy  fire  there.  If 
lines  start  from  villages,  they  should  be  diverted  by  the  shortest 
route  over  open  fields  in  the  desired  direction. 

To  enable  lines  which  have  been  damaged  by  shell  fire  to  be 
repaired  as  quickly  as  possible  it  has  been  found  useful  in  prac- 
tice to  establish  permanent  telephone  parties  in  dugouts  along 
the  lines ;  it  is  the  duty  of  these  parties  to  test  the  lines  fre- 
quently and  see  that  they  are  in  working  order. 

It  is  most  desirable  that  the  staffs  of  every  field  artillery  regi- 
ment and  Abteilung,  as  well  as  those  of  every  foot  artillery 
regiment  and  foot  artillery  battalion,  should  be  permanently 

29267°— 18 5 


66          GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES. 

provided  with  the  larger  pattern  folding  telephone  box,  so  as  to 
avoid  the  large  number  of  separate  boxes  otherwise  necessary 
at  a  regimental,  or  Abteilung,  or  battalion  command  post.  These 
take  up  room  and  are  difficult  to  supervise  properly. 

The  usual  practice  of  changing  telephone  apparatus  when 
reliefs  were  carried  out  proved  to  be  a  source  of  very  marked 
interruption.  It  must  not  take  place  when  the  fighting  is  so 
severe.  The  outgoing  units  should  hand  over  their  apparatus  to 
the  units  which  are  relieving  them.  These  remarks  apply  par- 
ticularly to  folding  telephone  boxes,  the  removal  of  which  caused 
considerable  interruption  in  the  service. 

36.    WIRELESS    COMMUNICATIONS. 

It  is  desirable  that  light  wireless  stations  should  be  allotted 
to  the  staffs  of  infantry  regiments  and  battalions,  in  order  to 
improve  the  communications  in  the  front  area.  They  could  be 
formed  from  the  stores  in  reserve. 

37.    RUNNERS. 

Runners  and  the  establishment  of  relays  of  runners  have 
proved  very  useful  everywhere.  The  casualties  were  compara- 
tively slight.  All  important  information  and  orders  should 
always  be  sent  in  duplicate.  One  infantry  brigade  recommends 
that  100  meters  should  be  the  normal  distance  between  the 
relay  stations  of  runners  in  the  fire  zone. 

38.    MOTORCYCLES    AND    BICYCLES. 

The  headquarters  of  corps,  divisions,  and  brigades  must  each 
have  two  motorcycles  from  the  reserve  stores  placed  at  their 
disposal  when  they  go  into  the  front  line.  The  establishment 
of  motorcycles  proved  insufficient  for  the  heavy  fighting;  this 
deficiency  was  painfully  evident.  The  establishment  of  ordi- 
nary bicycles  was  also  not  sufficient  for  the  work  to  be  done. 

39.    LIGHT-SIGNALING    LINES. 

The  existing  organization  of  the  light-signaling  service  does 
not  meet  requirements.  It  is  considered  urgently  necessary 
that  a  complete  light-signal  detachment  should  be  formed  in 
each  corps.  A  total  of  about  30  signal  lamps  of  medium  range 
is  required  to  enable  a  signal  line  to  be  established  for  every 


GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES.  67 

infantry  regiment  and  every  artillery  group.  Besides  these, 
four  light-sign'al  sections,  with  apparatus  of  a  greater  range, 
are  required  to  establish  long-distance  light-signal  communica- 
tions in  the  divisional  sectors.  The  temporary  allotment  of 
light-signaling  apparatus  from  reserve  stores  can  not  be  con- 
sidered satisfactory,  as  the  full  utilization  of  this  method  of 
communication  depends  mostly  on  the  signal  stations  working 
well  together  and  with  their  respective  command  posts. 

Until  this  urgent  demand  can  be  complied  with  it  is  sug- 
gested that  an  auxiliary  light-signal  detachment  should  be 
formed  in  each  division  by  making  use  of  the  personnel  of  the 
searchlight  sections.  It  was  not  possible  to  employ  the  search- 
light sections  for  their  proper  work  in  the  fighting  on  the 
Somme.  Good  results  were  obtained  by  an  attached  division, 
which  had  already  formed  an  auxiliary  light-signal  detach- 
ment. Another  division  of  the  corps  succeeded  in  forming  two 
auxiliary  light-signal  stations  and  in  maintaining  satisfactory 
communication  over  a  distance  of  12  kilometers  by  flashes  on 
the  horizon,  although  direct  vision  was  not  obtainable.  The 
great  value  of  communication  by  light-signaling  was  made 
doubly  clear  by  the  continual  interruptions  of  the  telephone 
communications. 

40.    LIGHT-PISTOL   SIGNALS. 

The  communication  between  the  front  line  and  the  artillery 
for  the  direction  of  barrage  fire  was  entirely  confined  to  light- 
pistol  signals.  It  was  found  that  three  light  pistols  per  com- 
pany are  not  enough  and  that  the  ammunition  supply  is  too 
small.  It  is  considered  necessary  that  the  establishment  of 
light  pistols  should  be  at  least  doubled  by  additional  pistols 
from  the  reserve  stocks,  and  that  a  large  supply  of  ammunition 
should  be  provided  before  units  go  into  the  front  line.  As  a 
result  of  the  difficulties  experienced  corps  headquarters  were 
obliged,  when  the  fourth  corps  was  relieved,  to  order  all  the 
light  pistols  which  were  still  available,  together  with  their 
ammunition,  to  be  handed  over  to  its  successors,  although  the 
light  pistols  were  part  of  the  war  establishment. 

41.  BALLOON  AND  AEROPLANE  OBSERVATION. 

The  means  for  providing  the  artillery  with  aerial  observation 
has  proved  to  be  insufficient.  It  has  again  been  shown,  as, 
indeed,  had  already  been  recognized  under  less  difficult  condi- 


68          GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES. 

tions,  that  it  would  be  a  great  advantage  to  add  a  captive  bal- 
loon and  at  least  two  observation  aeroplanes  to  the  war  estab- 
lishment of  each  field  artillery  brigade  (of  two  regiments). 

Matters  would  not  be  improved  by  temporarily  allotting  these 
important  means  of  obtaining  observation,  for  good  results  can 
only  be  attained  by  continual  cooperation  between  the  observer 
and  the  fire  commander. 

The  numerical  superiority  of  the  enemy's  airmen  and  the  fact 
that  their  machines  were  better  were  made  disagreeably  appar- 
ent to  us,  particularly  in  their  direction  of  the  enemy's  artillery 
fire  and  in  bomb  dropping. 

The  English  aeroplane  observers  also  made  use  of  sound 
signals  to  communicate  with  their  batteries  while  in  the  air. 
It  is  very  likely  possible  that  a  rapid  means  of  communication 
with  the  batteries  can  be  established  in  this  way ;  it  might  be 
very  serviceable  as  a  complement  to  wireless  messages,  which 
are  frequently  interrupted.  Experiments  in  this  direction  are 
being  carried  out  in  the  fourth  corps. 

42.    ANTIAIRCRAFT   MEASURES. 

The  number  of  our  battle  planes  was  also  too  small.  The 
enemy's  airmen  were  often  able  to  fire  successfully  on  our  troops 
with  machine  guns  by  descending  to  a  height  of  a  few  hundred 
meters.  The  German  antiaircraft-gun  sections  could  not  con- 
tinue firing  at  that  height  without  exposing  their  own  troops  to 
serious  danger  from  fragments  of  shell.  This  has  produced  a 
desire  for  the  antiaircraft  defenses  to  be  supplemented  by  ma- 
chine guns;  these  must,  if  necessary,  be  supplied  from  the  re- 
serve stocks.  A  further  lesson  to  be  learned  from  this  surpris- 
ingly bold  procedure  on  the  part  of  the  English  airmen  is  that 
the  infantry  make  too  little  use  of  their  rifles  as  a  means  of 
driving  off  aircraft. 

The  best  defensive  weapons  among  the  antiaircraft  guns  were 
the  batteries  of  four  10-centimeter  guns  of  the  foot  artillery. 
The  antiaircraft  guns  mounted  on  motor  cars  are  considered 
less  useful  for  the  present  conditions  of  fighting  than  the  sta- 
tionary guns,  as  they  continually  require  new  telephone  con- 
nections with  the  antiaircraft  telephone  exchange  system  as 
they  alter  their  positions. 

It  has  already  been  found  necessary,  even  in  quiet  sectors,  to 
fit  up  some  field-gun  sections  as  auxiliary  antiaircraft  defenses, 


GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAI  STUDIES.          69 

to  supplement  the  regular  antiaircraft-gun  sections.  This  was 
still  more  necessary  in  the  battle  of  the  Somme.  It  is  desirable 
that  at  least  one  battery  of  each  field  artillery  brigade  should  be 
equipped  with  guns  mounted  on  light  field-howitzer  carriages, 
so  as  to  have  guns  at  hand  which  can  be  quickly  employed  either 
for  antiaircraft  purposes  or  for  forming  a  barrage.  To  make 
these  guns  still  more  useful  for  defense  against  aircraft,  it  is 
also  desirable  that  each  field  artillery  brigade  be  equipped  with 
portable  antiaircraft  mountings  (pivots)  for  two  antiaircraft- 
gun  sections.  It  would  be  possible  to  arrange  for  the  transport 
of  these  mountings  by  the  light-ammunition  column,  on  two- 
wheeled  trailers. 

43.    SPECIAL  KEPOBTING  DETACHMENTS. 

In  consequence  of  the  comparative  slowness  with  which  re- 
ports from  the  front-line  trenches  reach  the  higher  commanders, 
When  sent  by  the  usual  channels,  it  has  been  found  necessary 
for  commanders  to  make  arrangements  independent  of  these 
channels,  and  to  keep  themselves  informed  by  their  own  agents 
of  the  course  of  the  fighting.  For  this  purpose  the  most  prac- 
tical method  is  the  employment  of  so-called  "  spy  troops  "  (spah 
trupps)  as  well  as  the  orderly  officers  who  go  forward  from  time 
to  time.  These  special  reporting  detachments  consist  of  one 
officer  and  a  few  picked  noncommissioned  officers  and  men, 
equipped  with  infantry  telephone  apparatus,  to  connect  up  with 
existing  lines.  They  should  choose  their  own  position  so  that 
they  can  observe  any  particular  sector  in  which  fighting  is  tak- 
ing place. 

Their  duty  is  to  insure  that  reports  on  the  progress  of  the 
fighting  reach  the  commander  by  whom  they  have  been  sent 
out,  as  quickly  as  possible,  by  means  of  a  combined  system  of 
telephones  and  runners.  To  enable  these  detachments  to  work 
successfully  in  action,  they  should  be  formed  in  the  divisions 
during  quiet  periods  and  be  thoroughly  trained  in  the  duties 
which  they  have  to  perform. 

VI.  ARMS. 

44.    SMALL   ARMS. 

Numerous  complaints  have  been  received  of  rifle  breech  ac- 
tions being  completely  clogged  with  dirt  both  in  attack  and 
defense.  It  is  therefore  advisable  to  fit  a  cover  over  the  breech 


70          GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES. 

of  the  rifles,  like  that  used  in  the  English  Army,  which  can  be 
easily  unfastened  and  then  hangs  from  the  rifle. 

The  1908  pattern  pistol  has  proved  to  be  a  very  useful  weapon 
for  hand-to-hand  fighting  in  villages  and  woods.  It  is  also 
recommended  by  several  units  as  a  useful  weapon  for  machine- 
gun  detachments  in  close  fighting.  One  field-artillery  regiment 
recommends  the  adoption  of  the  new  pattern  sword  bayonet  with 
saw  edge,  which  has  already  been  experimentally  adopted  for 
mounted  troops.  Automatic  rifles  (musketen)  are  stated  to 
be  useful  weapons  for  trench  warfare. 

45.  MACHINE  GUNS. 

Machine  guns  usually  have  to  be  brought  up  over  open  ground 
under  a  heavy  barrage.  The  great  weight  of  the  gun  has  again 
proved  to  be  a  serious  disadvantage  under  these  conditions. 
Even  if  the  gun  is  dismounted,  it  is  very  difficult  to  drag  up 
the  heavy  sledge  over  ground  which  is  under  fire.  All  regiments 
are  unanimous  in  recommending  the  introduction  of  a  lighter 
form  of  gun  carriage,  modeled  on  that  of  the  improvised  gun 
carriage  used  by  the  machine-gun  marksman  sections.  One 
regiment  has  obtained  good  results  with  a  gun  carriage  of  its 
own  invention,  which  is  even  lighter. 

Complaints  have  also  been  received  that  the  ammunition  boxes 
and  water  jackets  of  the  machine  guns  are  too  heavy.  It  is 
proposed  that  the  lighter  boxes  and  jackets  used  by  the  machine- 
gun  marksman  sections  should  be  generally  adopted. 

The  wheels  of  the  machine-gun  hand  carriages,  used  by  the 
marksman  sections,  are  not  strong  enough  for  paved  roads,  so 
that  these  carriages  are  not  adapted  for  use  on  the  march,  but 
they  have  proved  suitable  for  bringing  the  machine  guns  into 
action,  and  very  useful  for  the  transport  of  ammunition,  rations, 
and  wounded. 

Spare  parts  for  machine  guns  must  be  kept  in  readiness  in 
large  quantities  behind  the  front  line,  so  that  they  can  be 
brought  up  to  the  troops  quickly  if  required. 

46.  HAND   GRENADES. 

The  hand  grenade  was  the  most  important  infantry  weapon 
both  in  attack  and  defense.  It  is  universally  suggested  that  the 
supply  of  hand  grenades  should  be  increased.  If  it  is  possible 
to  insure  a  supply  of  different  kinds  of  hand  grenades,  the  gen- 


GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES.  71 

eral  opinion  is  in  favor  of  the  use  of  "  ball  "  and  "  egg  "  grenades 
for  attack,  despite  their  small  effect,  in  preference  to  cylindrical 
grenades  with  handles,  as  a  larger  supply  of  the  two  former 
can  be  taken  into  action. 

It  would  appear  advisable  to  use  only  one  kind  of  hand  gre- 
nade. This  would  simplify  training  in  the  use  of  hand  grenades. 
In  fighting  such  as  we  have  had  on  the  Somine  defense  and 
attack  continually  alternate.  It  is  not  always  possible  to  bring 
up  sufficient  quantities  of  the  particular  hand  grenade  which 
is  best  suited  to  the  conditions  of  the  fighting  at  the  moment, 
but  as  the  cylindrical  grenade  with  handle  is  on  the  whole  the 
most  effective  it  is  recommended  that  this  pattern  should  be 
universally  adopted. 

47.    GUNS. 

The  guns  of  the  field  artillery  proved  on  the  whole  to  be  thor- 
oughly satisfactory.  Their  failure  was  usually  due  to  the  am- 
munition, or  to  the  fact  that  the  number  of  rounds  fired  was 
greater  than  the  life  of  a  tube  permits.  Jams  were  frequently 
experienced  with  field  guns.  These  were  due  to  steel  cartridge 
cases  (manufacturer's  mark  A.  E.  G.)  and  brass  cartridge 
cases  with  steel  base  ( Sp :  61 ).  These  cartridges  often  jammed 
when  the  breech  was  opened  and  could  only  be  removed  by  the 
use  of  the  rammer.  The  rate  of  fire  was  in  consequence  con- 
siderably reduced.  Repeated  forcible  opening  also  damages  the 
breech.  It  is  true  that  many  jams  may  have  been  due  to  the  fact 
that  the  necessary  care  in  the  storing  and  handling  of  ammuni- 
tion could  not  be  observed  under  the  conditions  which  existed 
on  the  Somme. 

The  buffer  proved  to  be  the  weakest  point  of  the  howitzer. 
The  leather  washers  burn  through  and  the  glycerin  runs  out. 
The  bad  working  of  the  buffer  affects  the  sides  of  the  carriage, 
which  are  rather  weak,  so  that  damage  easily  occurs. 

VII.  AMMUNITION. 

48.   VARIOUS    KINDS   OF   AMMUNITION. 

A  supply  of  good  ammunition  of  even  quality  and  character  is 
an  absolute  necessity  for  rapid  preparation  for  action,  a  high 
rate  of  fire,  and  accurate  shooting,  particularly  if  a  barrage  is 
to  be  placed  close  in  front  of  our  infantry. 


72          GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES. 

The  long  shell  of  the  light  field  howitzer  was  supplied  with 
five  different  fuses,  of  which  two  kinds  had  to  be  fired  with 
safety  precautions.  Fresh  registration  or  ranging  is  required 
when  a  change  is  made  from  one  ammunition  to  another.  At 
critical  moments,  or  in  the  dark,  it  is  not  possible  to  ascertain 
with  what  kind  of  fuse  every  shell  is  fitted.  This  ammunition 
besides  is  supplied  without  shell  baskets.  It  is  therefore  diffi- 
cult, and  takes  time,  to  bring  the  reserves  of  long  shell  up  to 
the  guns. 

The  old  pattern  of  field-gun  ammunition  has  proved  efficient. 

The  use  of  the  "  green  cross  " l  ammunition  is  very  hard  on 
the  guns,  for  in  consequence  of  the  limited  possibilities  of  using 
it,  a  great  quantity  of  ammunition  has  to  be  expended  in  a  short 
time.  For  example,  a  light  field  howitzer  battery  fired  over 
3,500  rounds  of  this  ammunition  in  24  hours. 

49.    EXPENDITURE    OF    AMMUNITION. 

The  average  daily  expenditure  of  ammunition  per  gun  during 
the  whole  period  of  the  fighting  was : 

Rounds. 
(Field)    guns 145 

Light  field  howitzers 170 

Heavy  field  howitzers 119 

10-cm.  guns 118 

(21-cm.)  mortars 51 

The  small  expenditure  of  (field)  gun  ammunition  is  to  be 
attributed  to  the  small  supplies  available.  Instructions  had  to 
be  issued  to  the  troops  to  be  economical  with  (field)  gun  shell. 

The  highest  daily  average  expenditure  per  gun  reached  during 
the  period  of  fighting  in  the  army  group  for  the  different  kinds 
of  guns  was : 

Rounds. 
(Field)    guns 322 

Light  field  howitzers 479 

Heavy  field  howitzers—  _  233 

10-cm.    guns ._  321 

(21-cm.)    mortal's  _  116 

1  The  exact  nature  of  this  ammunition  is  not  known,  but  the  expres- 
sion "  green  cross "  probably  refers  to  some  kind  of  gas  shell. — 
(Translator.) 


GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES.  73 

The  following  quantity  of  ammunition  is  considered  necessary  : 


Battery. 

In  the  bat- 
tery posi- 
tion. 

In  reserve 
with  the 
division. 

In  reserve 
with  the 
corps. 

(Field)  guns  

Rounds. 
2,200 

Rounds. 
500 

Rounds. 
2,200 

Light  field  howitzers                                     .  .  . 

2,200 

600 

2,200 

Heavy  field  howitzers.        

1,400 

300 

1,400 

10-cm.  guns  

1,600 

400 

1,600 

(21-cm.)  mortars  (2  mortars)   ...  .           

300 

80 

300 

Large  quantities  of  ammunition  can  only  be  provided  near  the 
battery  by  extensive  distribution  in  the  surrounding  country. 
Carrying  ammunition  over  long  distances  by  men  must  be 
avoided,  as  their  endurance  is  fully  taxed  day  and  night  by 
firing  and  entrenching.  The  more  ammunition  is  collected  near 
the  battery  position,  the  more  will  be  exploded  by  being  hit. 
Another  result  of  storing  large  quantities  of  ammunition  in  the 
battery  position  is  that  on  changing  position  a  large  part  of  it 
must  be  left  behind  in  the  old  position,  the  subsequent  removal 
of  which,  if,  indeed,  this  is  possible,  can  only  be  accomplished 
with  the  greatest  difficulty. 


50.    AMMUNITION    SUPPLY. 

The  supply  of  artillery  ammunition  of  all  kinds  during  the 
first  days  of  the  battle  did  not  equal  the  great  expenditure. 
Reserve  supplies  were  only  available  in  very  small  quantities. 
On  July  14  an  English  attack  took  place  which  necessitated  a 
great  expenditure  of  ammunition.  It  was  impossible  to  re- 
plenish the  supply  in  the  battery  positions  from  the  ammuni- 
tion brought  up  by  the  L.  of  C.,  or  from  the  ammunition  depots 
of  the  army  groups,  to  such  an  extent  as  to  insure  that  the 
requirements  for  the  next  day  would  be  met.  The  army  group 
was  compelled  to  ask  for  ammunition  from  Stein's  army  group, 
and  this  had  to  be  partly  brought  up  by  night,  under  difficult 
conditions,  from  the  advanced  ammunition  depots  of  the  two 
divisions  nearest  to  the  army  group  in  the  north. 

From  July  15  onward  the  supply  of  ammunition  was  better. 
The  amount  sent  up  to  the  batteries  was  made  up  by  supplies 
from  the  L.  Of  C.  in  such  quantities  that,  as  a  general  rule,  the 
amount  of  ammunition  laid  down  in  paragraph  49  as  being 


74          GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES. 

necessary  in  the  battery  positions  and  in  reserve  with  the 
divisions  was  always  available.  The  army  group  was  also  able 
to  collect  gradually  a  small  reserve  of  ammunition  (exclusively 
field-gun  ammunition),  but  the  supply  was  never  sufficient  to 
make  good  the  expenditure  in  the  event  of  the  railway  being 
blocked  for  one  or  two  days.  The  lack  of  gun  ammunition  was 
always  felt,  and  large  reserves  were  never  available.  It  is 
true  that  army  headquarters  always  succeeded  in  bringing  up 
the  gun  ammunition  trains  quickly  and  sending  the  ammunition 
from  these  trains  to  the  battery  positions,  but  a  block  on  the 
railway  might  have  had  serious  consequences.  It  is  absolutely 
necessary  to  place  so  much  ammunition  at  the  disposal  of  the 
army  groups  that  the  above-mentioned  "  iron  rations "  are 
available  in  the  battery  positions  and  in  the  divisional  and 
corps  ammunition  depots. 

The  supply  of  ammunition  was  arranged  for  by  corps  head- 
quarters* as  far  as  the  corps  and  divisional  depots.  Motor 
lorries,  artillery  ammunition  columns,  and  infantry  ammu- 
nition columns,  supply  parks,  and  supply  columns  equipped 
with  heavy  country  carts,  were  all  tinder  one  organization.  As 
soon  as  the  arrival  of  the  trains  was  announced  the  columns 
were  despatched  to  the  detraining  stations.  The  means  of 
transport  were  sufficient.  The  divisions  had  at  their  disposal 
the  battery  and  light  ammunition  columns,  one  supply  park 
or  supply  column,  and  in  some  cases  a  foot  artillery  ammuni- 
tion column  as  well. 

Motor  lorry  columns  have  been  very  efficient  and  have  car- 
ried out  their  duties  very  satisfactorily.  The  allotment  of  the 
country  carts  to  the  columns,  which  were  used  as  a  temporary 
measure  to  bring  up  artillery  ammunition,  proved  a  practical 
arrangement. 

There  should  be  ammunition  depots  for  a  large  quantity  of 
ammunition  close  to  the  detraining  stations.  In  addition,  light 
railways  are  required  from  the  detraining  stations  to  the  depots. 
These  were  not  provided,  and  consequently  a  large  quantity  of 
ammunition  was  piled  up  along  the  railway  lines  immediately 
beside  the  detraining  station. 

VIII.  ENGINEER  STORES. 

51.    PIONEER   PARK    DETACHMENT. 

A  pioneer  park  detachment  must  be  available  in  every  corps 
to  take  over  the  management  of  the  parks  and  the  supply  of 


GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES.          75 

engineer  stores  as  soon  as  the  corps  is  moved  into  a  new  posi- 
tion. Until  an  establishment  for  it  is  approved  the  detachment 
must  consist  of  troops  drawn  from  the  corps,  but  it  must  be 
formed  before  the  corps  takes  up  its  new  position.  The  pioneer 
commander  must  have  a  suitable  officer  at  his  disposal,  who 
will  be  in  charge  of  the  supply  of  stores ;  he  should  not,  if  pos- 
sible, be  on  the  establishment  of  any  pioneer  unit.  The  park 
detachment  must  be  sent  to  its  sphere  of  action  as  soon  as  the 
employment  of  the  corps  is  decided  upon.  In  the  interest  of  the 
troops  only  specialists  should  be  attached  to  it. 

The  officer  in  charge  of  the  supply  of  stores  must  be  able  to 
move  about,  so  that  he  can  take  personal  action  quickly  should 
blocks  occur.  A  small  motor  car  should,  therefore,  be  allotted 
to  him. 

52.   PIONEER  PARKS  AND  THE  SUPPLY  OF  ENGINEER   STORES. 

A  special  pioneer  railhead  for  pioneer  stores  must  be  pro- 
vided. In  order  to  facilitate  supervision  and  traffic,  ammuni- 
tion and  food  supplies  should  not  be  unloaded  at  this  station  if 
possible.  Entire  trains  loaded  with  pioneer  stores  must  be 
brought  up  to  insure  an  ample  supply.  This  will  also  obviate 
the  necessity  of  shunting  at  the  stations  in  the  zone  of  opera- 
tions. 

To  enable  him  to  send  pioneer  stores  quickly  up  to  the  parks, 
the  officer  in  charge  of  stores  must  have  sufficient  transport  at 
his  disposal ;  motor  lorries  from  the  reserve  depots  are  most 
suitable.  Each  divisional  pioneer  park  must  have  half  a  motor 
lorry  column  at  its  disposal.  Horse-drawn  vehicles  are  only 
to  be  used  in  cases  of  emergency,  owing  to  their  limited  capacity 
and  speed. 

In  front  of  the  divisional  pioneer  parks  small  regimental  parks 
containing  pioneer  stores,  rations,  and  the  most  important 
articles  of  equipment  must  be  pushed  forward  for  the  battle  and 
established  in  convenient  positions,  distributed  along  the  front 
immediately  behind  the  trenches.  The  farther  forward  these 
regimental  parks  are  the  better  for  the  fighting  troops  who  have 
to  fetch  their  material  from  them.  They  should  be  under  the 
supervision  of  officers  or  senior  noncommissioned  officers.  It 
is  the  duty  of  the  regimental  store  officers  to  see  that  the  parks 
are  constantly  kept  filled. 


76          GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES. 
IX.  CLOTHING  AND  EQUIPMENT. 

53.    STEEL    HELMETS. 

The  steel  helmets,  issued  immediately  before  and  during  the 
battle,  gained  a  great  reputation  among  the  troops  in  a  very 
short  time.  It  is  considered  desirable  to  equip  artillery  ob- 
servers and  antiaircraft  posts  with  steel  helmets. 

54.    JACKETS    AND   FOOTGEAE. 

Owing  to  the  fact  that  the  buttons  down  the  front  of  officers' 
jackets  are  now  covered  up  it  is  impossible  to  attach  field 
glasses  and  pocket  torches  to  them.  For  the  assaulting  parties 
lace  boots  and  puttees  proved  satisfactory. 

55.   PACKS. 

Generally  speaking,  the  knapsack  has  proved  superfluous  in 
such  critical  fighting,  both  in  defense  and  attack.  The  fighting 
kit  is  sufficient.  A  sandbag  converted  into  a  knapsack,  in  addi- 
tion to  the  haversack  and  jacket  and  trouser  pockets,  has 
proved  useful  for  taking  a  larger  amount  of  supplies  into  the 
fighting  line. 

56.    WATER   BOTTLES. 

It  has  been  found  necessary  during  hard  fighting  to  supply 
infantry  with  large  tin  water  bottles  (capable  of  being  slung) 
from  the  reserve  depots,  in  order  to  carry  a  double  supply  of 
water,  as  infantry  fighting  in  the  front  line  suffers  more  from 
thirst  than  from  hunger. 

57.   ENTRENCHING  TOOLS. 

Repeated  requests  from  all  arms  for  an  increased  supply  of 
entrenching  tools  must  be  met  by  their  provision  from  the 
reserve  depots  behind  the  battle  sector. 

58.    HAND     STEREOTELESCOPES. 

It  is  very  desirable  that  the  troops  be  supplied  with  hand 
stereotelescopes  as  they  are  easy  to  carry  and  are  therefore 
more  convenient  than  stereotelescopes  or  semistereotelescopes 
for  observers  during  heavy  fighting. 


GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES.  77 

59.    MAPS. 

The  original  supply  of  maps  was  insufficient,  not  only  as 
regards  quantity  but  also  as  regards  detail.  The  latter  was 
particularly  apparent  owing  to  the  fact  that  during  the  un- 
favorable conditions  for  observing  which  prevailed  firing  had 
at  first  to  be  carried  out  chiefly  by  the  map.  Even  if  it  could 
not  be  expected  that  all  the  numerous  battery  positions  (which 
in  comparison  to  the  original  front  in  June  are  well  behind 
the  line)  could  not  be  reconnoitered  and  fixed  beforehand  it 
would  nevertheless  have  been  of  advantage  if  a  large  number 
of  points  on  the  ground  in  question  had  been  fixed  and  in- 
serted on  the  map.  The  subsequent  supply  of  maps  was  also 
inadequate. 

60.    ILLUMINATING   MATERIAL. 

Arrangements  can  be  made  for  the  troops  to  have  at  their 
disposal  a  sufficient  supply  of  illuminating  material  by  the  issue 
of  a  certain  quantity  from  the  reserve  supply  of  paraffin,  lights, 
and  spare  batteries  for  electric  pocket  lamps.  For  the  artillery, 
illumination  is  absolutely  essential  when  firing  at  night  to  enable 
it  to  distinguish  the  reference  points,  to  set  fuses,  etc. 

X.  HORSES  AND  VEHICLES. 

61.    HORSES   AND   VEHICLES. 

The  horses  have  stood  their  strenuous  exertions  comparatively 
well.  This  may  be  attributed  to  the  fact  that  oats  were  avail- 
able in  considerable  quantities. 

The  supply  of  horses  and  vehicles  to  the  troops  has  reached 
the  utmost  limits  owing,  on  the  one  hand,  to  the  permanent  re- 
duction in  the  establishment  of  horses,  and,  on  the  other  hand, 
to  the  permanent  increase  in  fighting  material  and  articles  of 
equipment. 

For  bringing  up  trench  material  and  sending  forward  food 
and  ammunition  at  times  when  there  are  heavy  demands  for 
transport,  it  is  very  desirable  that  divisions  should  be  allotted 
motor  lorries  and  sections  of  horse-drawn  columns  from  the 
reserve  supply. 

In  the  case  of  machine  guns  the  absence  of  spare  horses,  which 
had  been  struck  off  the  establishment,  was  badly  felt.  In  one 


78          GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES. 

machine-gun  company  all  the  riding  horses,  including  that  of  the 
company  commander,  had,  owing  to  the  lack  of  spare  horses, 
to  be  used  as  draught  horses. 

XI.  FOOD  SUPPLY. 

62.   RATIONS. 

It  is  necessary  that  fresh  troops  -going  into  the  line,  when  the 
precise  state  of  the  battle  is  uncertain,  should  be  supplied  with 
the  third  iron  ration.  All  troops  were  unanimous  in  their 
request  for  increased  supplies  of  bread,  rusks,  sausage,  tinned 
sausages,  tinned  fat,  bacon,  tinned  and  smoked  meat,  and  to- 
bacco, in  addition.  There  was  also  urgent  need  for  solidified 
alcohol  for  the  preparation  of  hot  meals. 

In  various  quarters  the  necessity  for  a  plentiful  supply  of 
liquid  refreshments  of  all  kinds,  such  as  coffee,  tea,  cocoa, 
mineral  waters,  etc.,  is  emphasized  still  more.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  supply  of  salt  herrings,  which  increase  the  thirst, 
was  found  to  be,  as  a  general  rule,  very  undesirable.  There  is 
no  necessity  for  an  issue  of  alcoholic  drink  in  warm  and  dry 
weather. 

Similar  requests  for  improved  rations,  suited  to  the  prevailing 
conditions,  when  in  position,  were  made  by  the  artillery. 

63.    CANTEEN    STORES. 

The  fact  that  individual  batteries  of  a  field  artillery  Abteilung 
are  often,  for  tactical  reasons,  some  little  distance  apart,  and 
the  supply  wagons  are  engaged  in  bringing  up  rations,  has  the 
result  that  the  field  artillery  is  in  a  less  favorable  position  than 
the  infantry  as  regards  the  supply  of  canteen  stores,  which  are 
carried  on  the  supply  wagons  of  the  Abteilung  staffs.  A  large 
number  of  other  units,  by  regulation,  carry  no  canteen  stores 
with  them  and  have  to  depend  upon  the  friendly  assistance  of 
other  troops.  It  is  therefore  necessary,  on  principle,  that  in- 
fantry units  should  allow  the  sale  of  canteen  goods  to  artillery 
units,  etc. 

64.    RATION   SUPPLY. 

No  special  difficulties  arose.  The  supply  columns  proved 
sufficient.  The  corps  arranged  for  rations  to  be  brought  up  to 
the  divisional  depots. 


GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES.          79 

65.    CARRYING   UP   RATIONS. 

The  formation  of  carrying  parties  (see- also  Par.  IV,  B  32) 
was  of  great  use  in  bringing  up  rations  and  also  in  supplying 
troops  with  ammunition  and  stores.  Wherever  infantry  pioneer 
companies  were  not  used  for  this  purpose  these  carrying  parties 
were  formed  within  companies ;  this  has  the  advantage  of  the 
feeling  of  cameraderie  which  prevails  between  such  carrying 
parties  and  their  fighting  troops. 

During  a  battle  it  is  advisable  to  provide  each  battery  with 
four  "  food  carriers  "  from  the  reserve  supplies. 

XII.  MEDICAL  SERVICES. 


66.   BELIEFS. 

The  medical  units  of  the  corps  went  into  the  line  with  the 
divisions.  The  reliefs  necessitated  by  this  proved  very  useful, 
and  this  arrangement  is  preferable  to  taking  over  medical  units 
already  in  the  line  and  belonging  to  other  corps,  when  the 
latter  are  relieved.  The  duties  of  the  medical  services  during 
continuous  fighting  in  trench  warfare  are  so  strenuous  that  the 
medical  personnel  urgently  requires  relief  at  the  same  time  as 
the  troops.  Furthermore,  the  medical  personnel  takes  greater 
pleasure  in  its  difficult  task  and  carries  it  out  with  more  devo- 
tion if  it  is  assisting  the  formation  to  which  it  belongs. 

The  relief  of  a  field  ambulance  presents,  it  is  true,  many 
difficulties.  It  is  best  for  the  incoming  personnel  to  arrive  in 
the  morning  and  for  the  outgoing  personnel  to  leave  during  the 
afternoon  of  the  same  day.  Should  both  parties  be  spending 
the  night  in  the  same  place,  the  outgoing  personnel  must,  if 
necessary,  bivouac,  in  order  that  the  quarters  may  be  at  the  dis- 
posal of  the  personnel  on  duty. 

t!7.    MOTOR  AMBULANCES. 

The  attaching  of  a  motor-ambulance  column  to  the  army  group 
proved  itself  very  useful.  In  this  connection  it  was  found  suffi- 
cient to  place  only  a  small  proportion  of  the  cars  at  the  dis- 
posal of  the  casualty  clearing  stations  (Hauptverbandplatze). 
The  majority  must  be  kept  together,  so  as  to  have  a  supply  of 
cars  available  for  use  wherever  they  are  most  needed  for  the 
moment.  This  motor-ambulance  reserve  was  principally  used  to 
transport  cases  to  hospital  trains. 


80          GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES. 

68.    STRETCHER  BEARERS. 

It  was  of  great  advantage  that  before  the  corps  was  sent  into 
line  50  stretcher  bearers  had  been  trained  in  each  of  the  divi- 
sional field  recruit  depots,  and  were  still  there  at  the  time  the 
corps  went  in.  The  great  demand  for  stretcher  bearers,  which 
was  universal,  was  in  this  way  met  to  a  certain  extent. 

69.     COMMUNICATION     BETWEEN     MEDICAL    UNITS. 

Telephone  communications  also  assumed  great  importance  in 
consequence  of  the  wide  distribution  of  the  medical  arrange- 
ments. It  is  desirable  that  the  regulations  should  point  out  the 
importance  of  having  ample  telephone  communications  between 
all  the  various  medical  units  in  the  line,  so  that  these  are  not 
neglected  until  all  the  other  telephone  communications  have 
been  provided. 

XIII.  BILLETING  AND  TRAFFIC  BEHIND  THE  FRONT. 

70.   BILLETING. 

Owing  to  troops  in  the  front  line  being  constantly  relieved,  a 
frequent  change  of  town  majors  was  necessary.  In  the  case  of 
extensive  billeting,  difficulties  occurred  owing  to  town  majors 
having  first  to  acquaint  themselves  with  the  billeting  conditions 
whenever  troops  moved  in,  and,  further,  agricultural  products, 
special  buildings,  and  orders  in  force  could  not  be  properly 
handed  over.  Permanent  town  majors  must  be  appointed  for 
villages  in  the  areas  in  which  the  columns  and  trains  are  work- 
ing and  in  the  rear  portions  of  the  divisional  billeting  areas. 

At  times,  when  there  is  no  great  activity  at  the  front,  arrange- 
ments must  be  made  for  the  construction  of  large  wooden  sheds 
in  the  back  areas  to  accommodate  men  and  horses. 

71.    MILITARY    POLICE. 

The  police  service  behind  the  front  is  of  the  utmost  impor- 
tance. During  any  protracted  fighting,  men  of  sufficient  au- 
thority and  energy  should  be  posted  on  all  roads  leading  to  the 
rear  from  the  battle  zone.  Points  of  concentration  for  suspects 
should  be  arranged  by  the  divisions  as  close  as  possible  to  the 
dressing  stations  and  casualty  clearing  stations.  In  the  villages 
behind  the  fighting  line  not  only  should  there  be  a  strict  control 


GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES.  81 

on  all  exits  but  an  internal  control  should  also  be  inaugurated. 
Detailed  regulations  should  be  issued  by  the  town  major,  who 
will  appoint  sergeant  majors  and  other  personnel  for  carrying 
out  this  service. 

72.    ROAD  TRAFFIC. 

Regulation  of  traffic  on  all  roads  is  the  duty  of  the  field 
mounted  police,  assisted  by  cavalry.  Each  division  should  have 
at  least  one  through  road  allotted  to  it  whenever  possible. 

XIV.  RAILWAYS. 

73.    RAILWAY  BUILDINGS. 

The  fighting  front  of  the  army  group  Stein  (later  Armin)  was 
at  first  dependent  on  the  railway  station  at  Bapaume  for  the 
whole  of  its  supplies.  This  station  was  complete  and  well  con- 
structed. During  the  first  days  of  the  operations  the  railway 
buildings  came  under  fire,  trains  could  only  run  into  Bapaume 
during  the  night,  and  the  detraining  station  could  no  longer 
be  used.  The  stations  under  construction  further  to  the  rear 
were  not  yet  complete.  In  addition  to  the  detraining  stations 
required  in  normal  times,  well-constructed  detraining  stations 
must  be  provided  so  far  back  that  even  if  the  first  or  second  line 
has  to  be  abandoned  the  enemy's  artillery  will  not  be  able  to 
shell  them  (about  13  kilometers). 

Even  in  quiet  times  all  railway  construction  must  be  carried 
out  from  this  point  of  view,  taking  into  consideration  the  fact 
that  during  operations  on  a  large  scale  at  least  three  times  the 
usual  number  of  men  must  be  provided  for.  The  wish  expressed 
by  the  troops  that  railways  should  be  provided  to  facilitate  the 
transport  of  material  to  the  front-line  trenches,  and  that  the 
pioneer  depots,  sawmills,  etc.,  which  in  normal  times  are  close 
to  the  front,  should  be  connected  by  railways  is  easily  under- 
stood. On  no  account,  however,  should  comprehensive  railway 
establishments  further  in  rear  be  neglected;  during  the  battle 
period  these  insure  supplies,  although  during  quiet  periods  their 
importance  is  not  so  apparent. 

All  such  railway  stations  must  be  provided  with  long  sidings 
for  ammunition,  pioneer,  supply,  and  hospital  trains.     In  addi- 
tion, each  siding  will  be  provided  with  good  roads  to  and  from  it 
and  good  dumping  places. 
29267°— 18 6 


82          GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES. 

74.    DETRAINING  PERSONNEL. 

During  important  operations  the  detraining  personnel  must 
be  permanent.  The  changes  in  commanders  and  men  detailed 
from  the  front  for  this  duty  caused  by  the  continual  reliefs  of 
the  fighting  troops  had  a  very  disturbing  effect,  and  every  one  of 
these  men  is  urgently  required  in  the  front  line.  The  work  at 
the  detraining  stations  requires  a  staff  with  knowledge  of  local 
conditions,  under  the  leadership  of  an  experienced  and  ener- 
getic official.  Insufficient  staff  is  the  cause  of  slow  detraining, 
congestion  at  the  stations,  and  blocks  in  the  traffic  along  the 
whole  section  of  the  line. 

One  officer  provided  with  a  motor  car  must  be  made  responsible 
for  the  whole  of  the  detraining  arrangements. 

(Signed)  SIXT  v.  ARMIN, 

General  Officer  Commanding. 


IV. 

LESSONS  DRAWN  FROM 

THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  SOMME 

By  STEIN'S  GROUP1 


1  General  von  Stein  (commander  of  the  Fourteenth  Reserve  Corps)  was  actually  in  com- 
mand of  all  the  German  troops  between  Monchy  and  the  Somme  at  the  beginning  of  the 
allied  offensive. 

83 


CONTENTS. 


1.  Construction  of  trenches:  Page. 

First  line  position 87 

Obstacles 88 

Dugouts 88 

2.  Method  of  holding  the  position ! 88 

3.  Strength  of  garrison 89 

4.  Reserves 89 

Position 89 

Strength 90 

5.  Machine  guns 90 

Siting 90 

Employment 90 

6.  Effect  of  British  artillery 91 

7.  Communications 91 

Buried  cables 91 

Efficiency  of  telephone  system 91 

Methods  recommended 92 

Buried  telephone  cable 92 

Light  signaling 92 

Wireless 92 

Carrier  pigeons 93 

8.  Signals  for  barrage  fire 93 

9.  Construction  of  battery  positions. 93 

Gun  emplacements 93 

Accommodation  for  men  and  ammunition 93 

10.  Artillery  ammunition  supply 94 

Quantity  in  battery  positions 94 

Corps  reserve 94 

Average  daily  expenditure 94 

Highest  expenditure 95 

Quantity  which  should  be  maintained  in  the  battery- 
positions 95 

Gas  shell,  effect  of 95 

11.  Widths  of  zones  of  barrage  fire 95 

84 


CONTENTS.  85 

Page. 

12.  Employment  of  aeroplanes,  with  special  reference  to  their 

cooperation  with  artillery 96 

Establishment  recommended 96 

13.  Food  supply 96 

14.  Medical  services 97 

Dressing  station 97 

Halting  places  for  ambulance  vehicles 97 

Main  dressing  stations 97 

Collecting  stations  for  slightly  wounded 97 

Field  hospitals 98 

Ambulance  sections 98 

15.  British  tactics 98 

Infantry,  machine  guns  and  trench  mortars , 98 

Artillery 99 

Gas  and  smoke  clouds. . .  99 


IV. 

LESSONS  DRAWN  FROM  THE  BATTLE  OF  THE 
SOMME. 


To  First  Army  Headquarters: 

Herewith  replies  to  the  questions  raised  in  the  memorandum 
from  Gallwitz's  army  group. 

1.  Have  the  principles  on  which  the  construction  of  trenches 
has  been  carried  out  up  to  date  proved  to  be  sound,  par- 
ticularly as  regards  entanglements,  the  depth  and  dimen- 
sions of  mined  dugouts,  and  the  nature  and  size  of  the 
entrances  to  dugouts? 

The  following  orders  were  issued  by  corps  headquarters : 
"  The  first-line  position  will  be  held  if  the  enemy  attacks.  It 
must  therefore  be  repaired  immediately  before  any  other  work 
is  undertaken.  It  consists  of  the  first,  second,  and  third  trenches, 
and  should  have,  if  possible,  two  rows  of  wire  entanglement  in 
front  of  each  trench.  There  should  be  at  least  two  communica- 
tion trenches  in  each  company  sector  from  the  third  trench  to 
the  first  trench,  but  the  points  at  which  they  enter  and  leave 
the  second  trench  should  not  be  opposite  one  another.  The 
number  of  dugouts  should  be  increased  until  there  are  suffi- 
cient to  accommodate  the  infantry  garrison  which  the  division 
considers  necessary  for  the  repulse  of  a  prepared  attack. 

"Accommodation  should  be  provided  first  of  all  for  the  pres- 
ent garrison  and  supports  in  the  first  trench  and  for  the  present 
sector  reserves  in  the  second  and  third  trenches.  Further  con- 
struction may  then  be  taken  in  hand.  Each  battalion  sector 
must  have  at  least  two  through  communication  trenches. 
***** 

"The  intermediate  and  second-line  positions  consist  of  at 
least  two  trenches,  each  provided  with  two  rows  of  wire  en- 
tanglements, which  should  be  on  pickets,  and  the  same  number 
of  communication  trenches  as  in  the  first-line  position.  Each  of 

87 


88          GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES. 

the  present  regimental  sectors  must  be  provided  with  sufficient 
accommodation  for  at  least  one  battalion. 

"  In  view  of  the  heavy  guns  which  the  enemy  is  employing, 
the  thickness  of  earth  above  dugouts  should  be  increased  for 
any  new  ones  that  are  constructed.  It  may  be  as  much  as  19J 
feet,  depending  on  the  nature  of  the  soil,  but  the  depth  below 
ground  must  not  prevent  a  quick  response  to  an  alarm.  All 
dugouts  must  have  at  least  two  entrances.  Dugouts  should  be 
constructed  under  the  parapet,  not  under  the  parados,  and  the 
entrances  should  be  in  the  front  slope  of  the  trench." 

These  principles  have  on  the  whole  proved  sound.  Partly 
owing  to  the  increase  in  the  number  and  effect  of  the  enemy's 
heavy  artillery,  the  following  alterations  are  suggested : 

Obstacles. — There  should  be  two  or  three  rows  of  wire  en- 
tanglement, each  from  3  to  5£  yards  deep,  with  an  interval  of 
from  5^  to  11  yards  between  each,  this  interval  being  provided 
with  trip  wires.  The  outer  edge  of  the  farthest  entanglement 
should  be  about  55  yards  from  the  trench.  The  wire  should  not 
always  run  parallel  with  the  trench,  but  should  follow  the  lie 
of  the  ground. 

Dugouts. — The  thickness  of  earth  overhead  should  be  from 
23  to  26  feet,  and  more  in  the  case  of  command  posts  and  the 
dugcJuts  for  the  medical  services,  telephones,  and  kitchens.  The 
dugouts  for  the  men  should  have  sufficient  accommodation  for 
two  groups  (i.  e.,  16  men),  with  two  entrances  separated  by  a 
traverse.  Several  dugouts  should  be  connected  up  to  form 
corridor  dugouts  with  accommodation  for  a  platoon.  The  dug- 
out recesses  should  be  on  the  same  side  as  the  entrances — not 
facing  them.  Entrances  should  be  4  feet  by  5J  feet,  and  should 
be  well  stayed  and  braced  to  increase  their  power  of  resistance. 
Inclined  galleries  offer  more  resistance  than  frames  built  in  on 
steps  one  below  the  other. 

2.  What    were    the    garrisons    of    first,    second,    and    third 
trenches  and  of  the  retired  positions? 

The  following  orders  were  issued  by  corps  headquarters : 
"The  garrison  of  the  first  trench  of  the  first-line  position 
should  be  strong  enough  to  repulse  the  enemy's  attack,  assum- 
ing that  the  men  reach  the  parapet  in  time,  but  no  stronger. 

"  The  second  trench  of  the  first-line  position-  is  garrisoned  by 
the  supports,  one  portion  of  which  is  specially  detailed  to  de- 
fend the  entrances  to  the  communication  trenches,  while  the 
other  portion  consists  of  strong  specially  formed  bombing  parties, 


GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES.          89 

which  are  held  in  readiness  to  rush  forward  at  ouce  to  the 
support  of  the  foremost  trench.  This  maneuver  must  be  prac- 
ticed as  if  it  were  a  regular  drill.  Local  conditions  may  make 
it  necessary  to  station  part  of  the  support  in  the  third  trench. 

"  The  fighting  strength  of  both  the  front  trenches  would  soon 
be  exhausted  if  the  sector  reserves  were  not  put  in.  These 
must  therefore  be  brought  close  up  in  good  time,  either  into  the 
third  trench  or  into  special  reserve  trenches.  In  case  of  an  at- 
tack they  should  be  moved  forward  into  the  second  (or  third) 
trench  to  replace  the  reinforcements  which  have  already  gone 
forward  (the  supports)  and  continue  the  task  allotted  to  the 
latter." 

The  method  in  which  the  trenches  were  occupied  on  the 
morning  of  July  1  is  shown  on  the  attached  1/80,000  map.  (Not 
attached. ) 

From  this  it  will  be  seen  that  the  first-line  and  intermediate 
positions  were  occupied  by  the  regiments  holding  the  foremost 
line.  Where  the  line  ran  more  or  less  straight  the  companies 
were  organized  in  depth,  so  that  part  were  in  the  first  trench, 
part  in  the  second,  and  sometimes  even  in  the  third.  The  bat- 
talion reserves  were  in  the  third  trench,  the  regimental  reserves 
in  the  intermediate  position. 

3.  Did  the  garrison  prove  to  be  too  strong  or  too  weak? 

Most  regimental  sectors  were  too  wide.  The  width  of  front 
held  by  an  infantry  regiment  which  has  to  resist  a  hostile  attack 
prepared  by  heavy  artillery  fire  should  not  exceed  1,300  yards, 
so  that  the  regiment  can  be  organized  for  action  in  depth.  It 
is,  as  a  rule,  sufficient  to  have  one  man  to  every  2  to  3  yards  as 
an  emergency  garrison  in  the  first  trench. 

4.  Where  were  the  reserves,  and  were  they  strong  enough? 
Were   the   complete  units  held  in  reserve   posted   in  the 
villages  or  in  the  trenches? 

The  positions  of  the  reserves  are  marked  on  the  attached 
1/80,000  map.  (Not  attached.) 

The  following  orders  were  issued  by  corps  headquarters : 
"  The  sectojr  commander  must  be  relieved  of  anxiety  as  to  his 
forces  being  exhausted  too  soon  by  moving  up  the  divisional 
reserves.  They  should  not  be  left  behind  in  villages  in  the  rear, 
but  should  be  brought  up  to  reserve  trenches  on  the  battle  field 
as  soon  as  the  threatened  sector  can  be  ascertained  from  the 
direction  of  the  enemy's  artillery  fire.  Whether  they  stay  there 
one  day  or  several  days  is  a  matter  of  indifference. 


90  QEKMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES. 

"In  critical  situations  it  is  not  sound  to  quarter  reserves  in 
villages  immediately  behind  the  front.  It  has  nearly  always 
proved  impossible  to  assemble  the  troops  quickly  when  they 
were  scattered  in  numerous  cellars,  etc.,  in  a  village  which  was 
being  heavily  shelled.  In  such  cases  the  reserves  should  be  in 
the  trenches." 

In  accordance  with  these  orders,  the  greater  part  of  the  divi- 
sional reserves  was  stationed  on  the  second-line  position.  In  cases 
where,  owing  to  the  shortage  of  working  parties,  there  were  not 
enough  dugouts  in  the  second-line  position,  a  small  part  of  these 
reserves  was  obliged  to  remain  in  villages  beyond  the  principal 
zone  of  fire.  In  the  case  of  the  second  guard  reserve  division, 
the  tactical  situation  made  it  possible  to  retain  a  battalion  in 
the  huts  at  the  Bois  de  Logeast. 

The  reserves  for  the  28th  Reserve  Division  and  12th  Division 
were  not  sufficient.  In  the  case  of  the  12th  Division,  they  con- 
sisted, on  the  evening  of  June  30,  of  troops  which  had  been  with- 
drawn from  the  first-line  position  because  the  divisional  com- 
mander considered  that  they  had  been  badly  shaken  by  artillery 
fire. 

The  corps  reserves  consisted,  on  the  morning  of  July  1,  of 
the  16th  Bavarian  Infantry  Regiment,  four  squadrons  of  dis- 
mounted cavalry,  and  the  Wiirttemberg  Cyclist  Company.  These 
were  too  weak.  To  be  able  to  meet  all  possible  situations,  two 
complete  divisions  would  have  been  necessary,  one  of  which 
should  have  been  in  and  near  Bapaume  and  the  other  south  of 
that  place. 
5.  How  can  our  machine  guns  be  most  effectively  placed 

and    employed?      For    instance,    on    commanding    points, 

firing  from  trees  (raised  platforms). 

The  following  orders  were  issued  by  Corps  headquarters : 

"  When  the  ground  permits  of  machine  guns  being  employed 
on  commanding  points  in  the  second  and  third  trenches,  with  a 
view  to  firing  over  the  first  trench,  every  advantage  should  be 
taken  of  it.  It  is  advisable  to  employ  the  bulk  of  the  machine 
guns  not  in,  but  behind,  the  first  trench.  When  fixing  their 
siting  the  possibility  of  delivering  both  frontal  and  flanking 
fire  must  not  be  forgotten. 

"  Used  as  an  emergency  garrison  for  the  intermediate  or 
second-line  position,  they  may  prevent  a  break  through  if  the 
enemy  succeeds  in  overrunning  the  first-line  position. 

"  Machine-gun  units  are  particularly  suitable  for  employ- 
ment as  a  commander's  mobile  reserve. 


GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES.          91 

"  Machine  guns  which  are  left  in  breastworks  or  trenches  dur- 
ing the  enemy's  intensive  bombardment  will  be  destroyed  unless 
they  are  covered  by  very  strong  concrete  emplacements.  It  will 
generally  be  impossible  to  erect  such  concrete  structures  in  the 
first  trench.  Machine  guns  must,  as  a  rule,  be  kept  in  the  dug- 
outs of  their  crews  until  the  enemy  assaults,  and  must  then  be 
placed  rapidly  in  position  at  suitable  points  on  the  parapet, 
without  making  use  of  the  sledges,  as  these  are  too  heavy  for 
trench  warfare." 

No  alterations  are  necessary  in  these  orders.  The  effect  of 
the  machine  guns  and  the  surprise  of  the  English  at  finding  so 
many  intact  machine  guns  after  a  seven  days'  artillery  prepara- 
tion, as  ascertained  from  numerous  prisoners'  statements,  are 
well  known. 

No  machine  guns  were  placed  in  trees. 

6.  What  nature  of  the  enemy's   guns,  trench   mortars,   and 
projectiles   caused   the   largest   number  of   casualties,   and 
what  caused  the  most  damage  to  the  trenches? 

The  largest  number  of  casualties  was  caused  by  artillery  fire 
(H.  E.  shell  and  shrapnel  up  to  12  centimeters,  i.  e.,  4.7  inches). 

The  trenches  were  damaged  most  by  heavy  trench  mortar 
projectiles ;  next  to  these,  heavy  shell  from  15  centimeter  (6 
inch),  upwards  caused  the  most  destruction. 

7.  Was   communication   maintained    between   the   front   line 
and  battalion  and  regimental  battle  headquarters?     What 
means  were  employed?     Have  you  any  proposals? 

The  following  orders  were  issued  by  corps  headquarters: 

"  Buried  cables  have  proved  very  successful  in  the  reserve 
corps.  When  crossing  the  open  they  are  buried  to  a  depth 
of  at  least  5f  feet,  and  in  trenches  they  are  laid  at  least  2J 
feet  below  the  surface  of  the  sole  of  the  trench.  When  laying 
new  lines,  a  greater  depth  is  advisable  (6£  feet  and  3|  feet). 
Further,  when  cables  are  led  into  dugouts,  command  posts,  etc., 
they  must  be  laid  underground." 

In  the  sectors  which  had  been  prepared  by  the  12th  Division 
from  Mametz  to  the  Somme,  the  lines  were  for  the  most  part 
laid  above  ground. 

On  26-6-16  the  corps  reported  to  army  headquarters  in  its 
morning  report: 

"The  telephone  communications  on  the  old  front  of  the  re- 
serve corps  have  proved  reliable.  In  the  Mametz  sector,  which 


92  GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES. 

has  just  been  taken  over,  and  in  the  12th  Division  they  are 
conspicuously  bad." 

On  30-6-16  the  telephone  communications  in  the  2d  Guard 
Reserve  Division,  52d  Division,  and  26th  Reserve  Division  were 
still,  on  the  whole,  good.  In  the  Thiepval  sector,  which  was 
particularly  heavily  shelled  by  the  enemy's  heavy  artillery, 
communication  between  battalions  and  companies  had  to  be 
maintained  by  means  of  runners.  In  the  110th  and  lllth 
Reserve  Regiments  of  the  28th  Reserve  Division,  which  were 
also  much  shelled  by  heavy  artillery  (9.2  inch),  it  was  possible 
to  make  uninterrupted  use  of  the  telephones  on  the  buried 
cable  lines  in  the  first-line  position  and  in  the  artillery  posi- 
tion. 

The  lines  between  the  artillery  and  the  infantry  were,  in  the 
course  of  time,  entirely  destroyed.  In  the  sector  of  the  109th 
Reserve  Regiment  and  62d  Regiment  telephone  communication 
ceased  almost  entirely  by  25-6-16,  while  in  the  sector  of  the 
63d  Regiment  much  damage  was  caused  a  little  later.  On 
30-6-16  runners  took  the  place  of  telephone  communication  in 
all  three  regimental  sectors  of  the  left  wing. 

Proposals. — Exposed  telephone  lines  should  be  laid  only  far 
behind  the  front  line;  if  possible,  never  in  front  of  the  third- 
line  position ;  even  in  rear  of  this  position  they  should  be  re- 
placed by  buried  cable  in  those  villages  which,  on  account  of 
the  proximity  of  a  railway  station,  etc.,  are  liable  to  bombard- 
ment by  heavy  artillery.  In  front  of  the  third-line  position 
buried  cable  (armored  cable)  should  be  laid  at  a  depth  of  10 
feet  across  open  country  and  5  to  6i  feet  when  beneath  the 
sole  of  a  trench  provided  with  trench  boards.  The  construc- 
tion of  the  cable  trenches  must  be  concealed  as  much  as  possi- 
ble from  the  enemy  (work  to  be  carried  out  by  night  or  in 
misty  weather,  and  trenches  covered  up  so  as  to  conceal  them 
from  aeroplane  observation).  The  routes  of  the  cable  trenches 
must  be  marked  on  the  ground  by  stone  slabs  and  recorded  on 
maps  which  can  be  given  to  the  repair  detachments. 

Telephone  communications  alone,  however  carefully  they 
may  be  constructed,  are  not  sufficient.  Several  means  of  com- 
munication must  always  be  available. 

At  many  points  on  the  front  the  light-signaling  stations  have 
proved  very  successful.  Small  wireless  stations  are  said  to  be 
under  trial.  No  information  as  to  the  result  of  these  experi- 
ments is  yet  available. 


GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES.  93 

Carrier  pigeons  and  communication  by  means  of  aeroplanes 
are  also  said  to  have  been  effective  at  other  points  on  the 
western  front.  The  Fourteenth  Reserve  Corps  has  not  had 
sufficient  experience  with  these. 

When  all  others  fail,  the  runner  still  remains  as  the  last 
means  of  communication.  Numerous  runners  must  be  trained 
to  know  the  ground.  Dugouts  should  be  constructed  at  inter- 
vals along  the  routes  used.  Runners  should  never  be  sent  out 
singly. 

8.  Have  the  signals  for  requesting  barrage   fire   proved  ef- 
fective? 

The  barrage  fire  signals  have  proved  effective.  The  light- 
signals  should  always  be  followed,  immediately  if  possible,  by 
detailed  reports  by  telephone  from  the  front  line  to  the  artil- 
lery group  commanders.  Better  arrangements  should  be  made 
for  the  supply  (of  signal  lights).  The  English  imitated  our 
barrage  fire  signals.  To  meet  such  eventualities,  an  ample 
supply  of  a  different  kind  of  signal  should  be  available  in  the 
Army,  or  better  still  with  the  corps,  so  that  the  signal  can  be 
changed  immediately. 

9.  Has  the  construction  of  the  battery  positions  proved  satis- 
factory?    What  is  the  best  method  of  storing  the  reserve 
of  ammunition  with  the  batteries? 

The  gun  emplacements  should  be  covered  in  with  concrete 
overhead  cover  only  if  the  latter  is  sufficiently  thick  to  keep 
out  9.2-inch  shells.  Weaker  concrete  cover  is  harmful,  as  the 
damage  to  the  guns  is  thereby  increased  if  £he  concrete  is 
penetrated,  and  buried  guns  take  longer  to  extricate.  Further, 
it  requires  a  very  long  time  to  repair  concrete  emplacements. 

If  it  is  not  possible  to  protect  the  gun  emplacements  against 
shell  of  the  largest  calibers  by  providing  concrete  of  sufficient 
thickness  or  strong  cover  of  logs  dogged  together,  it  is  better  to 
put  up  with  splinter-proof  cover  (without  concrete).  This 
will  be  the  most  usual  form  of  cover. 

To  guard  against  the  incendiary  effect  of  shell,  very  little 
timber  should  be  used  for  concealing  gun  emplacements ;  if 
used,  it  should  *be  covered  with  sheet  iron  or  painted  with 
asbestos  paint. 

Gun  detachments  and  ammunition  should  be  accommodated 
in  and  close  to  (50-100  meters)  the  batteries,  in  dugouts  pro- 
vided with  at  least  23  feet  of  earth  cover.  The  ammunition 


94          GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES. 

dugouts   situated   close  to   the  batteries   should   be  connected 
with  the  latter  by  blinded  trenches  or  by  mined  galleries. 

10.  Were  the  supplies  of  ammunition  sufficient?  What  re- 
sults were  obtained  with  T-shell  (lachrymatory  gas 
shell)? 

The  supplies  of  ammunition  on  24-6-16  consisted  of — 

1.  The  ammunition  stored  in  the  battery  positions. 

2.  The  ammunition  in  the  divisional  columns. 

3.  The  corps  reserve  in  columns  or  in  depots. 
The  quantities  stored  in  the  battery  positions  were: 

For  a  field  gun  battery,  2,400  rounds. 

For  a  light  field  howitzer  battery,  2,000  rounds. 

For  a  heavy  field  howitzer  battery,  1,200  rounds  and  300 
T  gas  shell. 

For  each  (21  cm.)  mortar,  220  rounds. 

The  light   ammunition   columns  of  the   field   artillery   were 
full,  the  battery  columns  for  the  heavy  field  howitzers  each 
contained  an  average  of  300  rounds,  and  the  battery  columns 
for  the  (21  cm.)  mortars  were  almost  empty. 
The  corps  reserve  consisted  of: 

25,000  rounds  for  field  guns. 

3,750  rounds  for  light  field  howitzers. 

1,200  rounds  for  heavy  field  howitzers. 

750  rounds  for  (21  cm.)   mortars. 

The  average  daily  expenditure  during  the  artillery  duel  from 
the  24th  to  the  30th  of  June  amounted  to — 

For  a  field-gun  battery,  1,500  rounds. 

For  a  light  field-howitzer  battery,  1,050  rounds. 

For  a  heavy  field-howitzer  battery,  520  rounds. 

For  each  (21  cm.)  mortar,  100  rounds. 

On  July  1,  the  day  of  the  infantry  attack,  the  average  ex- 
penditure was : 

For  a  field-gun  battery,  2,270  rounds. 

For  a  light  field-howitzer  battery,  1,800  rounds. 

For  a  heavy  field-howitzer  battery.  940  rounds. 

For  each  (21  cm.)  mortar,  200  rounds. 

The  quantities  stored  in  the  battery  positions  conseqxiently 
sufficed  to  meet  the  average  expenditure.  There  are,  how- 
ever, occasions  which  involve  a  specially  high  expenditure  by 
individual  batteries;  for  instance,  individual  batteries  on  indi- 
vidual days  fired: 


GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES. 


95 


Field-gun  battery,  over  4,500  rounds. 

Light  field-howitzer  battery,  over  3,000  rounds. 

Heavy  field-howitzer  battery,  over  1,200  rounds. 

A  single  (21  cm.)  mortar,  over  250  rounds. 
Although  it  is  probably  not  possible  to  raise  the  "  iron 
ration "  of  the  field-gun  batteries  as  high  as  4,500  rounds, 
nevertheless  the  figures  for  the  highest  expenditure  show  that 
the  average  expenditure  should  not  be  taken  as  a  basis  for 
determining  this  "  iron  ration." 

Consequently,  it  is  considered  essential  that  the  following 
amounts  should  be  maintained  in  the  battery  positions: 

For  a  field-gun  battery,  3,000  to  3,500  rounds. 

For  a  light  field-howitzer  battery,  3,000  rounds. 

For  a  heavy  field-howitzer  battery,  1,500  rounds  and  300 
T  gas  shell. 

For  each  (21  cm.)  mortar,  250  rounds. 

Batteries  to  which  ammunition  can  be  brought  up  by  day 
can  manage  with  a  smaller  "iron  ration." 

As  the  supplies  were  brought  up  in  good  time,  no  serious 
want  of  ammunition  was  felt.  It  is  considered  essential  that 
the  whole  of  the  divisional  columns  be  kept  filled.  The  corps 
reserve  must  be  regulated  in  accordance  with  the  facilities  for 
bringing  up  supplies  from  the  army  to  the  corps.  If  these  had 
not  been  good  as  regards  the  Fourteeth  Reserve  Corps  (some 
of  the  ammunition  trains  were  able  to  run  beyond  Bapaume), 
the  reserves,  especially  in  the  case  of  light  and  heavy  field 
howitzers,  would  certainly  have  proved  inadequate. 

The  bombardment  of  hostile  groups  of  batteries  with  T  gas 
shell  repeatedly  caused  a  marked  diminution  in  the  enemy's 
fire,  a  fact  which  was  also  observed  by  the  infantry  in  the 
front  line.  T  gas  shell  should  be  stored  in  special  dugouts. 

11.  How  wide  were  the  zones  of  barrage  fire?     What  width 
is  necessary? 

The  average  widths  of  the  zones  of  barrage  fire  for  a  field 
battery  were: 


24-6-16 

1-7-16 

In  the  2d  Guard  Reserve  Division  

Yards. 
395 

Yards. 
440 

In  the  52d  Division  

410 

385 

In  the  26th  Reserve  Division.          .             

455 

440 

In  the  28th  Reserve  Division  

620 

440 

In  the  12th  Division  

550 

435 

96          GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES. 

The  widths  of  these  zones  were  too  great.  A  field  battery  is 
unable  to  cover  more  than  a  width  of  220  yards  and  yet  insure 
that  the  barrage  is  effective  in  spite  of  guns  being  put  out  of 
action  and  of  the  absence  of  support  from  neighboring  sectors. 

12.  What  suggestions  have  you  for  the  employment  of  our 
aviators,  with  special  reference  to  cooperation  between  the 
artillery  flights  and  the  artillery? 

On  June  24  the  reinforced  Fourteenth  Reserve  Corps,  holding 
the  front  from  Monchy  to  the  Somme  (i.  e.,  a  front  of  more  than 
19  miles),  had  at  its  disposal  4$  flights  and  a  pursuit  flight 
( Jagclstaffel),  making  a  total  of  28  machines. 

This  allotment  was  insufficient  to  maintain  command  of  the 
air  against  the  enemy  who  was  far  superior  in  numbers.  Fur- 
ther, the  new  English  battle  planes  were  superior  to  our  owrn. 

The  organization  of  the  aviation  units  wras  not  suited  to  their 
effective  employment.  Reconnaissance  machines  and  single- 
seater  battle  planes  should  form  part  of  the  same  unit. 

Proposals. —  (1)  A  corps  flight  should  consist  of  12  reconnais- 
sance machines  and  8  single-seater  battle  planes,  which  mutually 
assist  each  other.  (2)  The  artillery  of  every  division  must  be 
allotted  an  establishment  of  one  artillery  flight,  consisting  of 
six  machines.  The  permanent  cooperation  of  the  same  battery 
and  artillery  commanders  with  the  same  artillery  aviators  is 
absolutely  essential. 

The  machines  of  both  the  ordinary  and  the  artillery  flights 
must  be  employed  offensively.  The  flights  of  hostile  machines 
behind  our  front  can  only  be  restricted  by  forcing  the  enemy  to 
defend  himself  over  his  own  ground.  The  artillery  machines 
with  their  escorts  should  form  a  continual  protection  for  our 
own  front. 

13.  How  was  the  feeding  of  the  garrisons  of  the  trenches 
carried  out  during  the  fighting? 

The  quantity  of  "  iron  ration*  "  in  the  position  was  increased 
to  5  days'  rations.  Ample  supplies  of  mineral  water,  cigars, 
chocolate,  and  solidified  alcohol  for  warming  up  food  were 
provided.  The  arrangements  proved  exceptionally  satisfactory. 

The  provision  of  kitchens  and  storerooms  in  mined  dugouts 
and  of  spare  kitchens  is  necessary.  Carrying  parties  with 
baskets,  etc.,  to  carry  up  food  into  the  front  line  during  pauses 
in  the  artillery  fire,  are  also  required. 


GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES.  97 

14.  Medical  services. 

Dressing  stations  (Truppenverbandpldtze) . — In  rear  of  every 
battalion  sector  it  is  advisable  to  have  one  bombproof  medical 
dugout  with  accommodation  for  30  wounded,  or  two  dugouts 
each  for  20  wounded.  It  is  necessary  to  provide  these  dugouts 
with  an  ample  supply  of  medical  stores,  rations,  and  lighting 
materials  sufficient  for  five  days  or  longer.  Telephone  appara- 
tus, stretchers  (hand  and  wheeled)  and  oxygen  breathing  appa- 
ratus are  also  necessary.  The  medical  personnel  should  include 
squads  from  the  medical  companies  under  competent  leaders 
who  know  their  way  about  the  whole  sector. 

As  regards  the  artillery,  it  is  necessary  to  provide  a  bomb- 
proof medical  dugout,  a  surgeon,  the  necessary  personnel,  and 
the  stores  mentioned  above  for  every  four  batteries,  assuming 
that  they  are  not  far  apart.  This  dugout  should  have  a  cen- 
tral position  close  to  a  main  road. 

Halting  places  for  ambulance  vehicles  (Wagenhaltepldtze) . — 
These  should  be  situated  not  more  than  4,400  yards  behind  the 
front,  as  otherwise  the  transport  from  the  dressing  stations  is 
too  exhausting  for  the  stretcher  bearers  and  lasts  too  long  for 
the  wounded.  Bombproof  dugouts  for  30  to  40  men  should  be 
constructed  at  these  halting  places.  Experience  shows  that  a 
large  number  of  wounded  tends  to  collect  at  these  points. 

Main  dressing  stations  (Hauptverbandplatze). — These  should 
as  a  rule  be  sited  beyond  the  zone  of  artillery  fire,  in  bomb- 
proof shelters  near  a  main  road.  It  is  necessary  that  eight 
motor  ambulances,  instead  of  four,  should  be  provided  for  the 
front  held  by  a  division. 

One  medical  company  per  division  is  not  sufficient  to  provide 
the  necessary  number  of  stretcher  bearers  in  trench  warfare  if 
the  battle  lasts  for  several  days.  Owing  to  the  much  greater 
difficulties  of  transport  in  the  trenches,  the  stretcher  bearers 
quickly  become  exhausted  and  must  be  frequently  relieved  if 
the  removal  of  the  wounded  is  to  be  carried  out  without  a 
hitch.  The  establishment  of  a  division  should  comprise  not 
less  than  two  medical  companies. 

Collecting  stations  for  slightly  wounded  (Leichtverwundeten- 
Sammelpldtze) . — A  collecting  station  for  slightly  wounded  was 
established  in  each  division,  from  which  men  who  were  slightly 
wounded  were  dispatched  to  the  ambulance  section  (Kranken- 
transport  Abteilung).  This  was  not  sound  in  practice,  as  a 
29267°— 18 7 


98          GERMAN  AND  ATTSTEIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES. 

large  number  of  wounded  collected  at  the  ambulance  sections 
and  it  was  not  possible  to  arrange  immediate  transport  for 
them. 

It  would  be  better  to  arrange  for  a  corps  collecting  station 
for  slightly  wounded,  where  these  could  be  treated  and  be 
properly  bandaged.  They  would  then  be  evacuated  as  ambu- 
lances became  available. 

Field  hospitals  (Feldlazaretten). — Field  hospitals  which  have 
been  formed  should  have  four  motor  ambulances  allotted  to 
them. 

Ambulance  sections  (Krankentransport  Abteilungen) . — 
Where  the  sector  held  by  a  corps  is  of  considerable  width  am- 
bulance sections  must  be  divided  up  and  allotted  to  more  than 
one  railway  station.  Hospital  trains  should  be  shunted  on  to 
sidings  so  that  they  do  not  interfere  with  other  railway  traffic. 
15.  What  experience  was  gained  regarding  the  enemy's  tac- 
tics, infantry,  machine  guns,  artillery,  and  trench  mortars? 

Infantry,  machine  guns,  and  trench  mortars. — Previous  to  the 
attack  the  enemy's  infantry  patrols  showed  increased  activity. 
The  foremost  trenches  were  probably  lightly  held  during  the 
intense  artillery  fire.  The  troops  for  the  assault  were  appar- 
ently assembled  in  the  trenches  in  rear. 

The  attack  on  July  1  was  well  prepared,  and  the  infantry  was 
splendidly  equipped  with  all  kinds  of  weapons  for  the  close 
combat.  It  was  provided  with  a  large  number  of  Lewis  guns, 
which  were  brought  into  action  very  quickly  and  skillfully  in 
newly  captured  positions.  It  is  very  desirable  that  our  infantry 
should  be  equipped  with  a  large  number  of  light  machine  guns 
of  this  description  in  order  to  increase  the  intensity  of  its  fire. 

The  individual  English  soldier  is  well  trained  and  shows  per- 
sonal bravery.  The  majority  of  the  officers,  however,  are  not 
sufficiently  thoroughly  trained.  They  are  lacking  in  ability  to 
exploit  a  success  and  to  follow  it  up  quickly. 

Small  blue  lights  and  small  flags  are  said  to  have  been  used 
by  the  enemy  to  communicate  to  the  rear  and  to  indicate  the  line 
reached.  Telephone  connections  were  established  very  rapidly. 

The  enemy's  trench  mortars  were  skillfuly  served  and  pro- 
duced effective  results. 

The  German  infantry  is,  nevertheless,  superior  to  the  English 
and  will  be  still  more  so  when  it  is  better  equipped  with  weapons 
for  the  close  combat  and  with  light  portable  machine  guns. 


GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES.  99 

Artillery. — The  enemy's  artillery  registered  skillfully  and 
inconspicuously.  The  guns  proved  accurate;  the  effect  of  the 
shells  was  good,  but  the  percentage  of  blinds  was  high. 

On  many  occasions  the  enemy  purposely  refrained  from  shell- 
ing batteries  and  observation  posts,  the  positions  of  which  were 
obviously  known  to  him  before  the  offensive  began.  It  was 
obvious  that  all  the  artillery  which  he  must  have  had  on  the 
ground  was  not  used  for  the  purpose  of  repelling  our  trench 
raids.  It  was  a  mistake  on  his  part  to  make  the  limits  of  the 
zone  covered  by  his  intense  bombardment  on  the  front  of  the 
2d  Guard  Reserve  Division  coincide  exactly  with  the  limits 
of  the  zone  of  attack.  This  made  it  easy  for  us  to  switch  bat- 
teries, at  the  very  outset,  from  sectors  which  were  not  threat- 
ened on  to  those  which  were  being  intensely  bombarded. 

Gas  and  smoke  clouds  were  employed  before  the  attack  in  the 
hope  not  only  of  causing  us  casualties  but  also  of  drawing  our 
barrage  fire,  thus  enabling  the  enemy  to  ascertain  its  intensity 
and  location,  and  the  positions  of  our  batteries.  In  the  actual 
attack,  gas  and  smoke  clouds  were  employed  alternately.  At 
some  points  on  our  front  the  last  cloud  was  a  smoke  cloud, 
under  cover  of  which  the  first  waves  of  the  attack  appeared 
suddenly  just  in  front  of  our  trenches. 

(Signed)  V.    STEIN, 

Lieut.  General. 


V. 


THE  GERMAN  ATTACK  OF  JULY  31, 1917, 
ON  THE  CERNY  PLATEAU. 

Translation  from  the  French  Bulletin  G.  Q.  G.,  Aug.  28, 1917.] 

101 


CONTENTS. 


Page. 

The  German  attack  of  July  31,  1917,  on  the  Cerny  plateau  ...  103 

I.  Objective  of  the  attack  and  division  of  forces 103 

A.  Objective 103 

B.  Division  of  the  forces  and  of  the  command. .  104 
Reserve  troops 104 

II.  Preparation  of  the  attack 105 

A.  Infantry 105 

(a)  The  infantry  is  allowed  to  rest  up  to 

the  hour  of  attack 105 

(ft)  Special  instruction  in  view  of  the 

attack 105 

B.  Preparation  of  the  ground 106 

C.  Artillery  preparation 107 

III.  The  carrying  out  of  the  attack 107 

A.  Stosstrupps 107 

B.  Method  of  progression 108 

C.  Liaisons  in  the  assault 110 

Conclusions Ill 

Annexed  document Ill 

Distribution  of  machine  guns  in  ' '  Blucher  " Ill 

Itinerary  of  the  assaulting  machine  guns -.  Ill 

Food  supplies 112 

102 


V. 

THE  GERMAN  ATTACK  OF  JULY  31,  1917,  ON 
THE  CERNY  PLATEAU. 

(Translation  from  the  French  Bulletin  G.  Q.  G.,  Aug.  28,  1917.) 


HEADQUABTEES  AMERICAN  EXPEDITIONARY  FOECES, 

GENERAL  STAFF,  INTELLIGENCE  SECTION   (A), 

October  15,  1917. 

NOTE. — The  information  which  follows  is  derived  from  cross- 
examinations  held  at  the  third  C.  A.  and  at  the  tenth  army,  as 
well  as  from  documents  found  on  prisoners. 

The  study  of  "the  German  attack  of  July  31,  1917,  on  the 
Cerny  Plateau  "  gives  in  a  very  complete  way  the  details  of  a 
divisional  attack  with  limited  objectives. 
The  characteristics  of  this  attack  follow: 

1.  Extreme  brevity   of  preparation   fire  as   such ;    this   fire 
lasting  only  5  minutes,  the  assailants  arrive  in  the  position 
when  the  defenders  are  just  beginning  to  shelter  themselves. 

2.  Suppleness  of  the  attacking  arrangements  of  the  battalion 
and  the  company,  arrangement  which  varies  with  each  unit. 

3.  Companies  were  dislocated  in  view  of  the  attack,  in  order 
to  form,  with  men  picked  from  the  various  groups,  a  certain 
number  of  "  stosstrupps,"  and  a  reserve  troop,  detached. 

4.  Role   of   the   "  stosstrupp "   which    is   in   fact   merely   an 
"  advance  guard  "  which  "  leads  and  shows  the  way." 

I.  OBJECTIVE  OF   THE  ATTACK   AND   DIVISION    OF 
FORCES. 

A.   OBJECTIVE. 

Since  the  cessation  of  our  attacks  the  enemy  wishes  to  re- 
capture the  entire  Siegfried  position,  on  the  Cerny-la-Bovelle 
Plateau,  the  enemy  wishes  to  reach  the  line,  consisting  of  the 

103 


104         GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES. 

Hayden-Mahler-Memel  trenches,  and  the  Fourragere  trench, 
and  unite  with  the  elements  which  they  have  already  taken 
of  the  Franconie  trench. 

Thrown  back  in  April-May  on  the  northern  slopes  of  the  La 
Bovelle  Plateau,  they  succeeded  at  the  end  of  June  in  reestab- 
lishing themselves  on  the  plateau  from  the  south  of  La  Bovelle 
up  to  the  eastern  approaches  of  Cerny.  To  the  south  of  Cerny 
they  are  clinging  to  the  northern  slopes  of  the  Chemin-des- 
Dames. 

They  therefore  have  to  capture  a  salient  easy  to  approach  at 
the  center  and  on  the  left  wing  (east),  but  difficult  to  approach 
on  the  right  wing,  where  they  have  not  yet  retaken  a  foothold 
on  the  heights. 

B.  DIVISION  OF  THE  FORCES  AND   OF  THE  COMMAND. 

The  command  is  in  the  hands  of  one  man  (general  commanding 
the  Thirteenth  D.  I.),  thus  insuring  in  the  best  way  the  com- 
bination of  efforts. 

There  are  three  regimental  sectors : 

(a)  Sector  of  the  13th  R.   I.:  This  is  a  maneuver  sector, 
with  a  difficult  outlet    (first  and  third  battalions  placed  side 
by  side;  the  second  in  immediate  reserve). 

The  first  battalion,  wing  battalion,  is  spread  out  over  a  front 
of  about  375  meters,  having  probably  three  companies  in  line  and 
one  company  in  support 

The  third  battalion,  on  its  left,  placed  holding  a  front  of  450 
to  500  meters,  has  three  companies  in  line  and  one  company  in 
support. 

(b)  Sector  of  the   15th   R.    I.:  This   is  the  center   of  the 
line.     The  second  battalion  is  spread  out  over  approximately 
750  meters,  having  its  four  companies  in  line.     (The  first  and 
third  battalions  being  held  in  reserve. ) 

(c)  Sector  of  the  55th  R.  I. :  This  is  the  left  wing;  the  second 
battalion  has  two  companies  in  line. 

RESERVE  TROOPS. 

(a)  The  second  battalion  of  the  13th  R.  I.  is  placed  as  reserve 
on  the  right  wing  (eastern  shelter  of  Cerny). 


GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES.         105 

(&)  The  first  battalion  of  the  15th  R.  I.  is  placed  behind  the 
center  of  the  attack  (probably  as  a  brigade  reserve),  having 
detached  a  company  to  the  left  wing  (shelter  of  the  eastern 
tunnel). 

(c)  The  third  battalion  of  the  15th  R.  I.  is  placed  on  the 
northern  borders  of  the  plateau  (probably  as  a  divisional 
reserve)  and  furnishes  Tragertrupps  to  the  assaulting  units. 

II.  PREPARATION  OF  THE  ATTACK. 

A.  INFANTRY. 

(A)     THE    INFANTEY    IS    ALLOWED    TO    REST    UP    TO    THE    HOUR    OF 

ATTACK. 

The  attacking  battalions,  all  of  which  have  held  the  Cerny- 
La  Bovelle  sector,  sent  back  to  rest  on  the  21st  and  quartered 
8  or  9  kilometers  from  the  front  (Parfondru,  Veslund).  To 
give  them  rest  the  lines  are  taken  over  by  parts  of  the  Eleventh 
B.  D.  They  only  return  to  the  sector  in  the  night  of  the  30th 
to  the  31st.  On  their  arrival  they  are  sheltered  in  "  stollen  " 
near  the  first  line,  and  do  not  take  their  position  of  departure 
until  a  few  minutes  before  the  attack  is  launched. 

The  assaulting  troops  are  really  fresh,  not  weakened  by  the 
demoralizing  influence  of  bombardments,  losses,  or  fatigue; 
fresh  troops,  without  being  new,  familiarized  with  the  sector 
which  they  have  occupied  and  knowing  their  objectives  of 
attack  well  from  previous  observations  made  on  the  spot. 

(B)    SPECIAL  INSTRUCTION  IN  VIEW  OF  THE  ATTACK. 

The  whole  of  the  positions  to  be  taken  had  been  represented 
with  a  great  deal  of  exactitude  on  the  ground  north  of  Vesbud ; 
trenches  and  communicating  trenches  had  been  dug  to  a  depth 
of  30  or  40  centimeters;  positions  of  departure  and  objectives 
had  been  staked  out  with  flags  having  the  same  conventional 
numbers  as  those  marked  on  sketches  distributed  before  the 
attack. 

While  they  were  resting,  starting  on  the  22d,  rehearsals  of 
assaults  were  held,  to  begin  with,  simply  with  battalions  and 
regiments ;  then,  on  the  26th,  27th,  and  28th  of  July,  rehearsals 
of  the  whole  were  carried  out,  one  of  which  was  held  in  the 
presence  of  the  general  commanding  the  division.  Stosstrupps 
were  likewise  formed  and  trained  for  their  special  mission. 


106        GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES. 

The  mechanism  of  the  attack  was  minutely  foreseen ;  every 
man  knew  his  place  of  departure,  his  objective,  his  mission ; 
for  the  men  handling  machine  guns  the  itinerary  and  the  posi- 
tion of  the  battery  were  fixed  for  every  piece.  (See  annex 
sheet  No.  1.)  Every  battery  chief,  every  commander  of  Stoss- 
trupp  or  Kampftrupp  received  a  sketch  marked  according  to 
the  numbers  of  the  flags  used  in  the  rehearsal,  and  showing  the 
itinerary  to  be  followed. 

Nothing  is  left  unforeseen  in  the  mission  to  be  carried  out; 
it  has  been  endeavored  to  have  everyone  reach  a  state  of  reflex 
action  during  the  attack.  Thus  the  troops  will  only  have  to 
repeat  a  known  maneuver  on  known  ground. 

This  technical  and  moral  preparation  of  the  infantry  will 
cause  the  blow  to  be  delivered  with  the  maximum  of  vigor. 

Finally,  to  make  sure  of  surprising  the  e.nemy  as  much  as 
possible,  the  commanding  officer  leaves  his  troops  in  ignorance 
as  to  the  hour  of  attack  up  to  the  very  last  moment ;  they  only 
know  the  day  X ;  they  do  not  know  the  hour  X.  In  the  eighth 
company  of  the  15th  R.  I.,  the  company  commander  had  told 
his  men  on  the  evening  of  the  30th  that  they  would  attack  on 
the  31st  at  9  o'clock  in  the  evening.  But  the  next  day  at  12 
o'clock  they  found  out  that  the  preparation  would  begin  at  12.55 
and  the  assault  at  1  p.  m. 

B.  PREPARATION  OF  THE  GROUND. 

It  has  been  entrusted  to  troops  which  will  not  carry  out  the 
attack ;  some  of  them  only  will  participate  in  it  as  supporting 
units  (second  battalion  of  the  13th  R.  I.;  third  battalion  of  the 
15th  R.  I.). 

Discreet  preparations  are  commenced,  the  purpose  of  which 
is  difficult  to  discern ;  lines  and  numerous  defense  accessories 
are  built ;  old  trenches  (Franconie  trench)  repaired  ;  of  machine 
guns  installed  on  the  Franconie.  The  creation  of  a  continuous 
trench  removing  a  noticeable  indentation  (between  the  Le 
Meduse  trench  and  the  Zouave  Charlet  trench)  would  be  like- 
wise justified  by  the  defensive. 

More  precise  indications  as  to  the  purpose  of  these  prepara- 
tions appear  only  during  the  last  days  in  the  work  on  the  old 
Yser  tunnel  (which  is  prolonged  under  our  lines)  and  especially 
with  the  creation  of  new  emplacements  of  mine  throwers. 

On  the  whole,  a  summary  and  rapid  organization. 


GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES.         107 
C.  ARTILLERY   PREPARATION. 

The  Germans  noticeably  increased  their  artillery  strength  a 
few  days  before  the  attack,  by  bringing  up  a  number  of  trench 
mortars;  these  mortars  tried  out  the  range  in  a  very  discreet 
manner  (few  shots).  They  were  to  form  the  nucleus  of  the 
German  artillery  preparation. 

The  artillery  (field  and  heavy)  is  grouped  together  without 
being  moved,  in  order  to  form  provisional  units  which  will  be 
able  to  produce  a  concentrated  fire. 

An  important  bombardment  is  started  on  the  27th,  on  the 
whole  Cerny-Ailles  front,  having  without  doubt  a  destructive 
effect,  but  also  appearing  to  be  an  isolated  artillery  rehearsal. 

On  the  28th  occurs  an  intermittent  sprinkling  of  the  first  lines. 

The  actual  preparation  lasts  only  from  12.55  to  1  p.  m.  on  the 
31st,  thus  combining  to  the  greatest  degree  the  effects  of 
violence  and  of  surprise ;  the  assailants  reach  the  position  when 
the  defenders  are  just  beginning  to  seek  shelter. 

III.  THE  CARRYING  OUT  OF  THE  ATTACK. 

A.  STOSSTRUPPS. 

They  are  made  up  of  men  drawn  from  the  normal  personnel 
of  the  companies.  These  men  are,  if  possible,  volunteers;  if 
there  are  not  enough  volunteers,  the  remainder  are  chosen  by 
the  officers.  Every  "  Stosstrupp  "  is  especially  trained  for  its 
mission  on  the  rehearsal  ground. 

NOTE. — The  company  "  Stosstrupp  "  is  not  a  permanent  part 
of  the  company.  Formed  for  the  attack,  it  is  generally  dis- 
banded afterwards  and  the  men  go  back  into  their  various 
platoons.  In  fact,  it  is  becoming  more  and  more  usual  for  all 
the  men  in  the  companies  to  receive  the  instruction  of  "  Stoss- 
trupps." 

But  it  seems  that,  besides  the  three  regular  sections,  the  exist- 
ence of  a  fourth  section  is  becoming  more  and  more  general. 
This  section  acts  as  a  sort  of  reserve  of  the  company  com- 
manders, remaining  at  his  disposal,  to  be  used  by  him  at  the 
difficult  point  of  combat,  in  the  offensive  as  in  the  defensive. 

It  is  composed  in  general  of  the  best  squads  and  of  special- 
ists ;  three  squads  of  light  machine  guns,  three  squads  of  grenade 
throwers. 

Strength. — Variable;  varies  from  8  men  (one  group)  to  20 
men. 


108        GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES. 

It  almost  always  includes  foot  soldiers,  to  whom  the  attack 
is  entrusted ;  pioneers  entrusted  with  the  destruction  of  shelters 
and  obstacles ;  and  always,  it  seems,  one  light  machine  gun 
to  defend  the  captured  ground  (with  three  gunners,  one  non- 
commissioned officer,  chief  of  the  piece,  and  at  times  a  gun- 
smith). 

In  certain  cases  the  "  Stosstrupp  "  is  formed  almost  entirely 
of  pioneers  (as  was  the  one  ordered  to  take  the  southern 
outlet  of  the  Yser  tunnel ;  it  seems  that  a  flame  thrower  went 
with  it). 

Armament. — Foot  soldiers  always  carry  10  grenades  and 
their  gun.  (NOTE. — This  equipment  is  lighter  than  that  of  the 
foot  soldiers  of  the  following  waves,  who  carry  20  grenades 
besides  gun). 

Pioneers. — They  carry  shears,  etc.,  and  their  rifle  (those  of 
the  Garde  are  armed  with  a  revolver). 

Men  handling  machine  guns  carry   their  revolvers. 

The  number  of  Stosstrupps  and  their  composition  are  ex- 
actly determined  according  to  the  mission  of  the  companies 
and  the  depth  of  the  objectives  to  be  reached,  thus : 

There  were  three  Stosstrupps  of  20  men  at  the  seventh  com- 
pany of  the  15th  R.  I.,  which  made  up  the  flank  of  the  attack 
and  had  a  distant  objective  assigned  to  it. 

There  were  two  Stosstrupps — one  of  10,  the  other  of  23 
men,  1  officer,  and  1  ensign  bearer — at  the  eighth  company 
of  the  15th  R.  I. ;  this  company  was  placed  at  the  center,  but 
had  more  than  600  meters  to  cover. 

There  were  three  Stosstrupps  of  10  men  at  the  ninth  and 
twelfth  companies  of  the  13th  R.  I. ;  this  company  attacked 
on  a  more  narrow  front  and  had  been  assigned  closer  objec- 
tives. 

B.  METHOD  OF  PROGRESSION. 

The  Stosstrupps  play  a  double  part — leaders  and  scouts. 
They  leave  in  waves,  advancing  in  open  order  as  far  as  the 
first  French  line,  then  spread  out  in  the  trench  and  try  to 
clear  it.  The  first  wave  joins  them ;  relieved  by  it,  they  rush 
on  again  toward  the  second  line,  and  so  on,  as  far  as  the  final 
objective  which  they  themselves  clean  out,  assisted  by  the 
following  wave. 


GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES.         109 

Their  normal  method  of  progression  is  in  extended  waves 
and  in  open  country. 

As  soon  as  a  strong  resistance  is  offered,  they  advance 
through  the  communicating  trenches  in  the  following  order 
(example  taken  from  the  seventh  company  of  the  15th  It.  I., 
see  plan  No.  2)  : 

The  Stosstrupp  leader  goes  first ;  then  grenade  throwers  in  a 
row  or  "  teil "  of  6 ;  then  pioneers,  in  a  row  of  3,  1  ensign 
bearer ;  again  grenade  throwers  in  a  row  of  6 ;  finally  the  ma- 
chine-gun men  (4  plus  1  noncommissioned  officer). 

The  speed  of  the  advance  is  very  carefully  regulated  in 
agreement  with  the  artillery  : 

From  12.55  to  13  o'clock,  fire  on  the  Iglan  and  Deimling 
trenches. 

From  13  to  13.03  o'clock,  the  fire  is  carried  back  to  the 
Dresde  and  Mirberg  trenches. 

From  13.03  to  13.06  o'clock,  the  fire  is  carried  back  to  the 
Brahms  and  Bruckner  trenches. 

From  13.06  to  13.10  o'clock,  the  fire  is  carried  back  to  the 
Memel  and  La  Fourragere  trenches. 

From  13.10  o'clock  on  the  fire  is  carried  to  the  south  of  the 
Chemin  des  Dames. 

The  Stosstrupps  arrive  with  the  last  shells ;  they  have  barely 
two  minutes  to  spend  in  each  trench,  and  they  leave  the  actual 
fighting  to  the  following  waves. 

The  distance  between  the  waves  (or  "fight  waves")  and  the 
Stosstrupps  is  likewise  very  precisely  regulated ;  before  the 
start,  the  various  waves  are  massed  in  the  most  advanced 
trenches  (parallels,  sapheads)  with  the  Stosstrupps;  they  run 
forward  automatically  as  soon  as  they  see  the  Stosstrupps,  or 
the  preceding  wave  arrive  in  the  first  trench ;  when  the  objec- 
tives are  farther  away,  the  distance  between  waves  is  prede- 
termined (in  the  ninth  company  of  the  13th  R.  I.,  10  meters  be- 
tween the  Stosstrupp  and  the  first  wave ;  15  meters  between  the 
first  and  second  waves). 

The  carrying  troops  (Tragertrupps)  themselves  follow  at  a 
short  distance,  then  the  reserves,  which  unite  the  captured  posi- 
tion with  the  position  of  departure. 

In  short,  everything  is  set  in  operation  so  as  to  obtain  first 
of  all  an  extremely  rapid  action ;  the  speed  of  the  blow  seems 
to  be  the  first  element  of  success,  in  the  opinion  of  the  German 
commanding  officer.  The  object  of  this  rapid  progression  is  to 


110        GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES. 

reach  commanding  stations  by  surprise,  neutralize  the  local 
commanding  staff  by  isolating  them  from  their  troops;  then 
attack,  in  case  the  range  was  too  short,  and  to  inform  the  com- 
ing continues  in  the  first  line  the  third  should  already  be  oc- 
cupied. 

In  the  rapidity  of  this  advance  no  trace  is  found  of  the 
hierarchy  which  the  German  order  of  May  11,  1916,  established. 
(NOTE. — "Principles  for  the  execution  of  an  infantry  attack 
in  trench  warfare."  Translation  of  the  G.  Q.  G.  of  July  13, 
1916,  under  No.  9178),  between  the  various  assaulting  waves. 
Assaulting  wave  (Sturmwelle)  ;  clearing-out  wave  (Aufrau- 
mungswelle)  ;  strengthening  wave  (Verstarkungswelle). 

The  common  mission  of  all  the  waves  is  to  fight ;  the  waves 
follow  each  other  in  succession  and  without  stopping.  There  is 
but  one  distinction;  the  Stosstrupp  does  not  give  battle;  its 
mission  is  to  open  the  way ;  the  other  waves  fight.  The  Ger- 
mans rely  especially  on  the  following  maneuver:  Overrun  the 
enemy  and  pass  beyond  him  to  reduce  the  strong  positions. 

C.  LIAISONS  IN  THE  ASSAULT. 

They  are  very  thoroughly  planned  out. 

(a)  Liaison  with  the  artillery. — In  each  battalion  one  artillery 
officer  with  a  few  gunners  starts  with  the  Stosstrupps  and  the 
first  wave  to  insure  the  lengthening  of  the  range  during  the 
attack,  in  case  the  range  was  too  short,  and  to  inform  the  com- 
manding staff  of  the  objectives  reached.  Variously  colored 
rockets  are  used  to  ask  for  a  lengthening  or  a  shortening  of 
the  range. 

(&)  Liaison  with  aerial  observation. — The .  stosstrups  were 
supplied  with  white  panels  and  newspapers  to  mark  the  front. 
An  infantry  avion  must  follow  the  attack. 

(c)  Liaison  with  the  commanding  staff. — With  the  company 
staff  go : 

1.  Runners  (melder). 

2.  Signal  men   (winker)   with  small  electric  searchlights   (a 
different  colored  light  for  each  battalion). 

3.  Finally,  two  out  of  three  companies  of  the  first  wave  were 
equipped  with  two  -couples  of  carrier  pigeons  and  two  pigeon 
attendants. 

If  the  final  objective  was  reached  the  infantry  immediately 
signaled  the  fact  by  means  of  white  rockets. 


GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES.         Ill 
CONCLUSIONS. 

From  the  few  items  of  information  which  precede,  it  seems 
that  one  can  deduce  the  following  principal  points  of  the 
technique  used  by  the  enemy  in  sudden  attacks  with  limited 
objectives : 

I.  Stosstrupps  are  being  used  more  extensively. 

II.  Stosstrupps  have  a  tendency  to  become  more  mixed  in 
their  composition.    They  are  tending  to  become  a  chance  group- 
ment, instead  of  a  selected  formation  (Elite  group). 

III.  The  number  of  Stosstrupps  varies   (as  does  the  whole 
plan  of  attack)  according  to  the  mission  and  to  the  ground  to 
be  covered. 

There  is  no  rigid  formula ;  there  are  merely  fixed  categories 
which  are  altered  according  to  the  demands  of  the  situation. 

IV.  Increasing  importance  given  to  the  violence  of  the  blow : 

1.  During  the  preparation ; 

2.  In  the  attack,  not  only  by  the  leading  units  (progression  at 
fixed  time  and  very  rapid),  but  by  the  waves  (following  very 
close  and  automatically). 

ANNEXED  DOCUMENT. 
[Twelfth  R.  I.,  No.  435,  machine  gun.] 

DISTBIBUTION    OF    MACHINE    GUNS    IN    "  BLUCHEB." 

Itinerary  of  tl\e  assaulting  machine  guns. 

• 

Gun  No.  5  will  follow  Stosstrupp  No.  5  into  the  first  French 
line  and  will  be' placed  in  position  at  point  370K. 

Gun  No.  6  of  the  second  machine-gun  company  will  follow 
Stosstrupp  No.  10  in  the  first  French  line  and  will  be  placed  in 
position  at  point  370. 

Gun  No.  2  (of  the  first  machine-gun  company)  will  follow 
Stosstrupp  No.  9  into  the  first  French  line,  point  370.  After  the 
successful  outcome  of  the  attack,  it  will  be  placed  in  position  at 
point  371  p.  in  our  new  first  line. 

Gun  No.  10  (of  the  first  machine-gun  company)  will  follow 
Stosstrupp  No.  12  in  the  first  French  line  to  point  279.1.  After 
the  successful  outcome  of  the  attack,  it  will  be  placed  in  posi- 
tion in  the  first  French  line  just  to  the  right  of  exit  S  of  the 
Cerny  tunnel. 


112         GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES. 

Gun  No.  11  (of  the  third  machine  gun  company)  will  follow 
Stosstrupp  No.  18  into  the  first  French  line,  and  will  be  placed 
in  position  at  point  278K. 

There  are  munition  depots  near  guns  2  and  3. 

There  will  be  one  machine-gun  man  in  line  as  a  reserve  for 
every  machine  gun  used  in  the  attack. 

FOOD  SUPPLIES. 

Each  man  is  to  have  two  days  of  reserve  food  supplies  and  two 
water  cans.  The  first  machine-gun  company  will  insure  the  sup- 
ply of  hot  nourishments ;  the  rations  will  have  to  be  handed  over 
to  it. 

(Signed)  GOESMANN, 

Officer  in  Charge  of  the  Hachine-Gun  Service 

at  the  General  Staff. 


VI. 


NOTES  ON  THE 

GERMAN  ATTACK  AT  BOIS  LE  CHAUME, 
SEPTEMBER  25,  1917. 


[Translated  from  Bulletin,  Second  Bureau,  Standard  French  Army.] 
29267°— 18 8  113 


CONTENTS. 


Page. 
Notes  on  the  German  attack  at  Bois  Le  Chaume,  September  25, 

1917 115 

Preparation 115 

Formation  of  the  attack 116 

The  attack 116 

Result 117 

Conclusion 118 

114 


VI. 

NOTES  ON  THE  GERMAN  ATTACK  AT  BOIS  LE 
CHAUME  SEPTEMBER  25,  1917. 

[Translated  from  Bulletin,  Second  Bureau,  Second  French 
Army.] 


HEADQUAETEBS  AMERICAN  EXPEDITIONARY  FORCES, 

GENERAL  STAFF,  INTELLIGENCE  SECTION  (A), 

October  16,  1917. 

Object :  Occupation  of  Bois  de  Chaume. 

General  of  infantry,  Von  Soden,  at  present  commanding  the 
western  Meuse  army  group,  summoned  together  on  Sunday,  the 
23d,  the  officers  taking  part  in  the  attack  and  declared  to  them : 
"  The  former  German  positions  must  be  carried  at  any  cost 
and  must  be  maintained.  Our  present  position  is  not  tenable 
without  holding  the  Croix  de  Vaux  (Vaux  crossroad)." 

Gen.  Von  Kuhne  addressed  his  division  (the  13th  D.  R.)  in 
similar  terms  and  added :  "  We  must  sacrifice  ourselves ;  above 
all  things  the  height  must  be  carried  in  order  to  prevent  the 
enemy  attacks." 

PREPARATION. 

(o)  Effectives  taking  part  in  the  attack,  two  companies  of 
storming  troops — the  13th  division  reserves  divided  up  as 
follows : 

For  assault :  One  battalion  of  39th  reserves,  1  battalion  of 
57th  reserves,  2  battalions  of  13th  reserves,  1  battalion  of  each 
regiment  in  reserve  for  attack,  1  battalion  of  39th  reserves, 
1  battalion  of  57th  reserves,  were  already  holding  the  sector 
and  were  charged  with  organizing  it  after  the  attack.  (These 
units  had  relieved  on  the  twelfth  units  of  the  35th  D.  R.  and  56th 
D.  I. )  A  regiment  of  the  78th  D.  R.  and  the  258th  reserves. 

( 6 )  Effectives  supporting  the  principal  attack :  On  west  flank, 
the  223d  reserves  of  the  48th  D.  R. ;  on  east  flank,  the  259th  re- 
serves of  the  78th  D.  R. 

115 


116        GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES. 

These  two  regiments  were  to  attack  the  first  French  trench 
and  to-  maintain  it  as  long  as  possible. 

The  rehearsal  took  place  on  a  terrain  representing  the  posi- 
tion to  be  attacked,  at  the  Schmiedeckerlager,  near  Romagne, 
where  the  two  companies  of  storming  troops  tried  out  the  attack, 
with  the  units  which  were  to  follow  and  support  them. 

The  storming  company  attacking  on  the  west,  commanded  by 
Lieut.  Balderman,  was  trained  (practiced)  with  the  battalion 
of  the  39th  reserves  (13th  D.  R.). 

The  storming  company  attacking  on  the  east,  commanded  by 
Lieuts.  Habel  and  Stellvertretor  Schwoer,  trained  with  the  units 
of  the  258th  reserves  (78th  D.  R.). 

The  units  of  the  57th  reserves  and  the  whole  13th  reserves 
(13th  D.  R.)  trained  separately. 

Two  rehearsals  of  the  whole  action,  Friday,  22d,  and  Satur- 
day, 23d,  took  place  in  the  presence  of  Gen.  von  Gallwitz,  com- 
manding the  fifth  army ;  Gen.  von  Soden,  commanding  the  west- 
ern Meuse  group ;  Gen.  von  Kuhne,  commanding  the  13th  D.  R. 

FORMATION  OF  THE  ATTACK. 

The  storming  company  on  the  west,  supported  by  the  39th  re- 
serves ( 13th  D.  R. ) ,  was  to  follow  the  Louvemont-Azannos  Road 
and  envelope  the  La  Chaume  trench  as  far  as  the  point  29.44. 

The  storming  company  on  the  east,  supported  by  the  258th 
reserves  (78th  D.  R.),  was  to  envelope  the  Gaulois  and  Cevennes 
trenches,  and  reach  likewise  the  (x)  point  29.44  ( (x)  point  de 
raccordement — junction,  meeting  point). 

The  57th  reserves  and  the  13th  reserves  were  to  make  a  frontal 
attack  up  to  the  La  Chaume  and  Cevennes  trenches  (see  plan). 

If  the  attacks  succeeded,  the  commanders  of  the  attacking 
troops  were  to  retire,  without  waiting  for  the  order,  three 
hours  after  the  attack. 

The  battalions  assigned  to  occupying  the  trenches  were  to  set 
to  work  immediately. 

THE  ATTACK. 

After  a  minute  preparation  lasting  eight  days,  the  troops  for 
the  assault  were  carried  in  autos  from  the  Schmiedeckerlager 
(starting  at  8  p.  m.  on  the  23d)  and  unloaded  between  Azannes 
and  Gremilly,  reaching  their  positions  between  1  and  2  o'clock  of 
the  morning  of  the  24th. 


GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES.         117 

The  assaulting  troops  immediately  took  up  their  assaulting 
positions  in  the  sector  between  the  Louvemont-Azannes  Road 
and  the  Croix  de  Vaux,  in  front  of  the  troops  occupying  the 
sector.  These  were  stationed  as  follows,  counting  from  west 
to  east :  One  battalion  39th  reserves,  1  battalion  57th  reserves,  1 
battalion  260th  reserves. 

The  attack  was  delivered  at  5.30  a.  m.  Although  bothered  at 
first  by  the  volleys  of  the  preparation  fire  of  their  own  artillery 
(falling  too  short),  the  assaulting  troops  nevertheless  made  fast 
enough  progress  in  the  western  section ;  but  on  being  caught  by 
our  artillery  barrage,  and  especially  by  our  machine-gun  bar- 
rage, they  ran  against  a  stubborn  resistance  of  the  French 
troops,  and  fell  back  in  disorder  into  the  Bois  le  Chaume. 

Our  own  men,  counter  attacking  promptly,  threw  the  enemy's 
lines  into  complete  disorder. 

The  enemy's  left  wing  seems  to  have  been  blocked  from  the 
very  beginning  of  the  attack. 

Last  of  all,  the  enemy's  frontal  attack  (57th  and  13th  re- 
serves) was  caught  on  the  flank  by  our  troops,  who  were  fol- 
lowing up  their  counter  attack  (coming  from  the  west  and  the 
southeast). 

After  hand-to-hand  and  grenade  fighting  lasting  several  hours 
the  enemy  was  completely  driven  back  and  left  about  120 
prisoners  in  our  hands. 

BESULT. 

Thanks  to  the  magnificent  resistance  of  the  French  troops 
(which  both  officers  and  men  among  the  prisoners  willingly 
acknowledged),  the  enemy  suffered'  a  complete  check,  with  very 
heavy  losses ;  e.  g.,  Lieut.  Balderman,  commanding  the  western 
storming  company,  on  reaching  the  La  Chaume  trench  had  only 
two  noncommissioned  officers  and  five  men  left  besides  himself. 

Lieut.  Matthies,  of  the  57th  reserves,  attacking  with  the  third 
wave,  had  to  use  them  to  make  up  the  losses  of  the  three  as- 
saulting companies  and  had  all  his  own  section  wiped  out. 

Lieut.  Offer,  of  the  13th  reserves,  was  left  alone  with  2  men 
out  of  the  40  who  started  out.  The  rest  were  all  killed  during 
the  grenade  fighting,  which,  according  to  him,  lasted  more  than 
three  hours. 

Lieut.  Balderman,  commanding  western  assaulting  company 
(Rohr  battalion)  made  the  following  statement: 

"They  told  us  we  had  in  front  of  us  a  division  of  working 
troops  (travailleurs),  but  they  (the  245th  and  348th  French  regi- 
ments), counter  attacked  like  tigers. 


118         GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES. 
CONCLUSION. 

The  enemy  seems  to  be  absolutely  determined  to  retake  the 
position  of  Bois  le  Chaume,  which  is  absolutely  indispensable 
for  him,  and  does  not  hesitate  to  engage  on  this  very  narrow 
front  the  strength  of  six  battalions  (admitting  that  all  the 
troops  who  were  in  reserve  for  organizing  the  position  once 
taken  were  not  able  to  come  into  action). 

An  officer  taken  prisoner,  questioned  in  regard  to  this,  re- 
plied :  "  If  it  is  necessary  to  take  the  height,  cost  what  it  may, 
we  will  begin  again  ;  although,"  he  added,  "  we  have  suffered 
very  heavy  losses  there." 


Schaint 

arman  a.tt».ttf  on  Btit  i»  CH 
&/*  ZS   /t/f 


Di<fi»ion 


«»*,,/?«  r» 


.  which  were,  in 
lint,  before  the  <L 


vn. 
GERMAN  DEFENSIVE  TACTICS, 


119 


CONTENTS. 


Page, 

German  defensive  tactics 121 

German  principles  of  defense  (Aug.  5,  1917) 122 

Method  of  holding  a  shell-hole  position 123 

German  method  of  holding  the  line 124 

Enemy's  defenses  (Aug.  17,  1917) 124 

Machine  guns 125 

Enemy's  tactics  (Aug.  10,  1917) 125 

German  tactical  methods 126 

Errata 126 

Extracts  from  the  construction  of  defensive  positions 127 

A.  Construction  of  positions  on  the  battlefield 127 

Principles .-.  127 

B.  Construction  of  new  positions 129 

C.  Reconstruction  of  old  positions 132 

The  employment  of  counter-attack  troops 132 

Employment  of  counter  attack 132 

120 


VII. 
GERMAN  DEFENSIVE  TACTICS. 


HEADQUARTERS  AMERICAN   EXPEDITIONARY  FORCES, 
GENERAL  STAFF,  INTELLIGENCE  SECTION  (A). 

Recently  captured  documents  indicate  a  new  method  of  de- 
fense on  the  part  of  Germany.  The  primary  underlying  princi- 
ple is  greater  distribution  in  depth.  In  other  words,  instead  of 
holding  a  defensive  position  with  large  forces,  making  the 
chief  resistance  either  in  the  first-line  trench  or  in  the  sup- 
porting trenches,  they  have  adopted  a  method  of  defense  so 
that  the  resistance  gradually  increases  as  the  attacking  force 
penetrated  toward  the  rear.  It  might  be  described  as  a  "  coil 
spring  defense,"  because  under  the  new  method  the  first  blow 
of  the  assault  is  taken  up  gradually  by  ever-increasing  forces 
of  troops,  with  the  result  that  as  the  assault  slackens  the 
defense  increases,  just  as  the  strength  of  a  spring  becomes  great- 
est as  the  pressure  reaches  its  maximum. 

In  order  to  effect  a  rebound  from  the  assault  the  Germans 
have  adopted  a  method  of  preparing  a  counter  attack  to  take 
place  immediately,  when  the  assaulting  troops  have  reached 
their  limit  and  are  stopped  by  the  heavier  defensive  lines.  For 
this  counter  attack  troops  are  placed  in  counter  attacking  posi- 
tions well  back  from  the  front-line  trenches.  They  are  supported 
by  field  artillery  horsed  and  ready  for  immediate  action.  When 
the  assault  stops,  the  counter  attack  is  launched  vigorously,  sup- 
ported by  light  artillery.  It  is  thought  by  the  Germans  that 
this  method  of  attack  enables  them  to  catch  the  assaulting 
forces  when  they  are  exhausted  from  the  attack,  are  out  of 
liaison  with  their  artillery,  and  as  a  consequence  the  Germans 
are  able  to  win  back  with  minimum  loss  to  themselves  a  large 
portion  of  the  ground  taken.  The  following  extracts  from 
captured  German  documents  give  in  detail  the  formation  for 
defense  and  for  counter  attack,  together  with  the  aim  to  be 
obtained  in  each  instance. 

(See  "Diagram  showing  the  organization  of  a  regimental 
sector  "  attached. ) 

121 


122        GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES. 

NOTE. — 

(a) There  are  only  two  companies  in  front  line  instead  of 
three. 

(ft)  The  commander  of  the  battalion  in  front  line  has  only 
his  own  four  companies  at  his  disposal  instead  of  five. 

(c)  The  support  battalion  is  distributed  in  depth,  instead  of 
three   out   of  the   four   companies   being  concentrated    in   the 
second-line  position. 

(d)  The  number  of  machine  guns  immediately  behind  the 
front  trench  has  been  reduced  from  eight  to  four,  the  bulk  of 
the  remainder  being  distributed  some  400  to  800  yards  behind 
the  front  line. 

The  note  attached  to  the  diagram  lays  down  that — 

(e)  During  a  hostile  bombardment  the  trench  garrisons  are 
to  take  cover  in  shell  holes  in  front  of  their  trenches  and  there 
await  the  attack. 

(/)  The  front  line  should  not  be  held  by  individuals  at  regu- 
lar intervals,  but  the  garrison  should  be  distributed  in  small 
groups  each  under  a  reliable  stout-hearted  man. 

(g)  The  companies  of  the  support  battalion  will  be  formed  up 
in  accordance  with  the  nature  of  the  ground ;  this  will  often 
necessitate  their  being  in  file  or  even  in  single  file. 

GERMAN    PRINCIPLES   OF   DEFENSE    (AUG.   5,   1917). 

A  captured  regimental  order,  dated  July  31,  1917,  lays  down 
that— 

(a)  The  front  line  is  not  to  be  continuous,  but  several  shell 
holes  are  to  be  connected  to  form  "  nests "  for  groups  and 
occasional  light  machine  guns. 

(ft)  A  continuous  belt  of  wire  is  to  be  put  out  in  front  of 
the  above  (a)  positions;  the  wire  is  to  be  loose,  irregular  in 
trace,  and  not  too  high,  so  that  it  can  be  enfiladed  when  possible. 

(c)  Shell-hole  accommodation  should  be  improved  by  letting 
in  frames   or   making  underground   framed  passages   between 
neighboring  holes,  great  care  being  taken  to  prevent  observation 
by  aircraft. 

(d)  Machine-gun  positions  are  to  be  well  camouflaged  and 
are  not  to  be  surrounded  by  high  wire. 

(e)  Communication  trenches  should  run  diagonally. 

(/)  Wire  in  front  of  the  second  line  should  be  continuous, 
but  gaps  must  be  left  for  offensive  purposes  and  be  clearly 
marked. 


GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES.         123 
METHOD  OF  HOLDING  A   SHELL-HOLE   POSITION. 

NOTE. — The  following  translation  of  a  German  regimental 
order  and  the  diagram  appended  to  it  show  a  method  of  hold- 
ing a  shell-hole  position  in  advance  of  the  front  line,  with  the 
object  of  concealing  the  main  line  of  resistance  and  of  avoiding 
the  effects  of  the  enemy's  bombardment : 

[19th  Inf.  Regt.    Regt.  H.  QM  25-6-17.] 

1.  The  systematic  destruction  of  our  defenses  forces  us  to 
dispose  our  forces  thinly  and  in  depth,  in  order  to  prevent  the 
enemy  from  recognizing  our  main  line  of  resistance  and  in  order 
to  disperse  his  fire. 

The  attached  diagram  indicates  how  a  front  of  450  yards  can 
be  held  against  fourfold  superiority  in  numbers  by  7  groups, 
3  machine  guns,  and  3  Granatwerfer. 

2.  This  disposition  is  only  practicable  if  entanglements  are 
completed   simultaneously   which   afford   special   protection   to 
the  flanks.     Low  wire  in  shell  craters,   connection   with   the 
remains  of  former  lines  of  wire  will  give  the  whole  the  ap- 
pearance of  destroyed  belts  of  wire  rather  than  that  of  a  spe- 
cially prepared   system.     The  construction   of   this   should  be 
expedited  by  all  possible  means. 

3.  The  defenses  and  garrison  must  be  concealed  from  hostile 
airmen  by  day ;  only  thus  can  our  power  of  resistance  be  main- 
tained to  meet  an  attack. 

The  lateral  communication  trench  (former  front  line)  must 
be  constantly  repaired.  This  important  work  should  deceive 
the  enemy  as  to  the  position  of  the  line  of  resistance  and 
divert  his  fire. 

4.  Next  in  order  of  importance  is  the  construction  of  dugouts 
for  the  machine  guns  and  supports  in  the  ground  between  our 
lines.    It  must  be  possible  to  find  in  and  round  Oppy  the  defen- 
sive positions  of  former  garrisons,  which  are  apparently  buried 
and  not  conspicuous. 

The  most  careful  concealment  of  this  work,  especially  of  the 
building  material  for  making  the  shafts,  is  the  duty  of  all 
commanders  of  working  parties;  they  must  satisfy  themselves, 
before  leaving  the  place  where  the  work  has  been  going  on, 
that  the  work  on  the  defenses  has  been  satisfactorily  carried 
out 

( Sd. )  SCHUSTER. 


124        GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES. 


GERMAN  METHOD   OF   HOLDING   THE   LINE. 

From  the  statements  of  prisoners  captured  recently  on  the 
Ypres  battle  front,  it  appears  that,  when  the  enemy  holds  a 
divisional  sector  with  two  regiments  in  front  line,  each  of  these 
regiments  has  two  battalions  disposed  in  depth  in  advanced 
positions  (shell  holes,  strong  points,  buildings,  etc.)  and  one 
battalion  in  close  support;  the  third  regiment  is  in  close  re- 
serve for  immediate  counter  attack.  The  average  front  held 
by  a  battalion  is  750  yards. 

The  following  diagram  illustrates  this  method  of  holding  a 
divisional  sector : 


2  Battalions. 


Advanced 
position 


Battalion  in 
close  support 


2  Battalions. 


3  Battalions 
(divisional  reserve). 


ENEMY'S  DEFENSES  (AUG.  17,  1917). 

A  captured  order  of  the  Fourth  German  Army  deals  in  de- 
tail with  modifications  in  the  construction  of  defensive  posi- 
tions in  accordance  with  recent  fighting  experience.  Great 
stress  is  laid  on — 

(a)  Concealment,  especially  from  the  air. 

(&)  Organization  in  depth. 

(c)  Evacuation  of  battered  front-line  trenches  and  occupa- 
tion of  an  advanced  line  of  shell-hole  posts  with  strong  points 
in  rear  of  it. 


GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES.         125 

(d)  The  construction,  at  irregular  intervals,  of  wire  entangle- 
ments throughout  the  whole  area  of  the  fortified  zone. 

(NOTE. — Captured  maps  show  wire  in  hedges  and  tree  rows 
throughout  the  area  behind  the  front.  This,  owing  to  its  sit- 
uation, is  often  invisible  on  aeroplane  photographs.) 

(e)  The  siting  of  communication  trenches  so  that  not  only 
can  they  be  used  for  defense,  but  their  destruction  will  entail 
a  large  expenditure  of  ammunition. 

(/)  Where  shallow  shell-proof  dugouts  ai'e  not  possible,  deep 
dugouts  will  be  used  even  in  front  line. 

(#)  The  siting  of  machine  guns  in  concealed  emplacements 
outside  the  trench  lines,  instead  of  in  the  angles  of  the  wire 
entanglements,  as  was  the  general  principle  in  the  Hindenburg 
line. 

MACHINE  GUNS. 

An  order  by  the  C.  G.  S.  of  the  German  Field  Army,  dated 
January,  1917,  emphasizes  the  importance  of  the  defense  re- 
taining practical  control  of  the  area  behind  the  front  trench 
system,  and  lays  down  that — 

(a)  The  most  certain  means  of  limiting  the  success  of  an 
enemy  who  has  penetrated  the  front  line  is  the  employment 
of  concealed  machine  guns  distributed  in  depth  and  checker- 
wise  behind  that  line. 

(6)  Owing  to  the  increase  in  the  number  of  machine  guns 
with  infantry  a  considerable  number  can  be  specially  detailed 
for  this. 

(c)  An  officer  should  be  temporarily  allotted  to  each  divi- 
sional sector  to  select  the  sites  and  supervise  the  construction 
of  the  emplacements. 

ENEMY'S  TACTICS  (AUG.  10,  1917). 

(a)  A  regimental  order  of  the  95th  Division,  dated  July  29, 
1917,  contains  the  following: 

"  The  capture  of  84  men  in  front  line  shows  that  the  garrison 
was  too  strong." 

(&)  An  order  of  the  454th  Infantry  Regiment,  235th  Divi- 
sion, dated  July  28,  1917,  emphasized  the  necessity  of  immediate 
counter  attack  by  the  counter-attack  regiment  (Stoss  Regi- 
ment) without  waiting  for  orders,  and  states  that  the  regiment 
will  be  at  once  backed  up  by  a  counter-attack  division  (Stoss 
Division). 


126         GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES. 

A  captured  order  of  the  235th  Division  shows:  In  order  to 
avoid  observation  by  hostile  aircraft,  movements  in  relief  were 
to  be  undertaken  in  the  early  morning.  In  clear  weather  bat- 
talions were  ordered  to  march  in  small  parties,  and  at  once 
to  take  shelter  on  the  approach  of  the  enemy's  aeroplanes. 

GERMAN  TACTICAL  METHODS. 

This  process  has  been  exemplified  by  the  move  of  the  79th 
Reserve  Division,  from  Maldeghem  toward  Thourout,  replacing 
the  3d  Guard  Division  as  a  counter-attack  division  to  the  Dix- 
muncle  group ;  the  3d  Guard  Division  in  turn  replaced  the  23d 
Reserve  Division  in  front  line. 

The  12th  Division  was  apparently  retained  as  a  counter- 
attack division  in  the  vicinity  of  Menin  for  the  Wytschaete 
group  and  is  now,  or  was  yesterday,  relieving  the  22d  Reserve 
Division. 


ERRATA. 

"  German  tactical  methods."  Immediately  following  this  title, 
insert  the  following: 

A  captured  order  shows  that  the  Germans  are  adopting  the 
following  general  defensive  organization  in  front  of  our  attack, 
viz: 

(1)  In  immediate  support  of  the  divisions  in  front  line  there 
are  divisions,  probably  one  for  each  group,  detailed  for  counter 
attack  solely,  and  called  "  counter-attack  divisions." 

(2)  Divisions   relieved    in   front   line   after   exhaustion    are 
moved  into  rest.     Their  place  is  taken  by  the  counter-attack 
divisions,  and  the  place  of  the  counter-attack  divisions  is  in 
turn  taken  by  divisions  farther  back. 

(3)  In  divisions  in  front  line  it  appears  to  be  the  intention 
to  retain  one  regiment  as  a  counter-attack  regiment. 

Page  128,  subdivision  6  ( a )  should  read :  "  In  front  of  forward 
shell-hole  line." 

Page  129,  subdivision  (e),"  Character  of  construction  "  should 
read  "Character  of  construction.  (See  illustration  A.)." 

Page  131,  subdivision  (o),  parenthesis  should  read:  "(Note 
illustrations  C,  D,  and  E.)" 

I.  Diagram  showing  the  organization  of  a  regimental  sector. 
See  paragraph  1,  page  123. 


GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES.         127 

II.  Diagram  showing  method  of  holding  a  shell  hole,  para- 
graph 1,  page  123. 

III.  Diagram  showing  "A  character  of  construction,"  para- 
graph B-e,  page  129,  B  wire,  paragraph  B-fc,  page  130,  C.  D.  E., 
order  in  which  work  is  carried  out ;  see  paragraph  B-c,  page  131. 

EXTRACTS  FROM  THE  CONSTRUCTION  OF  DEFENSIVE 
POSITIONS. 

[Translation    of    a    German    document,    dated    German    Army    Head- 
quarters, June  30,  1917.] 

1.  Three  categories: 

A.  Construction  of  positions  on  the  battlefield. 

B.  Construction  of  new  positions. 

C.  Modification  of  old  positions. 

A.  CONSTRUCTION  OF  POSITIONS  ON  THE  BATTLEFIELD. 

1.  Dugouts  in  old  trenches   (principally  1-2  lines)  proved  to 
be  man  traps.    Hence  discarding  of  rigid  rules  for  more  flexible 
method. 

2.  Strength  in  defense  must  be  in  concealment.    All  positions 
capable  of  being  photographed  will  be  destroyed  by  enemy's 
preliminary  artillery  fire. 

3.  Severity    of    enemy's    fire    makes    it    impossible    to    keep 
trenches  in  repair  and  attempting  to  do  so  exhausts  the  troops 
without  results. 

4.  Consequently  construction  of  positions  must  be  employed 
when   battle   begins.     There  must   be  a   deliberate   transition 
from  the  old  pattern  position  which  is  visible  to  a  zone  of 
defense   organised   in   depth.     This   must    allow   of   offensive 
action   by   the  defense  from  positions   which   are,   as  far  as 
possible,   concealed   and   are   lightly   held  in  front  and   more 
strongly  held  in  rear. 

PRINCIPLES. 

1.  As  destructive  fire  of  enemy  increases  the  mass  of  the 
infantry  will  be  removed  from  forward  trenches  and  dugouts 
and  will  be  distributed  in  depth  in  the  open  before  the  first 
infantry  attack  takes  place. 

2.  It  is  the  duty  of  all  commanders  on  the  battlefield  to 
give  timely   orders   for   the   methodical   redistribution   of   the 
troops  and  to  carry  out  such  orders  unhesitatingly. 


128         GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES. 

3.  During  battle  continuous  trenches  are  no  longer  insisted 
on  in  front-line  positions,  their  places  being  taken  by  shell- 
hole  nests  held  by  groups  and  single  machine  guns,  distributed 
checkerwise.     Shell  holes  to  be  improved  by  mining  frames  or 
by  joining  adjacent  shell  holes  by  tunnels  lined  with  frames, 
dirt  thrown  in  adjacent  shell  holes,  or  scattered  on  ground. 

4.  Close  behind  first  shell-hole  line  strong  points  will  be  con- 
structed for — 

(a)  Machine  guns. 

(b)  Assault  troops. 

(c)  Elements  of  support  already  brought  forward. 

5.  Strong  points. —  (a)  Usually  constructed  in  dugouts,   but 
(&)  failing  these,  in  open. 

6.  Wire. — (a)  In  front  of  forward  shell  line.     Irregular  in 
trace,  but  as  far  as  possible  forming  a  continuous  system; 
(&)  fill  shell  holes  in  advance  of  front  line  with  wire  to  pre- 
vent occupation  by  enemy;    (c)    farther   back  shell-hole  nest 
should  be  provided  with  wire  entanglements,  but  local  in  ex- 
tent, since  continuous  belts  make  offensive  action  on  part  of 
defense  more  difficult;    (d)    sufficient  wire  entanglements  so 
arranged  as  to  force  enemy  in  particular  directions  and  bring 
him   under   machine-gun   fire;    (e)    all   defensive  works   must 
remain  hidden  from  the  enemy.     Conspicuous  works  and  con- 
nected trench  lines  do  not  fulfill  this  important  condition. 

7.  Supports  and  reserves. —  (a)   Great  part  of  supports  and 
reserves  will  be  accommodated  in  the  open,  in  and  near  shell 
holes,   in  woods,   hollows,  etc.,   wherever  cover  from  air  ob- 
servation exists;  (b)  villages  draw  enemy's  fire  and  therefore 
must  be  avoided  whenever  possible;  (c)  supports  and  reserves 
must  work  methodically  at  construction  of  continuous  system, 
consisting  of  several  lines  of  trenches  which  must  be  screened 
as   much   as  possible  from   the  enemy's   observation    (reserve 
slope  position)  ;   (d)   this  system  will  form  a  support  for  the 
defenders  who  are  organized  in  depth  in  front  of  it. 

8.  Construction. —  (a)   Strongly  wired  with  gaps  for  passage 
of  troops  to  attack  through;   (b)  must  consist  of  several  lines 
of  trenches;   (c)  deep  dugouts  will  only  be  constructed  in  the 
second  and  third  line;  (d)  first  line  will  contain  small  dugouts 
for  about  one-sixth  of  the  garrison;   (e)  system  will  generally 
be  the  artillery  protective  line  about  1,650  to  2.200  yards  in 
the  rear  of  foremost  shell-hole  line;    (/)   additional  lines  will 
be  constructed  farther  in  the  rear  on  these  principles  to  form 
supporting  positions,  if  there  is  sufficient  labor. 


GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES.         129 
B.  CONSTRUCTION  OF  NEW  POSITIONS. 

(Note  illustrations  A  and  B.) 

The  principles  laid  down  for  the  construction  of  a  zone  of 
defense  organized  in  depth  must  be  applied  from  the  outset 
by  the  simultaneous  construction  of  the  front-line  positions, 
the  artillery  protective  line,  and  the  communication  trenches 
between  them,  when  constructing  new  positions. 

The  principles  of  organization  in  depth  must  be  followed  in 
the  disposition  of  machine  guns  and  trench  mortars,  and  par- 
ticularly in  the  distribution  of  the  artillery,  with  its  observa- 
tion and  command  posts.  It  is  not  sufficient  that  only  the 
infantry  should  be  disposed  in  depth.  The  chief  strength 
must  be  sought  by  organization  in  depth,  the  proper  distribu- 
tion of  force  over  the  whole  fortified  zone,  and  concealment. 

(a)  By  concealment. 

1.  Against  air  observation,  by  photographs  of  our  own  posi- 
tions to  insure  that  due  precautions  are  being  observed. 

2.  Dummy  works  to  deceive  the  enemy. 

3.  Impressing   on  every   man   the   necessity   of  concealment 
and   the  knowledge  that   artillery   positions  and   machine-gun 
emplacements  in  the  fortified  zone,  which  are  located  during 
construction,  lose  value. 

(ft)  Dugouts. — Construction  must  be  begun  at  once  through- 
out the  whole  depths  of  the  defensive  zones. 

1.  Dugouts  will  accommodate  the  following  troops:  («)  In 
the  first  trench,  one-sixth  of  garrison  of  front-line  position 
(fighting  troops)  ;  (ft)  the  second  line,  one-third  of  garrison; 
(c)  farther  to  the  roar  as  far  as  the  artillery  protective  line 
(exclusive)  about  one-half  of  the  fighting  troops. 

(c)  The    same   principles    are   followed    in    construction   of 
artillery  protective  line  which  is  intended  for  occupation  by 
supports. 

(d)  Additional  dugouts. 

1.  Numerous  dugouts  to  be  constructed  outside  the  trenches 
in   readiness   for   methodical    distribution   of   trench   garrison 
over  intervening  area. 

2.  Outside  the  trenches   at  the   commencement   of   the   de- 
fensive battle. 

(e)  Character  of  construction, 
29267°— 18 9 


130         GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES. 

.  1.  Where  mine  dugouts  can  be  constructed,  there  must  be 
26  to  33  feet  of  earth  over  them  and  at  least  two  exits. 

2.  Concrete  dugouts  must  not  be  conspicuously  high  and  the 
slope  of  the  earth  covering  them  must  be  flat. 

3.  Timber  of  good  dimensions  should  be  employed  for  casing 
when   constructing  mined  dugouts,   so  that  the  exits  will  be 
wide    and    high,    facilitating    rapid    egress    of    the    garrison. 
Exits  should  have  sufficient  thickness  of  earth  cover. 

(/)  In  the  front  line. 

1.  Must  be«  shellproof . 

2.  Only    sufficient   accommodation   for   small   proportion   of 
garrison  as  laid  down  in  paragraph  b  1. 

(g)  Where  possible,  should  be  constructed  of  material  of 
great  resisting  power,  such  as  concrete,  iron,  and  joints,  which 
facilitate  the  rapid  exit  of  the  men  and  allows  construction 
of  shellproof  dugouts  at  less  depth  than  necessary  by  mined 
dugouts. 

(h)  Observation  posts. 

1.  Splinter-proof  observation  posts  should  be  built  close  be- 
hind dugouts. 

2.  Observation  will  normally  be  carried  out  from  these. 

3.  In   an  intense  bombardment  observation   will  be  carried 
out  in  the  front  line,  in  addition  to  the  observation  posts,  by 
stout-hearted  men  leaving  dugouts  at  frequent  intervals  and 
observing  over  parapet. 

(i)  Exits  should  be  provided  from  the  rear  leading  to  the 
surface  behind  the  trench,  preferably  into  shell  holes,  thus 
providing  exit  for  garrison  when  enemy  has  penetrated  into 
trench. 

(/)  Protection. 

1.  By   means   of  several   recesses   at  entrances   to   dugouts 
containing  sentries  able  to  engage  the  enemy  as  soon  as  he 
enters  the  trench,  and  by  keeping  the  entrance  free,  enable  gar- 
rison to  come  out. 

2.  By  trench  block  in  concrete  dugouts,  enabling  the  entrance 
to  be  kept  under  fire,  preventing  the  enemy  from  forcing  an 
entrance. 

(fc)  Wire.— (See  illustration  B.) 

1.  In  advance  of  the  foremost  trench  a  strong  and  continu- 
ous wire  entanglement  consisting  of  three  belts,  each  33  feet 
wide,  with  intervals  of  15  to  33  feet  between  belts. 

2,  Irregular  in  trace  and  not  too  high. 


GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES.         131 

3.  Particular  care  to  be  taken  to  insure  that  front  belt  of 
wire  can  be  swept  by  flank  fire. 

4.  Wire  should  not  be  taut,  because  if  taut  it  is  severely 
damaged  by  concussion  caused  by  bursting  shells. 

5 .  In  emergency,  strong  wire  fences  3  to  5  feet  high  at  inter- 
vals of  6  to  10  feet  can  be  employed. 

(I)  Method  of  construction. 

1.  Construction   of   the   front   belt   of   wire,   outer   edge   of 
which  should  be  65  feet  in  advance  of  the  front  trench. 

2.  In  front  of  second  and  third  trenches  (and  in  the  case  of 
rear  positions  in  front  of  the  front  trench  also)  gaps  must  be 
left  for  passage  of  troops  moving  to  the  attack. 

(m)  Posts  should  not  be  driven  in  these  gaps,  the  wire  being 
merely  placed  in  readiness. 
(n)  Protection  of  wire, 

1.  The  first  three  belts  must  be  protected  by  sentries  in  holes 
of  short-length  trenches  behind  them. 

2.  In  zone  of  defense  organized  in  depth  wire  entanglements 
will  be  distributed  over  entire  area  in  blocks  about  30  feet 
deep,  irregular  and  not  continuous,  or  in  numerous  lengths  of 
strong-wire  fencing,  advantage  being  taken  of  natural  cover, 
such  as  hedges,  sunken  roads,  etc. 

(o)   Order  in  which  work  will  be  carried  out.     (Note  illus- 
trations C,  A,  and  E.) 

1.  Tracing. 

2.  Wiring. 

3.  Construction  of  dugouts. 

4.  Actual  digging  of  trenches,  unless  lack  of  material  ren- 
ders it  necessary  to  proceed  with  (4). 

(p)  Machine-gun  emplacements. 

1.  Construction  of  a   large  number   in   the  ground   between 
various  lines  must  be  begun  immediately. 

2.  They  will  be  sited  on  slopes  and  in  hollows,  with  special 
object  of  securing  flank  fire. 

3.  Commanding  points  will  not  be  used. 

4.  They  must  be  a  surprise  to  the  enemy,  and  therefore  will 
not  be  placed  in  the  angles,  where  the  enemy  is  bound  to  sus- 
pect their  presence.     (See  illustration  C.) 

5.  Dummy  emplacements  to  be  constructed  at  these  points. 

6.  Machine  guns  sited  in  concealed  emplacements,  flank,  or 
in  rear. 

(q)  Protection  of  machine  guns  against  air  observation. 


132         GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES. 

1.  Concealment  from  air  observation  by  erection  of  wire  net- 
ting covered  with  brushwood  over  excavation  and  building  mate- 
rials. 

2.  High  wire  surrounding  emplacement  will  disclose  its  posi- 
tion to  the  aviator. 

3.  Belts  of  wire  or  several  strong  wire  fences  so  arranged 
that  the  enemy  must  run  into  them  and  which  can  be  swept  by 
fire  their  entire  length  are  more  advantageous. 

(r)  Communication  trenches. — Where  possible  should  be  con- 
structed between  the  several  lines  obliquely  without  greatly  in- 
creasing their  length  with  result  that  they  will  provide  a  net- 
work of  trenches  in  which  the  communication  trenches  pro- 
vided with  wire  and  organized  for  fire  purposes  can  be  at  the 
same  time  utilized  as  switch  lines.  (See  illustrations  D  and  E.) 

(s)  Advantages. 

1.  Enemy  can  not  clearly  locate  defensive  system. 

2.  In  order  to  destroy  position  he  must  bombard  entire  area 
between  first  and  third  lines. 

3.  This  renders  artillery  preparation  more  difficult  and  in- 
creases area  with  which  it  must  deal. 

4.  An  enemy  penetrating  the  position  is  caught  in  the  net- 
work and  is  prevented  from  surrounding  those  portions  of  the 
trench  garrison  which  are  holding  out  in  front. 

5.  If  communication  trenches  are  dug  in  straight  lines  as  in 
sketch  b,  enemy  can  bombard  the  separate  lines  and  neglect  the 
ground  between  them. 

C.  RECONSTRUCTION   OF  OLD  POSITIONS. 

1.  The  majority  of  the  dugouts  are  in  the  first  trench.    This 
leads  to  crowding  in  the  forward  line  with  disastrous  conse- 
quences. 

2.  In  the  back  lines  where  possible  this  must  be  corrected  by 
digging  a  new  trench  in  front  of  the  old  first  trench. 

THE  EMPLOYMENT  OF  COUNTER-ATTACK  TROOPS. 

[Extracts  from  translation  of  a  German  document, 'dated  Headquarters 
Reserve  Corps,  June  13,  1917.] 

EMPLOYMENT   OF   COUNTER  ATTACK. 

Immediate  and  rapid  counter  attack  carried  out  by  reserve 
battalions  which  have  been  kept  concentrated  in  close  proximity 


GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES.         133 

and  are  provided  with  field  artillery  held  in  readiness  to  move 
(counter-attack  artillery)  leads  to  the  immediate  recapture  of 
the  whole  position.  In  such  cases  it  has  been  possible  for  the 
counter-attack  artillery  to  gallop  in  the  open  and  deliver  a  very 
heavy  and  disastrous  fire, 
(a)  Preparation. 

1.  Success  can  only  be  obtained  by  very  careful  preparation, 
necessitating  a  carefully  thought  out  plan  of  operation  with  the 
subordinate  commanders  acquainted  with  the  ground.     As  far 
as  possible  preliminary  practice  should  be  held.     Particularly 
careful  preparation  must  be  made  where  regimental  or  divisional 
boundaries  are  in  question. 

2.  Preparations  for  counter  attacks  to  be  carried  out  within 
the  divisional   sector  must  be  made   by  the  division  in   that 
sector. 

(ft)  Basis  of  the  preparation. 

1.  All  reserves  will  be  placed  at  the  complete  disposal  of  the 
divisional  commander. 

2.  The  resting  battalions  of  the  division  will  be  brought  into 
and  in  front  of  the  third-line  posiiton. 

3.  Counter-attack  regiments  will  be  brought  closer  up. 

4.  If  only  one  division  is  attacked  it  can  rely  on  the  group, 
placing  at  its  disposal  for  immediate  counter  attack  three  addi- 
tional battalions  and  two  or  three  batteries  of  field  artillery. 

5.  Guides  for  troops  of  other  divisions  not  familiar  with  the 
ground  is  of  extreme  importance  and  must  be  arranged  before- 
hand. 

(c)  Employment  of  second-line  fighting  divisions. 

1.  To  be  billeted  in  the  rear  billeting  area. 

2.  To  be  brought  forward  into  forward-bivouacing  area. 

(a)  They  will  bivouac  in  concentrated  groups  of  infantry 
regiments  with  artillery;  (ft)  billets  will  not  be  expected  as 
units  must  be  kept  together  and  villages  and  camps,  for  the 
most  part,  will  be  under  fire. 

3.  On  approach  of  hostile  attack,  troops  will  be  brought  for- 
ward from  bivouac  area  to  their  assembly  positions  for  the 
attack,  and  will  be  held  in  readiness  there. 

4.  Attention  must  be  paid  to  protection  against  aerial  observa- 
tion. 

5.  Troops  will  be  best  disposed  in  infantry  regimental  groups. 

6.  They  must  deploy  at  an  early  moment  so  that  when  they 
receive  orders   or   a   hostile   attack   takes   place,   the   counter 
attack  can  begin  without  any  loss  of  time. 


134         GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES. 

7.  Single   batteries  will   be   allotted   to   infantry   regimental 
groups  for  tasks  to  be  carried  out  in  direct  cooperation  with  the 
infantry  (antitank  defense  in  the  engagement  of  machine  guns). 

8.  These   artillery   units   should   remain   with   their   teams 
hooked  in. 

9.  The  remaining  batteries  will  be  in  a  position  of  readiness 
faced    according   to    the    requirements   of   the   situation    with 
their  teams  within  easy  reach. 

10.  Dispatch  riders  from  the  divisional  cavalry  should  be  with 
infantry  and  artillery.     It  is  important  that  both  be  well  sup- 
plied with  these  dispatch  riders. 

11.  Infantry  will  wear  assault  kit  and  carry  an  ample  supply 
of  ammunition.    All  unnecessary  equipment  will  be  left  in  their 
last  billeting  area. 

12.  Divisional  commanders  and  all  commanders  in  the  counter- 
attack division  should  be  close  to  their  troops  on  the  field  of 
battle  in  accordance  with  the  principles  of  open  warfare. 

13.  The  schemes  for  the  employment  of  the  second-line  fight- 
ing division  must  be  based  above  all  on  the  consideration  that 
the  counter  attack  will  have  to  be  carried  out  between  the  second 
and  third-line  positions  and  behind  the  second-line  positions 
with  the  object  of  at  once  retaking  any  guns  that  have  been  lost 
and  eventually  recapturing  the  whole  position.     The  positions 
of  readiness  for  batteries  will  be  chosen  correspondingly  far 
forward  as  the  observation  posts  and  battery  posts  must  be 
reconnoitered. 


GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES.         135 


FS 

tm    o    German    OdeuTttnt  captured    in    June.    191  7$ 
)  .  7OO-8OOm.-  -  < 

]<   ••S..v:U    ~i   ';;"rf    ~    ^^: 

2'plAtooni                        2  platoons 

tao  - 

l  pia'toon               ^  platoon 

^«  •*  S^PCoyT^  ™ 

,- 

4 

J>o 

P>             ^ 

,                                                  i     Commfrof  the 

C)  ,/                                                W  B*tt"  in  front  fin* 

\ 

4 

* 

1 

^  f  —  ^^  "^    J>  6' 

N 

- 

| 

ST^Coij.-1  '" 

1 

HtOC- 

Dioat 

~O' 
< 

Jr     Comm^'of  th« 
w  Support  Battalion 

Keierve  Sattulien  (9*  'to  W'Ceus.)  rtstirtf  in  rear. 

77   showing  the  Organization 
?/  a  Regimental  Sector 

eaf  t>y  The   Topographical 


136         GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STTTDIES. 


GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES.         137 


A/V\ 

*(C) 


frtntr? 


VIII. 

THE  CONSTRUCTION  OF  POSITIONS  FOR  THE 
COMING  WINTER. 

(Translation  of  a  German  document  captured  by  the  British.) 


HEADQUABTEKS  AMEBICAN  EXPEDITIONARY  FORCES, 

GENERAL  STAFF,  INTELLIGENCE  SECTION   (A), 

October  19,  1911. 

1.  With  the  approach  of  cold  and  rainy  weather,  a  gradual 
diminution  of  the  intensity  of  the  fighting  on  our  front  may  be 
anticipated.     At  the  same  time  these  weather  conditions  call 
for   increased   care   in   improving   the   accommodation   of   the 
troops   in   the  trenches   and   for   arrangements   for   providing 
them  with  hot  meals.     This  can  be  achieved  by  constructing 
continuous  trench  lines  with  the  requisite  covered  communica- 
tions, which  also  facilitate  the  disciplinary  supervision  of  units 
by  their  commanders. 

2.  The  work  of  improving  the  positions  must  be  begun  im- 
mediately, wherever  the  tactical  situation  in  any  way  permits. 

3.  It  is  essential  to  provide  a  continuous  fire  trench,  capable 
of  defense,  in  the  present  foremost  fighting  line.    Some  330-440 
yards  behind   it,    a   further   continuous   trench,   consisting   of 
lengths  of  fire  trench  connected  by  narrow  lateral  communica- 
tion trenches,  will  be  constructed  as  a  third  fighting  line  (third 
trench). 

4.  These  two  fihgting  lines  will  be  connected  in  each  company 
sector  by  two  communication  trenches.     In  conjunction  with 
these  short  lengths  of  trench  of  irregular  form  and  at  irregular 
intervals  will  be  constructed  to  serve  as  a  second  fighting  line 
(second  trench). 

5.  The  machine  guns,  well  distributed  in  depth,  will  be  sited 
in  the  ground  between  the  trenches.    They  will  not  be  sited  on 
commanding  ground,  but  will  be  well  concealed  on  slopes  and 
in  hollows,  with  the  special  object  of  securing  flanking  fire. 

139 


140        GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES. 

The  group  regards  these  machine-gun  emplacements,  when 
strongly  constructed  and  suitably  sited,  as  the  most  essential 
requisite  for  the  defense  of  the  whole  position  when  fighting  is 
resumed. 

The  identification  of  active  machine  guns  must  be  rendered 
as  difficult  as  possible  by  the  construction  of  dummy  emplace- 
ments. 

Cover  from  aerial  observation  is  specially  important  during 
the  construction  of  machine-gun  emplacements.  (The  excava- 
tion and  the  dump  of  building  material  should  be  screened  by 
wire  netting  and  branches.  Building  should  be  confined  to 
periods  of  poor  visibility.)  The  emplacement  should  not  be 
surrounded  by  high-wire  entanglements,  which  betrays  its  posi- 
tion to  the  airman,  but  bolts  of  wire  or  several  wire  fences 
should  be  constructed  so  that  they  can  be  enfiladed  by  the 
machine  gun  and  so  that  the  enemy  is  forced  to  run  into  them. 

If  water  is  not  encountered  close  below  the  surface  of  the 
ground  the  isolated  machine-gun  emplacements  should  be  con- 
nected with  the  nearest  trench  by  mined  galleries  or  covered 
passages. 

6.  A  dummy  trench,  with  an  entanglement  of  posts  without 
wire,  should  be  constructed  behind  the  third-fighting  line  (third 
trench ) . 

7.  Suitable  portions  of  the  communication  trenches  should  be 
arranged  for  delivering  flanking  fire  over  the  ground  between 
the  trenches. 

8.  An  irregular  but  connected  entanglement  in  advance  of  the 
front  trench  should  be  aimed  at.     The  shell  holes  there  may 
with  advantage  be  filled  in  with  wire,  in  order  to  prevent  the 
enemy  from  establishing  himself  in  them. 

Farther  in  rear  only  irregular  lengths  of  wire  entanglement 
and  fencing  will  be  employed,  so  arranged  that  counter 
attacks  are  not  impeded.  Full  use  should  be  made  of  wire  so 
arranged  as  to  force  the  enemy  in  particular  directions  and 
bring  him  under  the  fire  of  our  machine  guns. 

Special  attention  should  be  paid  to  siting  all  entanglements  so 
that  they  are  inconspicuous  and  are  concealed  from  view. 

9.  Small  shelters  should  be  provided  in  the  first  trench  for 
about  one-sixth  of  the  garrison,  and  in  the  second  trench  for 
about  two-sixths ;  dugouts  should  be  built  in  the  third  trench 
and  as  far  back  as  the  artillery  protective  line,  to  accommodate 
three-sixths  of  the  fighting  troops. 


GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES.         141 

The  same  principles  are  to  be  followed  in  the  construction  of 
the  artillery  protective  line,  which  is  intended  for  occupation  by 
the  supports. 

The  provision  of  numerous  dugouts  outside  the  trenches  paves 
the  way  for  the  methodical  removal  of  the  troops  from  the 
trench  lines  into  the  ground  between  them,  which  must  always 
take  place  immediately  the  defensive  battle  is  resumed. 

Where  mining  is  possible,  mined  dugouts  with  26-33  feet  of 
earth  cover  and  at  least  two  exits  should  be  constructed. 

Concrete  structures  which  should  at  the  same  time  all  be  con- 
structed for  use  as  machine-gun  emplacements,  must  be  of  low 
profile,  and  the  slope  of  the  earth  covering  them  must  be  kept 
flat. 

Dugouts  to  accommodate  more  than  two  groups  (i.  e.,  2 
N.  C.  O.'s  and  16  men)  are  open  to  grave  objections  and  should 
therefore  be  avoided. 

10.  All  shelters  in  the  first  trench,  in  addition  to  affording 
complete  protection  against  the  weather,   should  be  at   least 
splinter  proof. 

Owing  to  the  presence  of  water  close  beneath  the  surface  of 
the  ground,  it  is  generally  impossible  to  excavate  to  any  depth ; 
protection  must,  therefore,  be  sought  by  means  of  a  good  dis- 
tribution of  numerous  small  dugouts  in  those  portions  of  the 
second  and  third  trenches  in  which  concrete  work  can  not  be 
carried  out. 

The  attached  sketches  give  suggestions  for  the  construction 
of  shelters  and  dugouts. 

11.  Arrangements    for    drainage    must    be    considered    when 
laying  out  the  trenches.    The  several  lines  should  be  so  traced 
that  there  is  on  one  side  a  natural  fall  toward  one  of  the 
drainage  ditches  which  are  so  numerous  in  this  area.     Where 
this  is  not  possible,  catch  pits  should  be  provided  from  the  out- 
set (boxes  built  into  the  sole  of  the  trench)   from  which  the 
water  can  easily  be  removed  by  pumps  or  balers. 

12.  The  sides  of  the  trenches  should  be  revetted  at  the  bottom, 
in  order  to  reduce  as  much  as  possible  the  labor  of  their  upkeep. 
In  wet  ground  more  especially  the  method  of  revetting  shown  on 
the  attached  sketch  has  proved  very  satisfactory. 

13.  For  the  supports,  the  artillery  protective  line  should  be 
constructed  on  the  same  principles  as  the  front-line  position. 
It  must  be  provided  with  a  strong  wire  entanglement,  in  which 
gaps  are  left  for  troops  to  advance  through;  there  should  be 


142         GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES. 

several  trenches ;  dugouts  should  only  be  built  in  the  second 
and  third  trenches;  in  the  first  trench  there  should  only  be 
shelters  for  one-sixth  of  the  regular  garrison. 

14.  In  all  positions  the  wire  entanglements  should  be  begun 
first.    The  construction  of  shelters  and  dugouts  must  be  carried 
out  at  the  same  time  throughout  the  whole  defensive  zone.    The 
construction  of  machine-gun  emplacements  in  the  ground  be- 
tween the  trenches  must  be  taken  in  hand  at  once  on  a  particu- 
larly liberal  scale.     Touch  with  the  neighboring  division  must 
be  assured  in  all  defensive  positions. 

15.  The  consolidation  of  the  positions  in  the  manner  indicated 
above  presupposes  that  the  utmost  efforts  will  be  made  by  all 
available  personnel  and  that  every  quiet  interval  in  the  battle 
will  be  fully  utilized.     Every  unit  should  be  permeated  with 
the  desire  to  provide  its  men  as  quickly  as  possible  with  better 
conditions  as  regards  both  fighting  and  shelter  on  the  battle 
field.     Timely  demands  for  all  requisites  for  the  consolidation 
of  the  positions  will  considerably  facilitate  an  adequate  supply 
of  these  stores  in  the  divisional  parks. 

16.  To  begin  with,  the  construction  of  the  bridgehead  and  ar- 
tillery protective  line,  in  accordance  with  the  above  instruc- 
tions, will  be  taken  in  hand  by  the  24th  and  32nd  Divisions. 

(Signed)  v.  THAEB, 

Lieut.  Colonel,  C.  O.  S. 


GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES.         143 
DIAGRAM  SHOWING  TH?  ORGANIZATION 

or  • 

COMPANY    SECTOR    FOR    THC   VINT£R    MONTH*. 
l.iutd  with   on   order  of   the  Wyt »oh«»r.  Grouft  a»f.d  Sept.  £,l»17 


IX. 

INFORMATION  GATHERED 
CONCERNING  THE  ENEMY'S  ARTILLERY. 

29267° — 18 10  145 


CONTENTS. 


Page. 

Information  gathered  concerning  the  enemy's  artillery 147 

Communication-  between  infantry  and  artillery 150 

A.  Telephone  communications 150 

B.  Visual  communications 151 

C.  Communications  by  meana  of  sound 151 

D.  Communications  by  means  of  wireless 152 

E.  Communications  by  means  of  signals  between  artillery 

and  infantry,  aeroplanes  and  the  ground 152 

F.  Personal  liaison 152 

Infantry 152 

Artillery 153 

(A).  Employment  of  gas  shells 155 

(B).  Counter-battery  work 155 

(C).  Avoiding  British  destructive  shoots 155 

(D).  Disposition  of  the  enemy's  artillery 155 

(E).  Construction  of  battery  positions 155 

(F).  Camouflage 156 

(G).  Artillery  in  support  of  counter  attacks 156 

X.  Artillery  curtain  fires  in  misty  weather 156 

XI.  Cooperation  of  the  artillery  with  the  aviation 157 

XII.  Unit  of  angular  measurement  used  by  the  German 

artillery 157 

146 


IX. 

INFORMATION  GATHERED  CONCERNING  THE 
ENEMY'S  ARTILLERY. 


HEADQUABTERS  AMERICAN  EXPEDITIONARY  FORCES, 

GENERAL  STAFF,  INTELLIGENCE  SECTION  (A), 

September  11,  1917. 

Recent  captured  German  documents  and  statements  of  pris- 
oners show  the  following  artillery  tactical  dispositions: 

1.  Move  into  the  open  under  heavy  bombardment. 

2.  To  have  numerous  fire  positions,  resulting  in  frequent  shifts 
of  battery  positions. 

3.  Supply  of  ammunition  retained  at  these  various  fire  posi- 
tions. 

4.  Employment  of  short,  sharp  artillery  fire  before  a  surprise 
attack. 

5.  Warning  against  unnecessary  fire. 

6.  Rules  for  artillery  fire  against  trench  mortars. 

7.  Communication  between  infantry  and  artillery. 

8.  An   artillery   liaison   officer  with  the   infantry   when   ad- 
vancing. 

9.  Artillery  instruction. 

10.  Use  of  artillery  in  misty  weather. 

11.  Cooperation  of  the  artillery  with  the  aviation. 

12.  Unit  of  angular  measurement  used  by  the  German  ar- 
tillery. 

The  following  are  statements  from  prisoners  captured  and 
documents  covering  the  above : 

I.  (a)  The  following  is  an  extract  from  the  orders  of  the 
Ypres  group,  dated  June  11,  1917 : 

"  It  is  the  duty  of  the  artillery  to  evade  the  enemy's  destruc- 
tive fire  and  thus  maintain  its  fighting  strength.  Field  artillery 
can  attain  this  object  by  moving  into  the  open  and  evacuating 
battery  positions  which  have  been  discovered  and  are  heavily 

147 


148         GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES. 

shelled.  In  the  case  of  heavy  batteries,  the  effect  of  the  enemy's 
fire  must  be  minimized  by  distributing  the  guns  in  echelon  at 
wide  intervals. 

"  In  the  case  of  positions  in  the  open  it  is  only  possible  to 
keep  ammunition  in  small  dumps,  merely  protected  against  the 
weather ;  the  effect  of  direct  hits  is  also  diminished  in  this  way. 
As  the  large  quantity  of  ammunition  which  has  to  be  stored  in 
readiness  covers  a  large  area,  the  wide  distribution  of  the  guns 
and  the  movement  of  batteries  to  a  flank  is  facilitated. 

"  The  general  principle  that  in  case  of  heavy  bombardment  the 
regular  positions  should  be  abandoned  for  the  open  must  be 
applied  also  to  the  artillery." 

(6)  A  prisoner  captured  near  Hollebeke  on  July  31  made  the 
following  statement : 

1.  "  The  enemy's  artillery  casualties  have  been  very  heavy 
lately. 

2.  "  When  moving  up  to  the  line  from  Gheluwe  the  prisoner 
noticed  a  number  of  batteries  in  position  in  the  open.     These 
batteries  apparently  changed  their  positions  frequently." 

Another  prisoner  states  that  about  a  fortnight  ago  in  this 
sector  field  guns  were  brought  into  forward  positions  at  night 
for  the  purpose  of  gas-shell  bombardments  and  were  withdrawn 
again  before  dawn. 

(c)  The  following  information  has  been  obtained  from  prison- 
ers of  the  26th  Division,  captured  north  of  St.  Julien  on  the 
19th  of  August : 

"A  battery  of  field  guns  had  been  brought  into  position  about 
a  kilometer  to  the  rear  of  the  German  front  line  as  defense 
against  tanks,  which  were  expected  to  attack." 

(d)  An  officer  and  noncommissioned  officer  of  a  field  battery, 
captured  on  the  16th  of  August  east  of  Westhoek,  made  the  fol- 
lowing statements: 

"  When  the  guns  are  put  out  of  action  they  are  generally  re- 
placed within  24  hours  from  a  central  artillery  park.  The  prac- 
tice of  moving  guns  forward  during  the  night  is  confirmed. 
Single  guns  are  left  in  evacuated  battery  positions  to  give  them 
the  appearance  of  activity." 

II.  (a)  A  battery  has,  as  a  rule,  three  alternative  positions. 

(6)  German  documents  captured  by  the  French  show  the  im- 
portance attached  by  the  enemy  to  numerous  alternative  bat- 
tery positions.  A  list,  dated  August  28,  1916,  shows  that  a  group 
near  Bixschoote  of  7  batteries  of  field  and  heavy  artillery  had 
a  total  of  32  positions. 


GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES.         149 

Each  battery  had  at  least  four  positions: 

1.  The  normal  position  (Feuerstellung)  . 

2.  An  alternative  position  (Ausweichstelling). 

3.  Main  position  in  rear  (Ruckwartige  Hauptstellung). 

4.  Alternative  position  in  rear   (Ruckwartige  Ausweichstel- 
ling). 

(c)  An  order  dated  June  1,  1917,  shows  that  all  batteries  in 
this  area  were  to  be  provided  with  three  positions — 

1.  The  normal  position. 

2.  An  alternative  position  (Wechselstellung). 

3.  Position  for  a  reinforcing  battery  (Verstarkungsstellung). 

III.  (a)   The  rule  of  keeping  not  more  than  2,000  to  3,000 
rounds  in  a  battery  position  has  been  found  impracticable,  owing 
to  the  difficulties  of  bringing  up  fresh  supplies  frequently.    The 
present  system  is  to  keep  2,000  to  3,000  rounds  in  each  of  the 
alternative  positions,  so  that  a  battery  has  from  6,000  to  9,000 
rounds  within  easy  reach. 

(b)  Examination  of  German  artillery  prisoners  shows  that — 

(1)  Contrary  to  orders,  5,000  to  6,000  rounds  are  stored  near 
the  battery  positions.    The  result  is  that  the  dumps  are  large 
and  are  often  hit,  and  thus  much  ammunition  is  lost. 

(N.  B. — This  is  very  high  compared  with  the  amount — viz, 
3,000  to  3,500  rounds  of  7.7-cm.  ammunition — laid  down  by  v. 
'  Stein  on  8-9-16,  in  his  "  Lessons  drawn  from  the  battle  of  the 
Somme"). 

(2)  Barrage  fire  continues  for  a  period  of  five  minutes,  if 
the  request  is  not  repeated.    Rate  of  fire,  9  rounds  per  gun  per 
minute. 

(French  source,  July  19.  1917.) 

IV.  On  the  front  line,  in  front  of  the  objective,  a  single  salvo 
was  fired  before  the  onrush  of  the  attacking  troops,  which  jumped 
into  the  trench  at  midnight  behind  the  exploding  shells. 

On  July  8,  on  the  Pantheon-Froidmont  front,  the  infantry  ad- 
vanced after  a  three  minutes'  artillery  fire  (4.27  to  4.30). 

July  10,  north  of  Rheims  (Neufchatel  road),  the  troops  sup- 
posed to  accomplish  the  raid  were  to  leave  their  trenches  as  soon 
as  the  first  few  ininen  shot  at  the  French  trenches  had  exploded. 

July  12,  a  trench  raid  is  executed  after  three  minutes'  bom- 
bardment. 

V.  Economy  of  artillery  ammunition  and  man  power. 
C.  G.  S.  of  the  Field  Army  II,  56,435.     20-5-17. 


160         GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES. 

Too  many  bombardments  of  positions  not  occupied  by  the 
enemy  (destructive  shots  carried  out  against  empty  trenches; 
unnecessary  barrages;  shots  without  sufficient  data,  especially 
by  night). 

Insufficient  adaptability  regarding  infantry,  artillery,  and 
trench-mortar  tactics. 

( Sd. )  Ludcndorff. 


VI.  A  captured  order,  issued  on  June  15,  1917,  by  the  group 
of  Ypres,   lays  down  the  following  rules  for  artillery   action 
against  trench  mortars : 

(a)  The  methodical  engagement  of  the  enemy's  trench  mortars 
with  destructive  fire  by  day. 

(i)  Every  effort  must  be  made  by  infantry  and  artillery  ob- 
servers to  locate  trench  mortar  emplacements.  Flash  inter- 
sections form  a  useful  indication. 

(ii)  As  soon  as  a  trench  mortar  has  been  located  destructive 
fire  must  be  opened  on  it.  When  the  infantry  ask  for  trench 
mortars  to  be  engaged  they  must  report,  at  the  same  time,  the 
best  place  from  which  observation  can  be  carried  out. 

(iii)  Trench  mortars  should  be  engaged  with  deliberate  ob- 
served fire;  only  1  gun  of  the  battery  should  be  employed.  A 
light  field  howitzer  battery  will  generally  suffice  for  the  task. 

(6)  Engaging  trench  mortars  by  night. 

(1)  One  gun  of  a  battery  (7.7-cm.)  should  register  on  a  known 
or  suspected  trench  mortar  emplacement  by  day.  The  gun  will 
be  kept  laid  on  the  trench  mortar  by  night,  and  will  fire  a  few 
rounds  as  soon  as  the  latter  is  active. 

(ii)  Harrassing  fire  will  be  directed  at  night  against  vicinity 
of  trench  mortar  emplacements,  in  order  to  catch  ammunition 
carriers. 

VII.  Summary  of  measures  against  surprise  attacks. 

COMMUNICATION    BETWEEN    INFANTRY    AND    ARTILLERY. 

A.   TELEPHONE   COMMUNICATIONS. 

A  properly  constructed  and  coordinated  infantry  telephone 
system,  including  underground  lines,  at  least  from  the  company 
commanders  to  the  commander  of  the  front-line  troops. 

A  properly  constructed  artillery  telephone  system,  including, 
invariably,  two  lines  (one  underground)  from  the  batteries  to 


GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN   TACTICAL  STUDIES.          151 

their  own  observation  posts  and  direct  communication  between 
the  artillery  commander  on  duty  and  each  control  battery  (as 
far  as  possible  with  a  laddered  circuit). 

Telephone  lines  between  the  exchanges  of  these  two  systems. 

Direct  underground  lines  from  the  commander  of  the  front- 
line troops  to  his  control  battery. 

B.   VISUAL  COMMUNICATIONS. 

1.  Communications   by  means  of  flare  signals. — These  must 
be  provided  between  the  front  line  and  the  control  battery  con- 
cerned via  the  commander  of  the  front-line  troops,  and  from 
this  battery  to  the  observation  post  which  permits  of  the  best 
observation  in  the  infantry  regiment's  sector,  and,  if  necessary, 
to  the  batteries  dependent  on  the  control  battery.     Intermediate 
alarm  posts,  several  men  strong,  must  be  established  and  con- 
tinually occupied.     In  case  of  fog  additional  intermediate  posts 
must  be  established  at  points  fixed  beforehand. 

2.  Communications  by  means  of  lamp  signals. — These  must 
be  provided  between  the  front  line  and  the  control  battery  con- 
cerned via  the  commander  of  the  front-line  troops,  from  the 
artillery' commander  on  duty  to  each  control  battery,  from  the 
control  battery  to  the  observation  post,  which  permits  of  the 
best  observation  in  the  sector,  and  between  the  batteries  and 
their  observation  posts.     The  beams  of  light  must  be  screened 
from   observation  from   the  side.     Short  code  words  must  be 
arranged  beforehand  for  ordering  barrage  fire. 

C.    COMMUNICATIONS  BY  MEANS  OF  SOUND. 

1.  Alarm  instruments. — The  posts  should  be  established  in 
the  same  way  as  for  communications  by  flare  signals.  The  fol- 
lowing are  the  best  arrangements : 

(a)  Loud  sirens,  driven  by  compressed  air,  should  be  employed 
to  give  the  signal  for  barrage  fire. 

(b)  Large  bells  should  be  employed  for  gas  alarms. 

In  order  that  the  sound  may  spread  properly  alarm  instru- 
ments should  not  be  sited  in  trenches  and  holes  in  the  ground. 
If  the  artillery  can  not  recognize  the  alarm  signal  with  cer- 
tainty it  must  be  taken  to  mean  both  a  call  for  barrage  and  a 
gas  alarm.  Every  man  must  put  on  his  gas  mask  if  he  hears 
barrage  fire  opened  during  fog  and  has  not  previously  heard  the 
sirens. 


152         GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES. 

2.  Machine-gun  signals  should  be  arranged  beforehand  in  case 
of  fog  (5  rounds — pause — 5  rounds)  for  ordering  the  opening  of 
barrage  fire.  All  machine  guns  sited  in  rear  must  take  up  the 
signal  until  barrage  fire  is  opened. 

D.     COMMUNICATIONS   BY   MEANS    OF   WIRELESS. 

Communications  by  means  of  wireless,  with  the  assistance  of 
the  apparatus  of  the  trench  wireless  detachment,  from  the 
foremost  line  (infantry  and  artillery  observers,  company),  via 
the  commander  of  the  front-line  troops,  to  the  observation  post 
which  permits  of  the  best  observation  in  the*^  divisional  sector 
(divisional  observation  post),  or  direct  to  the  artillery  com- 
mander on  duty  (brigade  battle  headquarters),  and  thence  to 
the  division  (artillery  commander).  Power  buzzer  stations 
will  also  be  employed,  especially  for  communication  between 
the  foremost  line  and  the  commander  of  the  front-line  troops. 

E.    COMMUNICATIONS    BY    MEANS    OF    SIGNALS    BETWEEN    ARTILLERY 
AND    INFANTRY    AEROPLANES     AND    THE    GROUND. 

These  are  carried  out  by  wireless,  signal  lamps,  flare  signals, 
and  by  dropping  messages ;  and  from  the  ground  to  the  aero- 
plane by  means  of  cloth  signals,  signal  lamps,  and  flares. 

To  enable  wireless  messages  to  be  received  from  the  aero- 
plane a  fighting  wireless  station  will  be  established  at  every 
artillery  group  and  a  receiving  station  with  every  division. 

F.   PERSONAL  LIAISON. 

An  artillery  liaison  officer  will  be  attached  to  each  com- 
mander of  the  front-line  troops. 

INFANTRY. 

.  1.  Increased  readiness  for  action  at  dawn  and  during  foggy 
weather  is  necessary,  as  well  as  holding  the  front  line  more 
strongly,  the  dispatch  of  patrols  over  the  ground  in  front 
of  the  position,  while  all  machine  guns  should  be  kept  ready  to 
open  fire.  Rearward  flanking  works,  strong  points,  and  hold- 
ing-on  points  must  be  continually  occupied  by  emergency  garri- 
sons. Artillery  which  is  particularly  exposed  to  danger  (close- 
range  guns)  must  be  protected  by — 


GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES.         163 

2.  Special  arrangements  must  be  worked  out  for  fog.    Where 
necessary  the  reserves  must  be  brought  up  closer  to  the  front 
line  in  case  of  fog.     Companies  in  rest  should  be  pushed  for- 
ward in  case  of  fog,  but  never  far  from  their  quarters. 

3.  Arrangements  must  be  made  to  bring  up  reserves  quickly. 
There  should  be  plenty  of  signposts.    Guides  should  be  trained 
and  allotted. 

4.  Machine  guns  should  be  sited  and  distributed  in  such  a 
way  as  to  fulfil  their  object ;  the  bulk  should  be  sited  between 
the   lines  and  positions — not   in   the  lines — properly   screened 
from  ground  and  aerial  observation,  and  as  far  as  possible  in 
shell-proof  shelters.    They  must  completely  command  the  whole 
foreground,  intervening  ground  in  rear,  by  a  cross  and  flanking 
fire.     In  combination  with  the  above  the  several  belts  of  wire 
should  be  connected  by  cross  belts,  so  that  the  obstacle  is  divided 
into  compartments  and  the  enemy  is  prevented  from  escaping 
the  machine-gun  fire. 

5.  Great  emphasis  should  be  laid  on  organization  in  depth. 
Assault  troops,  etc.,  must  have  perfectly  definite  objectives  as- 
signed to  them.     Measures  taken  must  be  tested  practically. 
Alarm  practices  should  be  frequently  carried  out,  especially  gas 
alarms. 

ARTILLERY. 

1.  At  least  one  control  battery  should  be  detailed  for  each 
infantry  regimental  sector.     It  should  have  a  central  position 
relative  to  the  batteries  dependent  on  it,  and  have  a  plentiful 
supply  of  flares.     Instructions  should  be  given  that  the  control 
battery  will  only  open  barrage  fire  by  night  or  in  fog.    Barrage 
fire  must  be  opened  by  a  distinct  succession  of  salvos,  while 
the  fact  must  be  immediately  reported  to  the  group  and  the 
artillery  commander  on  duty,  and  flare  signals  must  be  sent  up. 

2.  Instructions  must  be  given  as  to  increased  readiness  for 
action  at  dawn  and  during  fog.    In  the  control  battery  the  men 
must  be  at  their  guns ;  in  the  case  of  the  other  batteries,  in  the 
immediate   neighborhood.     Sentries  must  be   posted   in   every 
battery  to  keep  a  lookout  toward  the  front  and  toward  the  con- 
trol battery ;   if  necessary,   these  should  be  noncommissioned 
officers. 

3.  An  alternative  observation  post  must  be  provided  for  every 
battery  beforehand. 


154        GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES. 

4.  Instructions  must  be  given  to  batteries  in  case  of  thick  fog 
to  open  barrage  fire  if  any  unusual  sounds  of  fighting  are  heard 
in  front  of  the  position. 

5.  Provision  must  be  made  to  engage  tanks  (short-range  guns 
and  guns  accompanying  the  infantry). 

6.  Provisions  must  be  made — particularly  in  the  case  of  field 
guns  and  light  field  howitzers — to  open  fire  at  very  close  ranges 
in  every  direction,  with  the  possibility  of  opening  flanking  fire 
on  the  ground  between  the  positions.     It  must  be  possible  to 
withdraw  guns  easily  from  their  pits.     Close  observation  must 
be  possible  from  each  battery. 

7.  Provision  must  be  made  to  concentrate  rapidly  the  fire  of 
the  batteries  on  threatened  points,  including  those  in  adjoining 
sectors. 

8.  Targets  should  be  allotted  to  batteries  in  case  of  a  hostile 
attack.     The  results  of  registration  must  be  preserved  in  both 
the  battery  position  and  the  observation  post ;  there  must  be 
several  copies  and  these  will  not  all  be  kept  together. 

9.  A  battery  plan  must  be  provided  for  each  observation  post 
and  battery. 

10.  Steps  must  be  taken  to  regulate  annihilating  fire,  the  allot- 
ment of  targets,  registration,  and  the  fixing  of  the  quantities  of 
ammunition  to  be  expended  in  annihilating  fire. 

11.  Control  of  barrage  fire  and  the  bringing  up  of  a  number 
of  light  Minenwerfer  must  be  arranged  for ;  the  latter  should  not 
be  employed  on  other  tasks. 

12.  All  measures  proposed  should  be  tested  practically. 

VIII.  Artillery  reconnoiterlng,  following  the  attacking  troops. 
A  prisoner  of  the  one  hundredth  battalion  of  foot  artillery 

captured  during  the  German  attack  of  the  night  of  July  14-15, 
west  of  Cerny,  was  part  of  a  group  of  artillerymen  which  was 
following  the  second  assaulting  wave  at  the  center  of  the  attack 
and  included  four  men  under  the  leadership  of  an  officer  of  the 
eleventh  battery  of  the  ninth  foot  regiment  of  reserve  artillery. 

The  mission  of  this  detachment  was  to  find  out  the  effects  of 
the  artillery  fire  and  to  take  the  necessary  measures  to  better 
the  fire  immediately  in  case  of  need. 

In  this  case  he  was  to  notify  at  once  the  artillery  information 
officer,  who  was  in  the  German  trench  (which  they  had  started 
from),  and  was  in  communication  with  the  rear  by  telephone. 

IX.  The  following  extracts  are  taken  from  captured  orders 
issued  between  February  and  July,  1917,  by  the  Ypres  group,  as 
illustrating  recent  developments  in  German  artillery  tactics: 


GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES.         155 
(A)    EMPLOYMENT    OF    GAS    SHELLS. 

"  For  bombardments  with  gas  shells  it  is  advisable,  whenever 
possible,  to  select  special  battery  positions  in  the  neighborhood 
of  the  actual  positions,  even  in  the  open,  so  as  not  to  be  inter- 
fered with  by  the  enemy's  artillery." 

(B)    COUNTER-BATTERY   WORK. 

"  No  .  opportunity  for  counter-battery  work  should  be  lost. 
*  *  *  Batteries  which  are  located  during  the  night  should 
be  immediately  shelled  with  the  help  of  observation  sections, 
either  by  batteries  provided  with  flash  reducers  or  by  batteries 
in  specially  chosen  positions." 

(C)  AVOIDING    BRITISH    DESTRUCTIVE    SHOOTS. 

"When  it  is  clear  that  the  enemy  is  registering,  the  battery 
should  conceal  itself  as  far  as  possible  by  occupying  an  alter- 
native position  before  the  enemy  opens  his  destructive  fire, 
which  he  often  does  not  do  until  the  next  day." 

(D)  DISPOSITION   OF  THE  ENEMY'S   ARTILLERY. 

1.  "Artillery  must  be  organized  in  depth  and  battery  posi- 
tions sited  checkerwise,  so  that  in  case  of  the  enemy  breaking 
through  all  batteries  are  not  put  out  of  action  at  once. 

2.  "  In  order  to  have  a  reserve  available  for  an  ..immediate 
counter  attack  one  or  two  batteries  per  divisional  sector  should, 
from  the  outset,  be  placed  in  positions  about  5,500  yards  in  rear 
of  the  front  line.     Emplacements  for  such  batteries  should  be 
sited  above  ground,  so  that  direct  fire  can  be  opened  on  tanks 
or  infantry  which  have  broken  through.     Such  batteries  should 
only  fire  occasionally." 

(E)    CONSTRUCTION    OF  BATTERY   POSITIONS. 

1.  "The  thickness  of  the  walls  of  reinforced  concrete  em- 
placements should  be  at  least  5  feet.     Only  properly  prepared 
concrete  resists  bombardments ;  concrete  blocks  do  not. 

2.  "  The  floors  of  emplacements  should  be  made  of  strongly 
built  concrete,  in  order  to  resist  a  direct  hit  from  a  shell  pene- 
trating underneath  the  floor. 


166        GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES. 

3.  "An  emplacement  to  hold  a  single  gun  or  a  section  should 
be  made  about  100  to  450  yards  from  each  battery  position. 
This  emplacement  should  be  strengthened  with  concrete  and  well 
concealed ;  it  will  serve  for  the  amount  of  fire  which  is  ordi- 
narily necessary  and  will  protect  the  principal  emplacements 
from  aeroplane  observation.    The  better  emplacements  in  aban- 
doned battery  positions  will  often  serve  for  this  purpose.     Iso- 
lated shelters  for  storing  ammunition  and  other  purposes  should 
be  constructed  to  a  flank  and  in  rear  of  the  battery  position. 

4.  "  In  battery  positions  with  no  concrete  shelters  the  follow- 
ing is  the  only  type  of  ammunition  shelter  which  is  to  be  con- 
structed :  'Ammunition  should  be  placed  on  thick  planks  in  small 
heaps,  surrounded  by  small  earth  walls  and  sheltered  from  the 
rain  by  a  light  roof,  if  possible,  of  corrugated  iron.    There  should 
l>e  a  sufficient  interval  between  the  heaps.' " 

(F)    CAMOUFLAGE. 

"  It  is  necessary  to  confront  the  enemy  with  a  constantly 
changing  situation." 

Great  stress  is  laid  on  the  necessity  of  camouflaging  actual 
battery  positions  and  simulating  activity  in  dummy  positions. 
Moving  sections  should  fire  constantly,  especially  at  night,  from 
different  positions. 

(G)   ARTILLERY  IN   SUPPORT  OF  COUNTER  ATTACK.. 

The  following  are  taken  from  Tpres  group  intelligence  sum- 
mary of  August  1,  1917,  describing  the  battle  of  July  31 : 

1.  "  The  counter-attack  batteries  followed  close  behind  the  at- 
tacking infantry,   and  the  fourth  battery  opened  fire  on  the 
enemy's  infantry  at  a  range  of  660  yards.    In  addition,  it  put  a 
tank  out  of  action  with  a  few  rounds. 

2.  "  Our  attack  took  the  English  on  the  right  flank  and  was 
completely  successful.     It  was  particularly  well  supported  by 
the  2d  and  3d  Abteilungen  of  the  273d  Fd.  Art.  Regt.,  which 
sent  guns  forward  to  Gravenstafel  as  soon  as  the  situation  .per- 
mitted.    These  guns  shelled  the  English  at  short  range  and  put 
several  tanks  out  of  action." 

X.    ARTILLERY   CURTAIN   FIRES   IN   MISTY   WEATHER. 

A  German  order  recently  captured  gives  the  following  rules 
to  be  followed  for  enabling  the  quick  execution  of  curtain  fires 
in  misty  weather: 


GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES.         157 

1.  "The  artillery  groups  should  establish  between  their  bat- 
tery nearest  to  the  line  and  the  infantry  command  of  the  sub- 
division of  the  sector  a  line  of  relay  posts  for  the  safe  trans- 
mission of  demands  for  curtain  fires. 

"  From  experience  acquired  at  Verdun  and  on  the  Somme  the 
enemy  launches  strong  attacks  in  the  mist,  when  the  heavy 
shelling  of  the  preceding  days  has  destroyed  all  the  telephone 
connections.  The  transmission  of  requests  for  curtain  fires 
must  therefore  not  be  hoped  for  by  means  of  the  telephone. 

"  Relay  posts  will  be  established  300  meters  from  one  another, 
and  each  post  be  supplied  with  pistols,  star  shells,  and  sirens. 

2.  "  So  as  not  to  lessen  the  personnel  of  active  batteries  it  is 
necessary  to  draw  men  for  the  relays  from  the  runner  squads. 

"  In  the  event  of  its  being  misty  weather  the  personnel  should 
be  brought  up  from  the  rest  stations  and  placed  at  predeter- 
mined places." 

XI.    COOPERATION   OF  THE   ARTILLERY   WITH   THE  AVIATION. 

A  German  order,  dated  the  17th  of  June,  1917,  recalls  to  field 
batteries  their  duties  in  helping  out  infantry  patrol  planes, 
when  the  latter  are  flying  low,  and  protecting  the  planes  from 
the  fire  of  enemy  machine  guns. 

In  the  mentioned  sector,  one  battery  had  as  its  duty  the 
shelling  of  all  known  battery  emplacements,  while  another 
battery  was  set  aside  for  the  purpose  of  shelling  any  new 
machine  guns  opening  fire  on  the  planes. 

XII.   UNIT   OF   ANGULAR    MEASUREMENT   USED   BY   THE   GERMAN 
ARTILLERY. 

Different  systems  of  angular  measurement  were  formerly  em- 
ployed in  the  field  and  foot  artillery.  In  the  field  artillery  the 
unit  of  angular  measurement  was  1/6,  400  part  of  360  degrees, 
i.  e.,  3.375  minutes.  In  the  foot  artillery,  the  unit  was  one- 
sixteenth  of  a  degree,  i.  e.,  3.75  minutes. 

A  war  ministry  order,  dated  December  25,  1916,  points  out 
the  inconvenience  due  to  the  fact  of  there  being  two  systems  of 
graduating  sights,  directors,  etc.,  and  lays  down  that  in  the 
future  the  foot  artillery  will  adopt  the  system  of  graduation 
hitherto  used  by  the  field  artillery.  The  sights  of  all  natures 
of  gun  and  howitzer  will  now  be  graduated  in  accordance  with 
this  system. 


X. 


THE  EMPLOYMENT  OF 
MACHINE  GUNS  IN  TRENCH  WARFARE. 


[Translation  of  a  German  document.) 

159 


CONTENTS. 


Page. 

The  employment  of  macnine  guns  in  trench  warfare 161 

Case  (a) 161 

Case  (6) 162 

Table  showing  setting  of  sights  and  amount  of  ' '  lead  " 163 

160 


X. 

THE  EMPLOYMENT  OF  MACHINE  GUNS  IN 
TRENCH  WARFARE. 

(Translation  of  a  German  document.) 


FIRST  BATTALION,  395TH  INFANTRY  REGIMENT, 

October  9,  1917. 

1.  In  trench  warfare,  machine  guns  must  maintain  a  methodi- 
cal and  intense  harassing  fire  by  day,  and  particularly  by  night, 
on  the  hostile  trenches,  communication  trenches,  and  lines  of 
approach.     The  machine  guns  detailed  for  harassing  fire,  to- 
gether with  their  targets,  and  those  detailed  for  antiaircraft 
work  must  always  be  specially   marked   on   the   machine-gun 
sketch  plans,  after  the  division  moves  into  the  line. 

2.  The  engagement  of  the  enemy's  infantry  aeroplanes   (by 
machine  guns)   will  be  organized  on  the  following  principles: 

(a)  Regiments  will  detail  a  portion  of  the  machine  guns  in 
the  defensive  zone  for  antiaircraft  defense  during  the  opening 
stages  of  the  battle  until  the  commencement  of  the  infantry 
battle. 

The  remainder  of  the  machine  guns  will  keep  under  cover  on 
the  appearance  of  the  enemy's  infantry  aeroplanes  (contact 
patrols.) 

(b)  When  the  infantry  battle  commences,  all  machine  guns 
not  required   for  repelling  the  enemy's   infantry  assault   will 
open  fire  on  the  aeroplanes  which  are  attacking  our  infantry. 

3.  Instructions  for  the  engagement  of  the  enemy's  infantry 
aeroplanes  (up  to  a  height  of  1,000  meters). 

Case  (a). 

(i)  The  aeroplane  is  flying  in  a  direct  or  approximately 
direct  line  toward  the  observer. 

(ii)  The  aeroplane  is  flying  nearly  straight  overhead,  away 
from  tne  observer. 

In  both  cases,  fire  should  be  opened  by  machine  guns  and  by 
the  infantry  also. 

29267°— 18^ — 11  161 


162        GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES. 

When  the  aeroplane  is  approaching,  aim  will  be  taken  straight 
at  it. 

When  the  aeroplane  is  flying  away,  aim  will  be  taken  below 
the  aeroplane,  up  to  a  range  of  1,000  meters,  and  directly  at 
it  above  that  range. 

Machine  guns  will  not  open  searching  fire  on  an  approaching 
aeroplane,  but  will  do  so  (3  graduations)  when  the  aeroplane 
is  flying  away. 

If  the  aeroplane  is  not  approaching  directly  in  the  line  of 
fire,  the  direction  of  its  flight  should  be  traversed  with  fire  to 
a  width  of  50  meters. 

Sights  should  be  set  as  follows: 


Height  of  aeroplane. 

Aeroplane  approach- 
ing. 

Aeroplane  flying 
away. 

Meters. 
100-    400 
400-    700 
700-1,000 

Sights  at,  meters. 
1,400-1,700 
1,700-2,000 
1,900-2,000 

Sights  at,  meters. 
400 
400 
400 

Aeroplanes  flying  at  a  height  exceeding  1,000  meters  should 
not  be  fired  on.  Fire  will  be  opened  at  about  2,000  meters 
range.  Sights  once  set  will  not  be  altered  so  long  as  the 
aeroplane  remains  at  the  same  height.  Variations  of  range 
does  not  entail  a  corresponding  modification  of  the  sighting. 

Case  (b). 

If  the  aeroplane  is  flying  across  the  front,  or  obliquely  to  a 
flank,  it  will  be  engaged  by  machine  guns  only. 

Aim  will  be  taken,  on  principle,  in  front  of  the  aeroplane, 
in  the  direction  in  which  it  is  flying. 

In  order  to  keep  the  aeroplane  as  long  as  possible  within 
the  zone  of  dispersion  of  the  bullets,  machine  guns  will  both 
employ  searching  fire  (Tiefenfeuer),  and  will  alter  the  point 
of  aim  from  one  of  minimum  "lead"  (in  which  the  cone  of 
dispersion  certainly  lies  behind  the  aeroplane)  to  one  of  maxi- 
mum "lead"  (in  which  the  cone  of  dispersion  certainly  lies 
ahead  of  the  aeroplane). 

This  traverse  will  be  made  slightly  faster  than  the  speed  of 
the  aeroplane. 


GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES.         163 


As  soon  as  the  point  of  aim  of  maximum  "  lead  "  is  reached, 
fire  will  cease,  and  will  be  opened  again  at  the  point  of  aim 
of  minimum  "  lead." 

Table  showing  setting  of  sights  and  amount  of  "lead." 


Range. 

Angle  of  sight. 

Sights  set 
at— 

Minimum 
"lead"  and 
maximum 
"lead." 

Searching 
fire. 

Meters. 
100-    600 

Meters. 
600 

Aeroplane 
lengths. 
2-5 

Graduations. 
3 

/Below  45°  

900 

X              >t_ii 

600-1,000 

1  Above  45°  

650 

3 

/Below  40°  

1,200 

i 

1,000-1,300 

\Above  45°  

850 

3 

The  length  of  an  aeroplane  length  is  taken  as  being  about  8 
metres,  and  the  velocity  160  km.  per  hour  (100  m.  p.  h.). 

4.  The  gun  captains  of  detached  machine  guns,  who  are  left 
to  themselves  in  the  open,  must  be  provided  with  exact  in- 
structions which  contain  the  following  points : 

In  the  order  book  : 

(a)  Habits  of  the  enemy. 

(6)  The  main  task  of  the  machine  gun,  with  exact  orders 
when  fire  is  to  be  opened. 

(c)  The  points  at  which  stores  have  been  established  of  R. 
and  armor-piercing  ammunition  in  belts  or  loose,  hand  grenades, 
light  pistols,  belt  fillers,  and  portable  wire  entanglements. 

(a)  The  arrangements  for  the  supply  of  ammunition  during 
the  fighting. 

(e)  The  points  to  be  held  by  the  infantry  attached  to  the 
gun. 

(/)  When  the  gun  ought  to  be  in  position,  and  where  it  must 
be  kept  when  not  in  position. 

On  a  sketch  plan : 

(a)  The  position  of  the  machine  gun  and  of  the  machine 
guns  in  the  neighborhood. 

(6)  The  sectors  of  the  field  of  fire. 

(c)  The  position  of  the  trenches. 

(d)  Ranges. 

(e)  The  positions  of  the  platoon  and  company  commanders' 
posts  and  the  ammunition  depot. 

(/)  The  nearest  telehone  and  lamp-signaling  station. 


164        GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES. 

The  machine-gun  captains  in  the  position  should  be  given  small 
schemes  to  solve,  so  that  during  the  fighting  they  can  not  be 
surprised  by  any  situation  which  may  arise. 

When  machine-gun  teams  are  relieved,  with  every  1908  pat- 
tern machine  gun  a  competent  man  should  be  left  for  24  hours 
longer  in  the  position.  His  duty  is  to  instruct  the  new  garrison. 

5.  Owing  to  the  fact  that  the  troops  are  equipped  with  a  larger 
number  of  machine  guns,  regiments  are  now  better  able  than  was 
previously  the  case  to  employ  their  1908  machine  guns  by 
sections.  The  employment  of  machine  guns  by  sections  has  the 
greatest  advantages  compared  with  the  employment  of  single 
guns  as  detached  machine  guns. 

The  team  of  a  detached  machine  gun  often  feel  as  if  they 
had  been  left  in  the  lurch  in  an  attack,  especially  if  the  enemy  is 
advancing  from  several  directions.  In  future,  therefore,  where 
the  employment  of  single  detached  guns  can  not  be  avoided, 
4  to  6  infantrymen  should  be  invariably  attached  to  the  gun, 
as  has  already  been  ordered.  These  will  not  only  take  over  the 
defense  of  the  flanks  but  are  also  intended  to  stiffen  the  morale 
of  the  garrison  and  prevent  them  from  feeling  isolated. 

The  employment  of  machine  guns  by  sections  should  be  the 
rule.  The  guns  can  then  mutually  support  one  another  and 
combine  their  fire  on  a  particular  area,  or  fire  in  two  different 
directions.  In  a  critical  situation  which  lasts  for  days,  the  gun 
teams  can  obtain  the  necessary  rest  in  turn,  and  casualties  can 
be  made  good.  In  case  one  gun  is  put  out  of  action,  the  other  is 
able  to  continue  the  defense. 

To  transform  machine  guns  employed  by  sections  into  real 
centers  of  resistance,  by  which  we  hope  to  repulse  with  cer- 
tainty even  the  strongest  hostile  attacks,  and  to  insure  that  they 
will  be  able  to  hold  out,  even  when  cut  off,  until  the  counter 
attacks  delivered  from  the  rear  destroy  the  enemy  or  at  least 
drive  him  back,  it  is  necessary  that  they  should  be  equipped 
for  long-continued  fighting.  Iron  rations,  soda  water,  and  espe- 
cially enough  ammunition — not  necessarily  in  belts — belt  fillers, 
spare  locks,  spare  barrels,  water  for  cooling  purposes,  etc., 
should  therefore  be  stored  in  the  positions.  The  guns  and  gun 
teams  of  such  sections  should  never  be  posted  in  the  same  dugout 
or  shell  hole,  so  that  the  whole  section  may  not  be  put  out  of 
action  by  one  direct  hit ;  they  should  be  separated,  but  close 
enough  to  one  another  to  form  one  battle  unit  under  a  single 


GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES.         165 

command.  The  greatest  importance  must  be  attached  to  the 
fact  that  the  command  of  a  machine-gun  section  is  in  one  officer's 
hands. 

Although  detached  machine  guns  in  their  positions  are  re- 
garded as  emergency  garrisons,  and  are  therefore  not  to  leave 
their  positions  (except  to  occupy  alternative  positions  close  by, 
which  have  been  laid  down  beforehand),  even  if  the  enemy  has 
pushed  forward  beyond  them,  the  situation  during  an  attack 
changes  so  quickly  and  in  so  many  different  ways  that  it  can  not 
be  appreciated  by  the  gun  captain,  who  is  engaged  in  serving  the 
gun.  It  is  therefore  absolutely  essential  that  there  should  be 
a  section  commander  with  every  section;  that  is  to  say,  with 
every  pair  of  guns  which  are  employed  as  a  unit.  He  must  be 
an  energetic  man,  capable  of  quick  decisions,  and  of  thinking 
tactically,  and  possessing  the  necessary  authority.  /  therefore 
give  orders  that  the  section  commander  must  always  be  with  his 
machine-gun  section. 

It  is  the  duty  of  the  regiment  to  see  that  the  right  individuals 
are  appointed  to  the  position  of  section  commander.  The  most 
careful  selection  must  be  made.  The  most  efficient  individuals 
are  only  just  good  enough  to  be  machine-gun  section  commanders. 
It  is  absolutely  essential  to  appoint  probationary  officers  to 
machine-gun  companies  in  good  time,  as  well  as  to  continue  their 
instruction  in  special  courses  behind  the  front.  Reports  must 
be  sent  in  by  September  8  that  the  above  orders  have  been 
carried  out. 

The  Einjahrigen  detailed  at  present  for  the  course  for  proba- 
tionary officers  will  be  trained  at  the  machine-gun  school  in  the 
use  of  both  the  1908  and  1908-1915  pattern  machine  guns.  In 
case  it  is  desired  that  other  Einjahrigen  or  probationary  officers 
should  be  trained  in  the  use  of  the  1908  pattern  machine  gun,  in 
view  of  their  transfer  to  the  machine-gun  companies,  the  appli- 
cations from  the  regiments  should  be  collected  by  the  brigade 
and  sent  in  to  the  division.  The  necessary  instructions  will  then 
be  given  to  the  machine-gun  school. 

So  long  as  the  supply  of  officers  and  warrant  officers  is  in- 
sufficient to  fill  all  the  vacancies  for  section  commanders,  these 
will  be  filled  by  energetic  and  competent  senior  noncommissioned 
officers.  A  list  of  the  names  of  section  commanders  is  also  to  be 
furnished  by  the  brigade  by  September  8.  The  machine-gun 
marksman  section  will  also  furnish  a  similar  list  to  the  division 
by  the  same' date. 


166        GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES. 

I  have  satisfied  myself  that  the  steps  which  I  wish  to  see  taken 
have  not  yet  been  carried  out  in  the  case  of  some  machine  guns 
of  the  Nineteenth  Reserve  Infantry  Regiment  and  the  machine- 
gun  marksman  sections  attached  to  it,  thus : 

(a)  The  principle  that  a  machine  gun  should  not  open  fire 
until  the  enemy  has  passed  the  machine  gun  which  lies  in  front 
of  it  has  not  yet  been  adopted.  In  some  cases,  also,  the  machine- 
gun  captains  were  not  in  a  position  to  act  on  this  general  prin- 
ciple, as  they  had  not  the  least  idea  where  the  machine  guns  in 
front  of  them  were  sited. 

(6)  The  sketch  plans  in  existence  were,  for  the  most  part, 
inadequate.  They  did  not  show  the  neighboring  machine  guns 
and  their  principal  field  of  fire.  In  practice  it  is  useful  to  pre- 
pare a  sketch  plan  which  can  be  hung  up  in  the  position  showing 
the  method  of  cooperation  of  the  neighboring  machine  guns,  so 
that  the  gun  team  can  get  the  information  from  it. 

(c)  It    is   very    important    that    the   company    commanders 
should  spend  a  considerable  time  with  their  sections  and  should 
discuss  with  them  the  different  possibilities  of  the  enemy's  ad- 
vance over  the  ground,   with  special  reference  to  the  sketch 
plan. 

(d)  Alternative  positions  were  not  marked  out  on  the  ground 
and  therefore  their  positions  were  not  accurately  known. 

(e)  I  must  once  more  point  out  that  whenever  a  gun  team  is 
relieved  one  man  must  be  left  behind  24  hours  longer  in  the 
position  to  instruct  the  new  team,  except  in  cases  where  gun 
teams  have  already  been  once  in  the  position. 

(/)  In  the  case  of  antiaircraft  machine  guns,  the  back-sight 
attachment  for  use  in  conjunction  with  the  circular  sight  must 
always  be  fixed  on  the  gun.  In  order  that  this  attachment 
may  be  quickly  removed,  the  screw  at  the  top  of  the  leaf  of  the 
back  sight  should  be  removed.  In  the  case  of  machine  guns 
which  have  to  be  removed  quickly  from  the  antiaircraft  stand 
in  order  to  fire  from  the  ground,  the  auxiliary  mounting,  as 
adapted  by  Lieut.  Braun's  seventy-seventh  machine-gun  marks- 
men section,  should  be  used. 

The  brigade  will  report  as  soon  as  each  machine-gun  company 
has  been  equipped  with  four  mountings  of  this  pattern. 

(g)  Machine-gun  teams  were  still  quite  insufficiently  equipped 
with  hand  grenades.  Each  man  should  be  provided  with  10 
hand  grenades,  in  two  bags  containing  5  each.  The  brigade 
and  machine-gun  marksman  detachment  will  report  by  Septem- 
ber 8  that  this  order  has  been  carried  out. 


GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES.         167 

I  request  that  the  men  be  instructed  frequently  in  these  or- 
ders. I  must  once  more  call  particular  attention  to  the  per- 
sonal letter  from  the  division  which  was  sent  to  the  machine- 
gun  companies  a  few  days  ago. 

( Signed )  BREITHAUPT. 

GENEEAL  STAFF  (INTELLIGENCE), 

Advanced  General  Headquarters,  October  27,  1917. 


ta/39631 


MAXIMUM  RANGES  OF  GERMAN  GUNS.  HOWITZERS  &  MORTARS 


i  FIELD  GUNS. 


FIELD  ARTILLERY. 


A  A 

UM'  floor 

tbi  LIGHT  FIELD  HOWITZERS. 


FOOT  ARTILLERY. 


PI  MEDIUM  RANGE  GUNS 

4'»  -  !X 
I     ra^-o—  .  ra-  %A 


VELOCITY  A  LONG  RANGE  GUNS. 


-— Id-cm  Cotet  Defence  Sun. 

\—IO  cuCotftDeftnu  tun  tin  Wheeled  Cirragt. 


—.IS -cm  Gun  *ith  Onrtaad  Shield. 
—IS -cm  CifennenUI  Cua  on  Whetted 
—  If  cm  Q.F.Mitvl Gun 
—17-cm  Q.F  Naval  Gun  L/40. 
-21-cm  Qf  Mini Gun  L/45 
—24-cm  Naval  £•"• 
—.356-on  Cout Defence  Gun. 


— 6SSP*- 


FIELD  HOWITZERS  &  MORTARS. 


13  "  y 


—28-cm  Howitzer  on  Travelling  Carnage. 
—!S-cm  Close  Defence  Howtatr— 
—A2-cm.  "-•*"• 


id)  CAPTURED  RUSSIAN  GUNS. 


—7SS<aHeV 
—B&cm6an 
—to  Mem  bug  Gun. 
_/JN-cn  f'~ 
-203-UH  Heritor- 


i  Can  tln/utry  Cunt 
note 


Maximum  Ranges  in  Yards 

T    —    web  time  fuie 
f    —   with  percussion  fuze 


This  diagram  cancels  la  '34612  dated 16 17 


1G8 


XI. 

THE  GERMAN  ATTACK  OF  AUGUST  10, 
SOUTH  OF  LA  ROYERE. 


Investigation  made  by  the  Sixth  Army. 

169 


CONTENTS. 


Page. 

The  German  attack  of  August  10  south  of  La  Royere 171 

Preliminary  movements 171 

Practice  for  the  attack 172 

Line  formation  of  the  201st  Regiment 172 

Formation  of  reserves 172 

Troops  for  the  attack 173 

Arrangement  for  the  attack 173 

Indications  of  attack 174 

Artillery  preparation 175 

Execution  of  the  attack 175 

Summary 176 

170 


XI. 

THE  GERMAN  ATTACK  OF  AUGUST  10  SOUTH 
OF  LA  ROYERE. 


On  the  evening  of  July  30  we  took  the  Gargousse  trench  from 
the  enemy,  making  218  prisoners,  who  belonged  for  the  most 
part  to  the  Third  Battalion  of  the  202d  Regiment  and  to  the 
Third  Battalion  of  the  203d  Regiment  (43d  Reserve  Division). 
The  losses  suffered  by  those  who  tried  in  vain  to  relieve  the 
troops  in  line,  and  then  to  make  a  counter  attack,  were  very 
heavy. 

Nevertheless,  the  43d  Reserve  Division  was  not  withdrawn 
from  the  front.  The  German  commander  even  had  the  troops 
told  that  they  would  be  relieved  only  when  the  lost  ground  was 
retaken. 

PRELIMINARY  MOVEMENTS. 

The  201st  Regiment  was  chosen  to  execute  the  attack.  On 
July  30  the  First  Battalion  was  taken  to  Filain.  The  1st  and 
3d  Companies  were  unable  to  counter  attack  because  of  our  fire, 
which  inflicted  great  losses  upon  them.  The  First  Battalion 
of  the  201st  Regiment  then  relieved  the  202d  on  the  31st. 

The  2d  Company  had  charge  of  blockading  the  communication 
trenches  leading  to  La  Royere.  It  had  to  be  withdrawn  because 
of  its  losses  the  morning  of  the  4th  and  went  to  Laval. 

On  the  6th  the  three  other  companies  of  the  First  Battalion 
of  the  201st  Regiment,  which  were  relieved  by  the  Third  Bat- 
talion of  the  202d  Regiment,  withdrew  in  their  turn  to  Laval. 

The  Second  Battalion  of  the  201st  Regiment,  after  remaining 
in  position  two  days  before  Filain,  was  sent  on  August  2  to 
Nouvion  to  rest. 

The  Third  Battalion  of  the  201st  Regiment  remained  in  the 
Pantheon  sector  until  August  4,  when  it  was  relieved  by  the 
Second  Battalion  of  the  203d  Regiment.  It  was  sent  toward 
the  "  Russenschlucht "  (L'Abordage  ravine),  where  it  was  re- 
placed by  elements  of  the  Third  Battalion  of  the  202d  Regiment 
and  by  the  218th  Regiment  (47th  Reserve  Division). 

171 


172        GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES. 
PRACTICE  FOR  THE  ATTACK. 

On  August  8  the  three  battalions  of  the  201st  Regiment  were 
united  at  the  Mouille  farm,  between  Athies  and  Eppes,  where, 
in  the  presence  of  the  commanding  general  of  the  division,  they 
rehearsed  an  attack  on  trenches  representing  the  French  posi- 
tion south  of  La  Royere. 

LINE   FORMATION  OF  THE  201ST  REGIMENT. 

On  August  9  the  First  Battalion  of  the  201st  Regiment  re- 
turned to  Filain,  to  gain  La  Royere,  where  it  relieved  the  Third 
Battalion  of  the  202d  Regiment,  one  company  of  which,  the  10th, 
was  kept  in  reserve  in  the  quarries. 

The  Second  Battalion  of  the  201st  Regiment  came  into  line 
on  the  right  (west)  of  the  First  Battalion,  relieving,  during  the 
night  of  the  9th-10th,  elements  of  the  202d  Regiment,  as  well 
as  two  regiments  of  the  103d  Division,  the  32d  and  71st  Regi- 
ments. 

The  Third  Battalion  of  the  201st  Regiment,  passing  through 
the  "  Russenschlucht,"  came  into  line  the  evening  of  the  9th 
on  the  left  (east)  of  the  First  Battalion,  relieving  the  Second 
Battalion  of  the  203d  Regiment,  two  companies  of  which  were 
kept  in  the  ravine. 

FORMATION  OF  RESERVES. 

The  First  Battalion  of  the  202d  Regiment  served  as  reserve 
on  the  slopes  descending  toward  the  rear  of  La  Roy&re.  Its 
four  companies,  as  well  as  the  10th,  kept  in  the  quarries,  were 
at  the  immediate  disposal  of  the  commander  of  the  attack.  Maj. 
Randel,  of  the  201st  Regiment,  whose  command  post  was  estab- 
lished at  La  Roy&re. 

The  command  post  of  the  Second  Battalion  of  the  201st  Regi- 
ment was  at  the  Saint-Martin  farm  in  the  quarries  which  shel- 
tered two  companies  of  a  regiment  whose  number  could  not  be 
determined.  These  two  companies  served  as  reserve  for  the 
right  attacking  front. 

On  the  left,  Capt.  von  Franzius,  in  command  of  the  Third 
Battalion  of  the  201st  Regiment,  established  his  command  post 
on  the  south  slopes  of  the  "  Russenschlucht."  He  had  at  his 
disposal  as  reserve  the  two  companies  of  the  Second  Battalion 
of  the  203d  Regiment  held  in  the  ravine.  The  two  other  com- 
panies of  the  Second  Battalion  of  the  203d  Regiment  constituted 


GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES.         173 

the  defensive' troops  for  the  first  line  between  the  B6chade  and 
Brunet  communication  trenches  to  the  east  of  the  front  of 
attack.  The  center  of  this  front  seems  to  have  been  held  by 
two  companies  of  the  battalion  of  which  the  two  other  com- 
panies served  as  reserve  for  the  Second  Battalion  of  the  201st 
Regiment.  Elements  of  the  103d  Division  were  farther  west. 

TROOPS  FOR  THE  ATTACK. 

The  201st  Regiment  was  reenforced,  as  some  companies  had 
suffered  losses  during  the  end  of  July  and  the  beginning  of 
August. 

The  2d  Company  was  filled  up  by  50  to  100  riflemen  drawn 
from  the  1st,  2d,  and  4th  Companies  of  the  202d  Regiment, 
who  had  been  working  in  the  fields  with  the  "  harvest  command  " 
of  Laon. 

The  9th  Company  was  reenforced  by  60  men  from  the  6th 
and  7th  Companies  of  the  203d  Regiment  coming  from  Presles. 

The  divisional  assault  company  furnished  seven  groups  of  the 
"  Brigade  school  of  assault,"  who  not  being  yet  adequately  pre- 
pared as  storming  troops,  were  supported  by  two  or  three  groups 
of  assault  battalion.  (It  should  be  noted  that  one  of  the  prison- 
ers captured  by  us  was  from  the  8th  Company  of  the  202d  Regi- 
ment, coming  also  from  the  "  harvest  command  "  of  Laon,  and 
he  had  been  assigned  to  a  group  of  assault  battalion  as  a  grenade 
carrier. 

The  storming  detachments  were  divided  into  four  storm 
platoons,  of  which  one  was  in  reserve  behind  the  spur  of  the 
Didier  Mill,  and  the  three  others  were  assigned  to  the  three  bat- 
talions of  the  201st  Regiment. 

In  each  of  these  battalions  10  to  12  men  of  the  storm  platoons 
were  attached  to  each  company  to  give  them  vim. 

ARRANGEMENT  FOR  THE  ATTACK. 

On  the  west  the  Second  Battalion  of  the  201st  Regiment  had 
the  following  mission: 

The  5th  Company  was  to  make  a  flank  attack  at  the  junction 
of  the  Saltpetre  trench  with  the  Gargousse  trench  and  the  Sene- 
gal communication  trench  in  the  direction  of  the  Negus  commu- 
nication trench. 

The  6th  Company,  on  the  south  of  the  farm,  was  to  reach  the 
junction  of  the  Laiton  trench  with  the  Gargousse  trench  in 


174        GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES. 

order  to  deploy  toward  the  Negus  communication  trench,  on 
meeting  the  7th  Company,  while  seeking  liaison  with  the  First 
Battalion  toward  the  east. 

The  7th  Company,  supported  by  the  8th,  was  to  attack  the 
front  of  the  Senegal  communication  trench  which  formed  our 
first  line,  and,  after  gaining  a  footing  there,  was  immediately  to 
spread  out  in  order  to  join  the  two  wing  companies. 

The  First  Battalion  of  the  201st  Regiment,  with  the  4th 
Company  in  support,  at  the  "  Munitions-Hoehle  "  (east  of  La 
Royere),  was  arranged  as  follows: 

The  2d  Company  was  to  attack  the  front  of  the  Gargousse 
trench  between  the  Laiton  and  La  Royere  trenches,  while  the 
1st  Company  debouched  by  the  latter  trench,  with  the  aim  of 
pushing  some  of  its  elements  as  far  as  possible  in  the  Voraces 
communication  trench. 

The  3d  Company,  reaching  the  Gargousse  trench  toward  the 
Bechade  communication  trench,  was  to  advance  in  the  Vanites 
communication  trench,  keeping  up  the  liaison  with  the  Third 
Battalion  in  the  Gargousse  and  Bandit  trenches. 

Each  one  of  the  1st  and  3d  Companies  was  to  be  accompanied 
by  a  flame  projector  of  the  assault  company. 

The  Third  Battalion  of  the  201st  Regiment,  keeping  two  com- 
panies as  support,  was  to  attack  as  follows : 

The  llth  Company,  leaving  the  Brunet  communication  trench, 
was  to  occupy  the  Gargousse  trench  toward  the  west  and  the 
French  part  of  the  Brunet  communication  trench,  connecting 
with  the  9th  Company,  which,  leaving  the  west  end  of  Balle 
trench,  was  to  capture  the  Chasseurs  communication  trench  and 
tke  Bandit  trench. 

The  whole  attack  was  thus  to  include  enveloping  maneuvers 
supporting  the  direct  attack  of  each  sector  and  gradually  gain- 
ing ground  in  the  conquered  trenches.  The  enemy  adopted  the 
wedge  formation  for  attack  (Keilangriff)  breaking  in  at  de- 
termined places,  with  storming  detachments  marching  at  the 
head. 

INDICATIONS  OF  ATTACK. 

Statements  of  prisoners  gave  warning  of  the  imminence  of 
the  attack,  which  extensive  operations  likewise  presaged.  The 
French  commander  was  thus  exactly  informed,  which  was  all 
the  more  important,  as  the  enemy  artillery  did  not  increase 
its  fire  until  a  short  while  before  the  attack. 


GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES.        175 
ARTILLERY  PREPARATION. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  it  was  not  until  the  afternoon  of  the 
8th  that  the  bombardment  of  our  first  lines  between  the  Pantheon 
and  L'Epine  de  Chevregny  and  of  our  rear  lines  gave  an  indica- 
tion of  any  preparation  for  attack,  and  which,  moreover,  in  addi- 
tion, caused  our  well-conducted  counter  preparation  fire  to  cease. 

The  German  artillery  was  fairly  active  during  the  nights  of 
the  8th  and  the  9th. 

On  the  9th  the  enemy  bombarded  our  first  and  our  rear  lines. 
On  the  9th  at  4  p.  m.,  slow  fire,  at  the  rate  of  1  round  per 
minute. 

From  6  to  10  p.  m.,  considerable  adjustment  by  airplanes  on 
our  batteries,  and  volleys  of  20  rounds. 

During  the  night  from  the  9th  to  the  10th  intermittent  fire. 

On  the  10th,  toward  3  o'clock,  large-caliber  rounds,  then  soon 
after  salvos  of  all  calibers  on  our  position  (up  to  4  shells  per 
minute  on  all  important  points),  with  interdiction  fire  on  our 
communication  trenches,  by  time-fuse  and  percussion  shells. 

There  were  barely  four  minutes  of  heavily  sustained  drum 
fire  (artillery  and  trench  mortars). 

EXECUTION  OF  THE  ATTACK. 

Before  the  rolling  fire  the  German  infantry,  using  communi- 
cation trenches  and  shell  holes,  advanced  southward  of  the 
Chemin  des  Dames  to  within  an  attacking  distance. 

At  25  minutes  past  5  (German  time),  at  a  signal  given  from 
an  airplane  (rockets  with  red  and  white  balls),  the  attack  was 
made,  while  the  enemy  artillery  opened  its  interdiction  fire.  Our 
artillery  barrage  did  not  reach  the  attacking  troops.  Only  our 
infantry  fire  had  any  effect,  but  not  enough  to  prevent  the 
Germans  from  penetrating  our  trenches  in  places. 

But  our  chasseurs  held  their  ground  at  certain  points  of  the 
first-line  trench,  particularly  in  the  exits  of  the  communication 
trenches  giving  access  to  the  second-line  trenches,  in  these 
trenches  and  in  the  saps. 

The  Germans  who  succeeded  in  getting  a  footing  in  the 
Gargousse  trench  could  not  deploy.  The  troops  charged  with 
the  enveloping  attacks  failed.  The  V.  B.  barrage  fire  inflicted 
heavy  losses  on  the  enemy,  increased  by  hand  grenades  and 
automatic  rifles,  while  our  artillery  executed  box  fire  and  bar- 


176        GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES. 

rages  which  at  the  same  time  prevented  the  arrival  of  reserves 
and  also  the  retirement  of  the  troops  checked  in  their  advance. 

Also,  when  the  French  counter  attack  was  started  the  Ger- 
mans, in  spite  of  their  furious  resistance,  were  unable  to  stop 
our  advance.  They  lost  completely  the  terrain  momentarily 
occupied  by  them,  and  those  not  killed  on  the  spot  were  imme- 
diately captured  (we  took  124  prisoners,  including  2  officers), 
with  the  exception  of  a  few  men  who,  having  taken  shelter  in 
shell  holes,  were  subjected  to  fire  of  low-bursting,  time-fuse 
shells  and  V.  B.  grenades,  which  finished  them. 

The  repulse  of  the  Germans  was  very  bloody.  Almost  all  the 
company  officers  were  killed.  The  number  of  corpses  left  in  the 
position  and  between  the  lines  was  very  large.  The  201st  Regi- 
ment may  be  regarded  as  almost  annihilated.  The  43d  Reserve 
Division  did  not  regain  the  trenches  that  it  lost  July  30,  but 
it  seems  that  it  had  to  be  withdrawn  because  of  its  losses. 

SUMMARY. 

This  German  attack,  well  prepared,  although  insufficiently 
supported  by  the  artillery,  executed  by  troops  perhaps  not  fresh 
enough,  and  certainly  dominated  by  the  moral  superiority  our 
chasseurs  had  acquired  over  them  on  July  30,  failed  completely, 
thanks  to  judicious  measures  and  the  heroic  attitude  of  the 
French. 


XII. 

THE  EXPERIENCE  GAINED 

DURING  THE  ENGLISH-FRENCH  OFFENSIVE 

IN  THE  SPRING  OF  1917. 

(10th  JUNE,  1917.) 


(Issued  by  the  Chief  of  the  General  Staff  of  the  Field  Army.) 
29267°— 18 12  177 


CONTENTS. 


Introduction 179 

I. — Construction  of  field  positions 179 

1.  Invisibility  and  dummy  works 179 

2.  Broad  defended  zone 179 

3.  Continuous  trenches 180 

4.  Strength  of  various  parts  of  the  position 180 

5.  Artillery  requirements 181 

6.  Forward  slope  and  reverse  slope  positions 181 

7.  Machine  guns  and  dugouts 181 

8.  Preparations  for  the  battle 182 

9.  Villages 182 

10.  Construction  of  defenses  during  the  battle 182 

11.  Construction  of  rearward  positions 182 

12.  Construction  of  positions  after  the  battle 182 

II.— Garrison 183 

13.  Width     of     divisional     sector,    counter-attack 

divisions 183 

14.  Distribution   of  infantry   and  machine  guns  in 

depth 183 

15.  Distribution  of  artillery  in  depth 184 

16.  Advanced  troops 184 

III.— Conduct  of  the  battle 184 

17.  Outposts  to  hold  foreground 184 

18.  Early  commencement  of  battle 184 

19.  Adaptability  on  the  part  of  commanders 184 

20.  Adaptability  on  the  part  of  the  troops 185 

21.  Evacuation  of  ground 186 

22.  Counter  attacks 186 

23.  Artillery  fire 188 

24.  Cooperation    of    aeroplanes    and    balloons    with 

infantry  and  artillery 189 

25.  "Minenwerfer" 190 

IV.— General 190 

26.  Clerical  work 190 

27.  "  Manuals  of  Position  Warfare  "  are  binding 191 

178 


XII. 

THE  EXPERIENCE  GAINED  DURING  THE  ENG- 
LISH-FRENCH OFFENSIVE  IN  THE  SPRING 
OF  1917. 


INTRODUCTION. 

Some  of  the  principles  regarding  the  construction  of  field  posi- 
tions and  command  in  battle,  laid  down  in  the  "  Manual  of  Posi- 
tion Warfare  for  all  Arms,"  have  been  specially  emphasized 
during  the  fighting  in  connection  with  the  last  Franco-British 
offensive  and  have  in  some  cases  received  further  development. 
The  most  important  points,  especially  those  which  were  not 
universally  observed  and  do  not  yet  appear  to  be  fully  under- 
stood, are  therefore  dealt  with  in  the  following  pages. 

I.— CONSTRUCTION  OF  FIELD  POSITIONS. 

1.  Sufficient  attention  was  not  paid  to  rendering  all  works 
as    invisible    as    possible    to    ground    and    air    observation. 
Screens  and  dummy  works  must  be  employed  on  a  consider- 
ably larger  scale  than  hitherto.     (Cf.  part  la,  pars.  3  and  19; 
part  16,  par.  5  et  seq.)1 

2.  The  more  defensive  works  there  are,  the  more  targets 
must  be  engaged  by  the  enemy,  and  the  more  will  he  be  obliged  to 
scatter  his  ammunition.    Consequently,  what  should  be  sought  is 

1  The  references  throughout  the  text  to  part  la,  part  8,  etc.,  refer  to 
the  following  translations  : 

Part  In.  "  General  Principles  of  the  Construction  of  Field  Positions," 
S.  S.  558. 

Part  16  has  not  been  translated. 

Part  5.  "  The  Employment  and  Duties  of  Artillery  Aeroplanes  In 
Position  Warfare,"  S.  S.  560. 

Part  6.  "  Communication  between  Infantry  and  Aeroplanes  or  Captive 
Balloons,"  S.  S.  563. 

Part  7  has  only  been  partially  translated.  See  "  Extracts  from  the 
German  official  textbook  regarding  Minenwerfer,"  S.  S.  548. 

Part  8.  "  The  Principles  of  Command  In  the  Defensive  Battle  In 
Position  Warfare,"  S.  S.  561. 

179 


180        GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES. 

not  to  make  the  various  lines,  strong  points,  dugouts,  obstacles, 
etc.,  extraordinarily  strong,  but  rather  to  prepare  a  broad  de- 
fended zone,  with  as  many  defensive  works  as  possible,  which  are 
organized  in  depth  and  mutually  flank  each  other.  (Cf.  part  la, 
pars.  1,  2,  and  8,  2d  subpar.)  The  disadvantage  that  the  various 
works  must  be  weaker  must  be  accepted. 

If  the  dimensions  are  excessive  (for  example,  in  concrete 
structures,  wire  entanglements,  etc.),  it  will  only  be  possible  to 
construct  correspondingly  fewer  works.  The  regulation  dimen- 
sions (part  1&)  should  therefore  not  be  exceeded. 

3.  The   statement   that  even   strongly   constructed   positions 
will,  in  the  course  of  time,  be  destroyed  by  the  heaviest  fire, 
must  be  admitted.     When,  however,  on  account  of  this,  recom- 
mendations have  been  made  that  no  positions  should  be  con- 
structed, it  is  going  much  too  far.     Continuous  fire  trenches 
and  communication  trenches,   and  good  entanglements  and 
dugouts  alone  enable  a  position  to  be  permanently  held  with 
a  small  garrison  in  ordinary  position  warfare;  they  are  also 
indispensable  in  the  battle  for  the  proper  command,  sheltering, 
and  care  of  troops  in  the  back  lines,  especially  when  the  front 
lines  have  become  shell-hole  positions. 

Further,  only  a  well-prepared  position  will  impose  lengthy 
preparations  on  the  enemy  and  the  employment  of  an  extraor- 
dinary amount  of  troops  and  armament. 

4.  The  strength  of  the  position  must  increase  from  front  to 
rear.     (Part  la,  par.  7.)     The  front  lines  must,  therefore,  be 
generally  considered  as  advanced  positions,  in  front  of  which 
works  to  be  held  by  advanced  posts  should  be  prepared.     (Cf. 
par.  16. )     Special  value  should,  therefore,  not  be  attached  to  the 
retention  of  ground.     (Part  8,  par.  6.)     If,  in  certain  cases,  the 
lie  of  the  ground  necessitates  the  foremost  line  being  held  in  all 
circumstances,  it  should  be  taken  into  consideration  when  pre- 
paring the  position. 

The  distance  from  the  advanced  lines  that  the  strongest  works 
and  the  dugouts  for  the  mass  of  the  troops  are  constructed  will 
depend  entirely  on  the  ground.  (Cf.  pars.  14  and  20.) 

5.  The  requirements  of  the  artillery  play  a  decisive  part 
in  the  selection  and  preparation  of  positions ;  sufficient  attention 
is  frequently  not  paid  to  this.     (Cf.  part  la,  par.  5,  and  part  8, 
pars.  1  and  28.)     Distribution  in  depth  and  the  provision  of 
reliable  observation  and  communications  are  particularly  im- 
portant for  the  artillery. 


GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES.        181 

Only  when  sufficient  shellproof  ammunition  dugouts  and  routes 
for  bringing  up  ammunition  (field  tramways)  are  available 
can  the  ammunition  supply  in  times  of  increased  activity  be 
considered,  at  least  to  some  extent,  insured.  (Of.  part  8,  pars. 
2,  5,  and  48  et  seq. ) 

6.  Forward  slope  and  reverse  slope  positions  (see  sketch) 
are  frequently  wrongly  appreciated.  A  decision  in  favor  of  or* 
against  one  or  the  other,  on  principle,  can  not  be  made.  The 
deciding  factors  are,  on  the  one  hand,  the  effect  of  our  own 
artillery,  which  requires  reliable.ground  observation  (therefore 
not  in  the  foremost  fighting  zone),  and,  on  the  other  hand,  pro- 
tection against  the  observed  fire  of  the  enemy's  artillery.  (Part 
la,  pars.  1,  5,  and  9.)  If  the  ground  or  the  tactical  situation 
(e.  g.,  touch  with  a  neighboring  sector)  imposes  the  selection  of 
a  position  which  is  unfavorable  in  itself,  the  disadvantages  must 
be  balanced  as  far  as  possible  by  the  manner  in  which  the  posi- 
tion is  constructed  and  garrisoned  (and  also  is  supported  by 
the  neighboring  sectors  \. 


/    fbs/7/ofv  on  Me  Oenrin  cfes  fames. 


2.    fxoay>/e  o/a good  rererse  sApt  /un'tim 


J!    6re/u/>e(  on  irAifA  a  fenran/ 
stye  fosifioa  is 


7.  It  has  been  clearly  shown  that  the  positions  selected  for 
the  machine  guns  and  the  dugouts  must  form  the  framework 
of  all  infantry  battle  positions.  The  greatest  stress  should  be 
laid  on  this  when  a  position  is  being  methodically  constructed. 
(Cf.  part  la,  pars.  6,  7,  and  11;  part  8,  par.  13.)  The  impor- 
tance of  an  inconspicuous  disposal  of  the  machine  guns  and  dug- 
outs in  depth  can  not  be  too  much  emphasized.  Deep-mined  dug- 
outs in  the  front  line  and  large  tunnels  have  again  proved  to 


188        GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES. 

be  mantraps.  Any  deep  dugouts  which  may  still  exist  in  the 
foremost  line  should  therefore  be  destroyed  (at  the  beginning 
of  the  battle,  at  the  latest),  and  large  tunnels  should  be  reduced 
in  size  by  blowing  up  portions  of  them. 

8.  The  importance  of  well  thought  out  improvements  of 
the  road  and.  railway  systems   (part  la,  par.  21,  and  part  8, 
pars.  2,  5,  and  48  et  seg.),  of  collecting  dumps  of  building  mate- 
rial, stores,  and  ammunition,  and  of  the  measures  for  the  ac- 
commodation and  welfare  of  the  troops,  is  still  underestimated. 
The  preparations  for  the  defensive  battle  must  begin  with  these. 
There  have  been  many  cases  of  want  of  coordination  and  co- 
operation within  the  staffs  in  connection  with  the  arrangements 
for  bringing  up  supplies  of  all  kinds. 

9.  Villages,  even  when  well  prepared  for  defense,  require  too 
many  troops  and  are  particularly  good  targets  for  the  artillery. 
The  tendency  to  exaggerate  the  importance  of  villages  and  the 
elaboration  of  their  defenses  for  the  battle  in  position  warfare 
must,  therefore,  be  counteracted.     (Cf.  part  16,  par.  83  et  seq.) 
Villages  will,  it  is  true,  retain  their  importance  in  quiet  periods 
for  the  quartering  of  troops,  but  it  will  be  wiser  not  to  include 
them  in  the  actual  scheme  of  defense  for  the  battle. 

10.  The  construction  of  defenses  during  the  battle  within 
the  foremost  battle  zone  is,  as  a  rule,  unsound.     The  work, 
especially  that  of  carrying  the  material  forward,  demands  too 
many  men  who  could  be. employed  in  the  fight  or  better  utilized 
in  the  construction  of  back  lines.    It  is  impossible  to  prevent  a 
position  becoming  a  shell-hole  position  during  heavy  fighting. 
(Cf.  part  8,  pars.  12  and  15.)     An  effort  should  be  made  to  con- 
nect the  various  shell  holes  by  trenches,  more  or  less  deep,  as 
soon  as  the  tactical  situation  permits. 

11.  The   construction   of  rearward  positions    (cf.   part   la, 
par.  23,  and  part  8.  par.  45  et  seq.)  requires  more  careful  prepa- 
rations and  can,  if  the  available  labor  is  more  fully  utilized,  be 
carried  out  to  a  greater  extent  than  has  hitherto  been  the  case. 
In  order  that  the  construction  may  not  be  based  on  obsolete 
principles,  a  sufficient  number  of  experienced,  mixed  construc- 
tional staffs  should  be  employed,  consisting  of  senior  officers  of 
all  arms  and  General  Staff  officers,  and  not  only  pioneer  staffs. 
A  regular  program  of  work  should  always  be  prepared  in  writing 
so  that,  in  case  there  is  a  change  in  the  personnel  employed,  the 
work  can  be  continued  on  a  definite  plan, 

12.  The  construction  of  positions  after  the  conclusion  of 
the  battle. — It  is  not  advisable  to  convert  the  shell-hole  posi- 


GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES.        183 

tions  into  new  fighting  positions ;  the  second  or  rearward  posi- 
tions should,  wherever  possible,  be  selected  for  the  new  fighting 
position  and  the  shell-hole  area  held  only  with  advanced  troops 
(outposts). 

II.— GARRISON. 

13.  The  width,  of  the  divisional  sector  (part  8,  par.  8)  fre- 
quently exceeded  3,300  yards.     This  must  also  be  the  case  in 
future.    The  divisions  were  generally  quite  capable  of  warding 
off   attacks   without   assistance.     Nevertheless,   in   special   cir- 
cumstances, second-line  divisions   (either  complete  or  parts  of 
divisions  including  artillery),  known  as  counter-attack  divi- 
sions   ("  Eingreifdivisionen  "),  will   be  brought  up  so  close — 
that  is  to  say,  within  range  of  the  enemy's  distant  bombard- 
ment— that  they  can,  if  necessary,  at  once  take  part  in  the 
battle. 

14.  As   regards   the   infantry,    the   principle   of  allotting   a 
weak  garrison  to  the  front  line,  distributing  the  machine  guns 
in  depth  and  chequer-icise  behind  this  line,  detailing  emergency 
garrisons,  especially  at  sector  boundaries,  and  providing  pro- 
tection for  the  machine-gun  nests  has  been  shown  in  most  cases 
to  be  correct.     (Cf.  par.  4  and  part  8,  par.  13.) 

On  the  other  hand,  stress  must  be  laid  on  the  necessity  for 
keeping  the  reserves  well  up.  This  should  not,  however,  lead 
to  excessive  crowding  in  the  foremost  fighting  zone,  which  in- 
creases the  losses  and  uses  up  the  troops  more  quickly.  The  art 
of  leadership  consists  in  preserving  the  correct  mean  in  this 
matter.  Otherwise,  it  can  not  be  denied  that  there  is  a  danger 
of  reserves  or  counter-attack  divisions  being  prematurely  used 
up.  (As  regards  the  employment  of  reserves  in  the  battle, 
compare  par.  22.)  Wherever  the  distribution  of  the  troops  in 
depth  ceases  to  exist  during  the  battle,  it  must  be  immediately 
restored  directly  pauses  in  the  fighting  occur.  (Part  8,  par.  16.) 

The  more  uncertain  the  attacker  is  as  to  where  the  principal 
strength  of  the  defense  lies,  and  as  to  the  position  of  the  prin- 
cipal defensive  line,  of  the  most  important  flanking  defenses, 
of  the  strongest  reserves,  etc.,  the  more  difficult  will  the  attack 
be.  Adaptability  to  the  tactical  situation  at  the  time  is  essen- 
tial (cf.  Ill,  pars.  19  and  20)  ;  the  distribution  of  the  troops 
and  the  plan  of  defense  must,  therefore,  be  altered  from  time  to 
time. 

Every  unit  must  pay  attention  to  the  security  of  its  flanks. 
Emergency  garrisons  alone  are  not  sufficient;  detachments  will 


184        GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES. 

be  detailed  for  employment  on  the  offensive.  In  particular, 
special  detachments  ("  Nahtkommandos "  or  contact  detach- 
ments) will  be  formed  at  the  boundaries  of  divisional  and  group 
sectors. 

15.  Distribution  in  depth  is  as  necessary  for  the  artillery 
and  trench  mortars  as  for  the  infantry   and  machine  guns. 
(Cf.  part  8,  par.  28.)     In  this  respect,  too,  mistakes  have  been 
made.     Reserve  batteries  (with  teams)   and  batteries  in  readi- 
ness  in    "positions    in    observation"    are    indispensable.     (Cf. 
part  8,  par.  22.) 

16.  Distribution  in  depth  will  be  extended  forward  by  hold- 
ing the  foreground  with  advanced  troops  of  all  arms,  when- 
ever the  distance  between  us  and  the  enemy  permits.     (Cf. 
par.  4.) 

Ill — CONDUCT  OF  THE  BATTLE. 

17.  The  employment  of  outposts  to  hold  the  foreground  of 
the  position  has  proved  effective. 

18.  It  is  important  that  the  defensive  battle  proper  should 
be  commenced  in  good  time,     (Part  8,  par.  5.) 

19.  Adaptability  on  the  part  of  commanders,  in  accordance 
with  the  principles  laid  down  in  part  8,  paragraph  6,  is  as  much 
an  essential,  rendered  necessary  by  our  general  situation,  as  it  is 
tactically  advantageous.    There  should  be  no  hesitation  in  ex- 
ercising one's  own  initiative.     The  superiority  of  an  active  de- 
fense, carried  out  in  the  spirit  of  an  offensive,  should  be  strongly 
emphasised.     On  the  other  hand,  there  are  but  few  points  on 
the  ground  which  must  actually  be  held  at  all  costs.    We  have 
been  obliged  to  learn  to  adapt  ourselves  to  the  inevitable  lost 
of  a  number  of  positions,  which  we  considered  it  absolutely  in- 
dispensable to  hold,  after  we  had  incurred  heavy  casualties  to 
no  purpose.     The  "  morale "  of  the  troops  will  never  be  low- 
ered in  such  cases  by  a  voluntary  withdrawal  at  the  right  time 
in  accordance  with  orders,  if  they  understand  the  reasons  for 
such  a  step,  while  the  obstinate  retention  of  positions,  which 
have  obviously  become  unfavorable  for  us,  must  destroy  their 
confidence  in  their  commanders.     Complaints  are  again  being 
received  from  the  troops  that  in  its  anxiety  to  prevent  the  loss 
of  a  few  elements  of  trench  the  higher  command  prematurely 
pushes  forward  unnecessarily  strong  reserves.     The  result  is 
that  the  forward  area  of  the  battle  zone,  which  Is  exposed  to 
the  most  intense  fire  of  the  enemy's  artillery,  is  too  strongly  held 


GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES.         185 

and  avoidable  losses  are  incurred.  Although  it  may  not  be  pos- 
sible to  avoid  bringing  large  bodies  of  reserves  close  up,  com- 
manders must  not  lose  sight  of  the  aim  of  the  defense  in  a  battle. 
(Of.  partS,  par.  6.) 

20.  Greater  adaptability  on  the  part  of  the  troops  during 
the  battle  has  also  shown  itself  to  be  necessary.  This  is  as  true 
of  the  infantry  and  machine  guns  as  it  is  of  the  artillery  and 
Minenwerfer.  (Part  8,  pars.  15,  28,  43,  and  part  7.) 

The  battle  in  or  for  the  foremost  line  of  trenches  has  developed 
into  the  battle  for  the  first-line  position.  During  the  artillery 
preparation  the  areas  exposed  to  the  heaviest  bombardment 
should  be  avoided  and  those  not  swept  by  fire  must  be  looked  for. 
Experience  shows  that  careful  observation  of  the  usual  manner 
in  which  the  enemy  distributes  his  fire  makes  it  possible  to  de- 
termine the  position  of  such  areas.  The  best  procedure  in  these 
circumstances  is  to  move  toward  the  enemy  if  it  is  necessary  to 
leave  the  trenches. 

The  casualties  sustained  if  the  men  are  lying  in  the  open  or 
in  shell  holes,  so  long  as  the  fact  has  not  been  observed,  are 
usually  considerably  less  than  if  the  troops  remain,  in  all  cir- 
cumstances, in  positions  which  are  known  to  the  enemy.  In- 
fantry and  machine  guns  will,  therefore,  often  do  better  to  en- 
deavor to  engage  the  enemy  in  the  open  where  they  can  find 
cover  from  observation  in  shell  holes,  and  to  use  the  trenches, 
as  a  rule,  only  to  live  in  during  quieter  periods,  or  for  traffic, 
or  for  better  protection  against  the  weather.  The  attacker  will 
then  have  difficulty  in  finding  out  where  it  is  necessary  for 
him  to  concentrate  his  artillery  and  trench-mortar  fire,  and 
where  and  to  what  extent  his  infantry  attack  will  meet  with 
opposition. 

On  the  other  hand,  such  a  disposition  of  the  troops  and  system 
of  command  in  battle  increases  the  difficulties  of  command,  sup- 
ply, and  relief.  Men  lying  by  themselves  in  shell  holes  are 
particularly  susceptible  to  a  strong  feeling  of  isolation  which 
weakens  their  power  of  resistance.  During  heavy  fighting  it  is 
thus  easy  for  gaps  to  occur  in  which  hostile  nests  are  formed 
without  being  noticed.  Repeated  efforts  must  therefore  be  made 
by  all  possible  means  to  establish  communication  inconspicu- 
ously between  crater  and  crater.  Groups  or  small  bodies  of 
men  must  be  held  together  by  officers,  noncommissioned  officers, 
and  stout-hearted  men.  The  activity  of  patrols  and  infantry 
observers  within  our  own  position  acquires  an  extraordinary  im- 


186        GEBMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES. 

portance.  Men  engaged  on  these  duties  should  receive  special 
consideration  in  the  way  of  decorations,  leave,  etc. 

These  tactics  can  naturally  not  be  employed  in  the  same  man- 
ner on  all  occasions.  The  essential  point  is  that  we  can  not  be 
content  with  demanding  from  our  infantry  that  they  shall  sim- 
ply sit  still  and  allow  the  enemy  to  shell  them.  On  the  con- 
trary, they  must  be  as  active  as  possible  themselves  and  use 
their  heads  and  take  the  offensive  against  the  enemy.  In  this 
way  they  will  carry  on  the  fighting  with  less  losses  and  greater 
success  and  their  morale  will  be  strengthened  and  improved. 

This  implies  that  commanders,  even  those  of  comparatively 
small  'units,  must  have  a  certain  amount  of  freedom  in  deciding 
on  the  tactics  to  be  employed. 

21.  Although  the  principles  of  "The  Defensive  Battle"  per- 
mit of  withdrawals  of  limited  extent,  the  troops  must  retain 
a  clear  understanding  of  the  fact  that,  as  the  result  of  the  fight- 
ing, each  unit  muxt  maintain  intact  the  ground  entrusted  to  it, 
and  that  the  definite  evacuation  of  any  piece  of  ground  can  only 
be  carried  out  by  order  of  the  higher  command.    The  men  must 
realize  that  their  immediate  duty  is  absolutely  to  prevent  the 
enemy  from  penetrating  the  position  for  as  long  as  possible,  and 
that,  in  all  circumstances  they  have  to  destroy  or  eject  any  of 
the  enemy  who  may  happen  to  penetrate  the  position  tempo- 
rarily.    The  offensive  defensive,  the  immediate  and  independent 
counter  attack,  must  become  second  nature  to  every  man  and 
every  commander.    If  this  is  the  case,  every  detachment  which 
is  surrounded  by  the  enemy  will  have  the  certainty  that  our 
own  counter  attack  will  immediately  follow  the  enemy's  attack, 
and  that  the  longer  resistance  is  maintained  the  easier  will  be 
the  task  of  the  counter  attack.     The  enemy's  troops  who  are 
surrounding  our   detachment  will   then   be  surrounded   them- 
selves and  the  number  of  our  men  who  are  taken  prisoner  un- 
wounded  will  be  much  smaller. 

22.  It  has  again  been  proved  that  the  immediate  counter 
attack  plays  the  decisive  rdle  in  the  defense.     (Of.  part  8,  par. 
36.).    The  immediate  counter  attack  should  strike  the  successful 
enemy  at  the  moment  of  his  success  or  immediately  afterwards, 
and  should,  so  far  a*  is  possible,  take  him  by  surprise  and  in 
flank.     It  is  the  most  effective  method,  and  that  which  can  be 
carried  out  with  the  least  expenditure  of  man  power  and  am- 
munition, of  restoring  the  situation  quickly  and  decisively. 

If  it  fails,  and  if  the  enemy  has  succeeded  in  consolidating 
his  position,  only  a  methodical  counter  attack  can  lead  to  the 


GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES.        187 

recapture  of  the  lost  ground.  This  usually  necessitates  the  em- 
ployment of  men  and  materiel  on  a  comparatively  large  scale. 
A  commander  has,  therefore,  always  to  ask  himself  before  every 
methodical  counter  attack  whether  the  possible  success  is  worth 
the  sacrifice. 

In  both  immediate  and  methodical  counter  attacks,  time  and 
opportunity  must  always  be  given  to  the  units  detailed  for  them 
to  be  thoroughly  instructed  as  to  the  ground  and  the  conditions 
under  which  they  will  have  to  flght,  and  to  prepare  for  the  at- 
tack. In  the  case  of  the  methodical  counter  attack,  all  these 
preparations  have  to  be  made  after  the  decision  to  carry  it  out 
has  been  taken.  There  is  plenty  of  time  for  its  execution,  as 
it  does  not  matter  whether  the  attack  is  delivered  sooner  or 
later.  In  the  case  of  the  immediate  counter  attack,  on  the  other 
hand,  the  commanders  and  subordinate  commanders  of  the  troops 
who  are  to  deliver  it,  and,  if  possible,  the  men  themselves,  must 
be  given  the  opportunity  of  making  their  preparations  before 
they  are  thrown  into  the  flght,  and  a  thorough  understanding  as 
to  the  details  of  the  tactical  situation  must  be  established  and 
maintained  between  the  commanders  of  the  troops  detailed  for 
the  attack  and  the  commanders  of  the  troops  in  line.  Otherwise, 
the  inevitable  results  will  be  casualties  and  reverses.  The 
higher  command  must  consider  it  an  important  part  of  its  duty 
to  insure  that  a  unit  is  never  sent  into  a  fight  with  the  conditions 
of  which  it  is  entirely  unacquainted.  The  subordinate  com- 
manders must  insure  that  the  time  given  them  for  purposes  of 
preparation  is  thoroughly  utilized.  This  applies  as  much  to  the 
employment  of  small  local  reserves  as  it  does  to  the  larger  bodies 
of  troops  who  are  stationed  farther  in  rear. 

Troops  who  are  detailed  by  the  higher  command  to  carry  out 
immediate  or  methodical  counter  attacks  should,  as  a  rule,  be 
placed  under  the  orders  of  the  commander  of  the  sector  in  which 
they  are  to  be  employed. 

It  still  frequently  occurs  that  the  strength  of  the  infantry 
detailed  for  an  objective,  whether  in  an  immediate  or  a  methodi- 
cal counter  attack,  is  excessive.  The  commander  must  always 
ask  himself  what  is  the  smallest  number  of  men  with  which  he 
can  gain  his  objective.  Strength,  even  in  the  offensive  defen- 
sive, is  in  no  way  a  matter  of  the  numbers  of  troops  employed 
but  a  question  of  the  skill  with  which  they  are  handled.  On 
the  defensive  fronts  the  divisions  in  line  will  in  most  cases  be 
sufficiently  strong  to  repulse  the  enemy's  attacks  at  once  or  by 
immediate  counter  attacks.  It  is,  however,  advisable  to  have 


188        GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES. 

complete  units  in  support  behind  them  to  meet  special  cases  and 
as  an  additional  precaution.  The  need  of  such  reserves  has 
given  rise  to  the  idea  of  counter-attack  divisions.  Before  such 
divisions  are  engaged  the  higher  command  must  always  take 
into  consideration  whether  they  are  to  be  employed  as  complete 
formations  or  whether  portions  of  them  will  be  sufficient  to 
achieve  the  object  in  view. 

While,  on  the  one  hand,  the  timely  release  of  reserves  is  deci- 
sive for  success,  the  army  commander  has  on  the  other  hand  to 
insure  that  they  are  not  prematurely  weakened,  so  far  as  their 
fighting  power  is  concerned,  by  being  continually  kept  up  too 
close  to  the  fighting.  This  particularly  applies  to  counter- 
attack divisions. 

23.  Artillery  fire. — An  increased  expenditure  of  ammunition, 
particularly  for  counter-battery  work  and  for  the  purpose  of 
inflicting  casualties  on  living  targets  with  H.  E.  or  gas  shell,  is 
necessary  in  the  defensive  battle  and  is  always  justified,  so  long 
as  the  ammunition  is  expended  on  the  right  lines.  Many  mis- 
takes are  still  made  in  this  respect. 

Special  pains  should  be  taken  not  to  miss  the  right  time  to 
employ  gas  shell  before  the  beginning  of  the  enemy's  attack. 

From  prisoners'  statements,  however,  the  resxilts  achieved  by 
the  German  artillery  against  the  assaulting  infantry  are  not 
always  in  proportion  to  the  enormous  quantity  of  guns  and 
ammunition  employed. 

One  of  the  principal  reasons  for  this,  in  addition  to  insuffi- 
cient observation,  is  to  be  found  in  the  fact  that  our  artillery 
fire  is  too  rigid.  A  strong  artillery  defensive  is  not  to  be  se- 
cured by  making  the  automatic  barrages  as  thick  as  possible. 
What  should  rather  be  repeatedly  emphasized  is  the  importance 
of  deliberate  observed  destructive  fire,  and  of  methodical  anni- 
hilating fire.  The  proper  employment  of  gas  shell  and  well- 
regulated  harassing  fire  also  promise  good  results. 

Methodical  annihilating  fire,  directed  against  the  enemy's 
jumping-off  trenches,  must  not  be  developed  into  a  stereotyped 
and  rigid  system  similar  to  automatic  barrage  fire  opened  with- 
out observation.  On  the  contrary,  it  must  be  varied  in  accord- 
ance with  the  situation  in  regard  to  the  width  of  the  front  and 
the  depth  of  the  area  to  be  shelled,  and  must  be  concentrated,  as 
each  occasion  arises,  on  the  positions  where  the  enemy's  at- 
tacking troops  have  been  detected  or  are  suspected  to  be  assem- 
bling. As  a  rule,  the  organization  in  depth  of  the  enemy's  at- 


GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES.        189 

tacking  troops  makes  it  necessary  for  annihilating  fire  to  cover 
an  area  of  considerable  depth. 

Methodical  annihilating  fire  gives  the  infantry  far  more  effec- 
tive support  during  a  battle  than  automatic  barrages,  with 
their  enormous  expenditure  of  ammunition,  which,  after  all, 
produces  only  slight  results. 

It  is  absolutely  essential  that  artillery  fire  should  be  flexible 
and  this  can  only  be  secured  by  means  of  the  most  extensive 
employment  of  aerial  observation  and  by  the  thorough  organiza- 
tion and  maintenance  of  artillery  communications  of  all  kinds, 
which  must  be  made  independent  of  telephone  lines  in  the  main 
zone  of  hostile  fire.  The  artillery  fire  must  be  quickly  adapted 
to  the  results  obtained  by  every  reconnaissance  and  to  every 
change  in  the  tactical  situation. 

24.  Infantry,  artillery,  pursuit  and  battle  aeroplanes,  as  well 
as  balloons,  can  lay  claim  to  performances  of  extraordinary 
excellence;  and  yet  there  is  a  very  great  deal  to  learn  in  the 
cooperation  of  aeroplanes  and  balloons  with,  the  troops. 
They  must  be  trained  early  to  work  together  on  the  lines  laid 
down  in  the  regulations.  (Of.,  especially  parts  5  and  6,  and  part 
8,  par.  22  et  seq.)  For  this  purpose  aviation  units  should  be 
detailed  to  the  fighting  troops  as  early  as  possible. 

Corps,  armies,  and  groups  of  armies  must  take  the  necessary 
steps  to  secure  the  concentration  and  cooperation  of  the  aviation 
forces  of  the  neighoring  sectors,  in  the  air,  at  the  points  where 
the  fighting  is  heaviest,  so  as  to  gain  the  supremacy  at  these 
points.  The  manner  in  which  available  aviation  units  and  bal- 
loons are  to  be  employed,  therefore,  requires  the  most  careful 
consideration. 

As  a  matter  of  principle,  one  artillery  flight  and  one  protective 
flight,  if  it  is  available,  should  be  attached  to  each  division  in 
line  on  the  main  battle  fronts  for  the  purposes  of  artillery 
observation.  In  addition,  groups  (corps)  should  have  one  or  two 
reconnaissance  flights  at  their  disposal  for  contact  patrol  work 
and  aerial  photography,  as  well  as  for  close  reconnaissance. 
They  should  also  be  provided  with  one  or  two  pursuit  flights  for 
the  actual  work  of  aerial  fighting.  The  army  will  usually  find  one 
reconnaissance  flight  sufficient  for  its  requirements,  while  it  will 
have,  in  addition,  the  balance  of  the  pursuit  flights.  The  army 
thus  has  it  in  its  power,  by  concentrating  the  pursuit  flights 
in  the  sectors  which  are  the  most  important  for  the  time  being, 
to  put  the  enemy's  aerial  observation  out  of  action  for  some 
hours  and  to  secure  our  own. 


190        GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES. 

The  tedious  and  exhausting  but  decisive  and  useful  work  of 
contact  patrols  and  artillery  aeroplanes  is  particularly  valuable. 
The  part  which  contact  patrols  and  pursuit  flights  can  play  in 
the  infantry  fighting  by  firing  at  the  enemy's  reserves  and  troops 
in  trenches  can  exercise  a  great  moral  effect. 

Bombing  raids  should,  as  a  rule,  be  carried  out  by  the  bomb- 
ing squadrons.  If  taken  for  such  an  operation,  flights  which 
are  already  employed  are  withdrawn  from  their  proper  duties. 

Economy  in  the  employment  of  their  aviation  forces  is  a  duty 
which  can  not  be  too  seriously  regarded  by  all  commanders.  If 
they  are  employed  too  frequently  both  men  and  machines  are 
overstrained  and  wear  out  too  quickly. 

On  the  quiet  fronts,  armies  must  insure  the  training  of  their 
pilots  for  contact  patrol  and  artillery  work  by  the  judicious 
employment  of  the  few  aircraft  at  their  disposal. 

25.  The  value  of  "  Minenwerfer  "  in  the  defensive  battle 
is  considered  doubtful  in  several  quarters.     Even  if  it  is  ad- 
mitted  that   they   are  primarily  offensive  weapons    (they  are 
indispensable  for  counter  attacks),  there  are,  on  the  other  hand, 
enough  well-known  examples  of  good  results  achieved  by  all 
kinds   of   "Minenwerfer"    (even   heavy   and   medium)    in   the 
defensive  battle.     "Minenwerfer"  must  be  disposed  in  depth, 
and   their  employment  must  be  flexible.    The  cooperation  of 
"  Minenwerfer "     and     "  Granatwerfer "     in     immediate     and 
methodical  counter  attacks  requires  particularly  thorough  train- 
ing.    (Cf.  part  7  and  part  8,  par.  43  et  seq.) 

IV.— GENERAL. 

26.  Clerical  work. — Legitimate  complaints  are  made  as  to 
the  enormous  increase  in  the  amount  of  clerical  work.    This  is 
already  described  as  a  tactical  danger,  owing  to  the  fact  that 
commanding  officers — even  down  to  battery  and  company  com- 
manders— are  kept  too  much  in  their  offices.     Independence  and 
initiative  are  also  diminished  by  this  fact.    The  supervision  and 
checking  which  must  be  carried  out  by  superior  officers  must  not 
increase  the  amount  of  clerical  work. 

Written  reports,  explanations,  and  instructions  of  all  kinds, 
as  well  as  the  preparation  and  keeping  up  to  date  of  many  kinds 
of  sketch  plans  and  maps,  can  not,  it  is  true,  be  dispensed  with, 
but  the  impression  exists  that  it  is  possible  to  reduce  the  quan- 
tity. There  must,  for  example,  be  something  wrong  with  the 


GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES.        191 

system  if  an  artillery  "Abteilung"  has  to  keep  a  register  of 
correspondence  in  its  battle  headquarters  and  has  about  40 
entries  daily  in  this  register.  The  fighting  must  suffer  from 
such  a  system,  and  an  immediate  alteration  is  necessary.  Every 
officer  in  a  responsible  position,  from  the  battalion  commander 
upward,  ought  to  ask  himself  if  he  can'  not  settle  a  question 
verbally.  Written  directions  from  superior  officers,  important 
as  they  are,  are  not  the  only  means. 

27.  Various  incidents  render  it  advisable  to  call  attention 
to  the  fact  that  the  "  Manual  of  Position  Warfare  for  all  Arms," 
including  this  special  part,  must  be  regarded  as  binding.  The 
orders  which  have  been  given  by  some  officers,  and  which  repre- 
sent a  considerable  departure  from  these  instructions  in  matters 
of  principle,  can  not  be  permitted  under  any  circumstances. 
On  the  contrary,  in  the  interests  of  uniformity  throughout  the 
army,  which  is  urgently  necessary,  it  is  expected  that  the  prin- 
ciples laid  down  in  these  manuals  will  be  applied  absolutely, 
and  without  additions  which  alter  their  meaning. 


XIII. 

THE  BATTLE  OF  MALMAISON 

(OCTOBER  23,  1917), 
AS  SEEN  BY  THE  GERMANS. 

29267°— 18 13  193 


CONTENTS. 


Page. 

The  action 195 

Artillery 197 

Aviation 198 

Machine  guns  and  trench  mortars 198 

Defensive  organizations 198 

The  enemy  troops 198 

Losses 199 

Effects  of  the  attack 199 

Some  suggestive  documents 200 

October  18 — To  the  company  commander 200 

Fourth  Company— October  19,  1917,  7.10  a.m..  to  K.  T.  K. 

Hans  links  (left) 201 

Answer  from  K.  T.  K.,  October  19,  1917,  7.15  o'clock 201 

October  20, 1917 — To  the  commander  of  the  Fourth  Company .  201 
Fourth  Company— October  19. 1917, 10  p.  m.— To  the  K.  T.  K. 

Hans  links  (left) 201 

Answer  from  the  K.  T.  K.,  October  20,  1917.  11.10  p.  m.,  to 

the  Fourth  Company 202 

October  21,  1917— Fourth  Company  to  the  K.  T.  K.  Hans 

links  (left)— 7.15  a.  m 202 

Answer  from  the  K.  T.  K.,  October  21,  1917,  to  the  Fourth 

Company,  7.25  a.  m 202 

194 


XIII. 

THE  BATTLE  OF  MALMAISON  (OCT.  23,  1917), 
AS  SEEN  BY  THE  GERMANS. 


From  captured  documents  and  the  interrogation  of  prisoners 
we  have  been  enabled  to  follow  the  entire  Battle  of  Malmaison 
from  the  German  point  of  view,  beginning  with  the  period  of 
preparation  and  continuing  up  to  the  withdrawal  of  the  enemy. 
The  documents  and  questionnaires  emphasize  in  an  astounding 
manner  the  extent  of  our  success  and  the  German  failure. 

THE   ACTION. 

I.  The  enemy  was  not  in  the  least  surprised  as  our  attack 
had  been  expected  since  the  beginning  of  September  (Artillery 
Brigade  order  for  the  103d  Division  of  Sept.  8).  The  convic- 
tion held  by  the  Germans  that  an  attack  was  imminent  in- 
creased little  by  little.  The  first  days  of  October  and  the  middle 
of  that  month  appeared  to  them  particularly  critical  periods. 

The  enemy  seems  to  have  known  about  our  offensive  prepara- 
tions, but  up  to  the  last  moment  thought  that  only  a  slight 
diversion  was  intended,  in  order  to  hold  a  certain  number  of 
divisions  on  the  Aisne,  the  main  action  taking  place  in  Flanders. 

Toward  the  8th  of  October,  when  a  plan  for  falling  back 
could  not  be  carried  out,  the  enemy  command  decided  to  main- 
tain the  position  by  putting  excellent  divisions  in  line,  in  order 
to  cut  short  any  French  attempt  in  that  region. 

The  enemy  had  only  an  imperfect  idea  of  the  strength  of  our 
means  of  attack.  The  artillery  oflicers  taken  prisoner  attribute 
their  ignorance  of  the  artillery  situation  to  the  perfect  camou- 
flage of  our  batteries ;  the  perfect  method  of  employed  prepara- 
tory fire,  judiciously  echeloned,  and  which  led  the  Germans  to 
conclude  that  there  was  only  question  of  displacement  of  the 
artillery  and  not  of  reenf  or  cements. 

Great  was  the  surprise  of  the  artillery  officers  when,  a  few 
days  before  the  attack,  there  was  the  map  of  the  batteries 
located  as  being  in  action  at  the  opening  of  demolition  fire. 

Several  artillery  regiments  were  quickly  brought  up,  but 
their  action  was  practically  nil,  as  it  was  impossible  to  cross 
the  canal  under  the  enemy  fire. 

195 


196        GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES. 

It  is  beyond  question  (according  to  messages  and  declarations 
made  by  captured  officers)  that  the  German  staff  knew  the  date 
and  hour  of  the  attack.  The  fact  that  we  advanced  that  hour 
at  the  last  moment  enabled  two  of  our  divisions  to  escape  the 
effects  of  a  counter-preparation  fire  which  would  in  all  proba- 
bility have  proved  fatal  had  their  start  been  delayed  until  the 
hour  originally  set. 

In  view  of  the  indications  of  an  attack  by  us,  another  division 
was  brought  into  sector  as  a  reenforcement  for  those  occupying 
the  menaced  front. 

This  division,  the  2d  Division  of  the  Guard,  came  into  line  on 
the  21st  of  September  between  the  103d  Division  and  the  5th 
Division  of  the  Guard. 

The  103d  Division  was  relieved  toward  October  12  by  the  13th 
Division.  On  its  right  was  the  14th  Division  and  on  its  right 
again  the  37th  Division,  one  regiment  of  which  occupied  the 
trenches  south  of  the  canal. 

On  the  left  of  the  2d  Division  of  the  Guards  was  the  5th 
1  >ivision  of  the  Guards  and  on  its  left  again  the  47th  Division  of 
Reserves. 

Several  divisions  were  stationed'  near  by,  three  of  which,  called 
divisions  for  intervention,  were  designed  to  act  as  supports,  on 
the  right  to  the  52d  Division,  on  the  left  to  the  9th  Division,  and 
in  the  center  to  the  43d  Division  of  Reserves. 

Finally,  in  addition  to  some  elements  of  the  10th  Division 
(in  sector  in  the  Saint  Gobaiu  forest),  the  6th  Division  (brought 
from  Russia)  and  the  3rd  Bavarian  Division  (brought  from 
Lorraine)  were  stationed  near. 

As  our  preparation  progressed  the  units  already  in  line, 
severely  tried,  had  to  be  relieved  by  others  then  in  billets,  in 
spite  of  the  difficulties  in  the  way  of  these  reliefs.  The  units 
charged  with  the  defense  of  the  successive  lines  took  up  their 
positions  at  the  cost  of  severe  losses. 

Considerable  reinforcement  of  artillery  was  achieved,  espe- 
cially in  heavy  artillery. 

Between  the  15th  of  September  and  the  15th  of  October  64 
new  batteries  appeared,  on  the  front  of  the  army,  including  40 
of  large  caliber.  This  brought  the  total  number  of  batteries 
before  our  front  of  attack  up  to  about  180,  63  of  which  were 
of  large  caliber. 

This  display  of  forces,  the  strength  of  the  troops  in  line,  and 
a  certain  miscalculation  of  the  effort  we  were  capable  of,  in- 
creased the  self-confidence  of  the  Germans.  A  small  strip  of 


GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES.        197 

ground  at  most  was  to  be  abandoned  where  the  width  of  the 
plateau  was  sufficient  to  permit  a  slight  withdrawal  without 
causing  great  inconvenience. 

The  order  hatl  been  issued  to  hold  on  at  any  cost  and  to  fight 
confidently,  as  the  French  were  unequal  to  the  Germans  in  close 
combat.  The  erroneousness  of  this  opinion  was  soon  proven, 
the  care  and  pains  taken  in  the  preparation  forcing  the  enemy 
to  retreat  across  the  canal  and  abandon  the  entire  Chemin  des 
Dames. 

II.  The  enemy  tactics  combined  a  desperate  defense  of  the 
first  position  by  troops  in  shelters  (the  concrete  of  the  Hinden- 
burg  line  and  the  natural  caves  appearing  to  be  bombproof)  or 
fortified  shell  holes,  and  a  counter  attack  of  every  echelon.    The 
captured  orders  left  no  doubt  on  this  subject,  and  preparations 
had  been  made  with  almost  exaggerated  minuteness. 

III.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  enemy  did  not  execute  a  single 
maneuver,  excepting  in  a  few  local  actions,  which  were  quickly 
overcome  by  our  retaliation. 

The  effects  of  our  bombardment  were  such  as  to  result  in  the 
premature  engagement  of  units  originally  destined  for  the 
counter  attack,  the  losses  occasioned  throughout  the  area  of 
action  of  our  guns  (which  was  very  extended  in  depth)  being 
so  severe  as  to  disorganize  the  plan  and  necessitate  the  utiliza- 
tion of  all  these  units  as  reinforcements,  without  having  control 
of  the  situation,  as  liaisons  had  become  impossible. 

ARTII.T.ERY. 

A.  The  enemy  artillei-y  did  not  hinder  our  preparations  as  it 
might  have  if  an  enforced  or  untimely  economy  in  ammunition 
had  not  interposed. 

The  few  ammunition  depots  which  were  blown  up  within  our 
lines  and  the  small  losses  they  were  able  to  inflict  before  we 
commenced  our  preparatory  fire  did  not  worry  us,  as  the  Ger- 
mans were  far  from  being  able  to  comply  with  their  instructions. 

The  enemy  batteries  were  practically  all  paralyzed  and  their 
fire  disorganized  as  soon  as  our  bombardment  began. 

B.  The  counter-preparatory  fire  before  the  attack  was  violent 
and  menacing,  especially  on  our  right  front. 

The  German  shells  did  not  follow  our  waves  on  that  part  of 
the  front  and  the  barrage  fires  were  everywhere  else  inoperative. 

C.  The  movement  toward  the  northeast,  observed  during  the 
few  days  just  before  our  attack,  was  accentuated  after  the  24th 
of  October.    The  comparative  inactivity  of  the  batteries  stationed 


198         GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES. 

on  the  other  side  of  the  canal  during  the  following  period  was 
proof  of  the  enemy's  confusion.  It  was  not  until  after  the  com- 
plete evacuation  of  Chemin  cles  Dames  that  an  artillery  line 
could  be  fixed  upon.  This  line  is  not  dense  and  has  not  been 
very  active. 

AVIATION. 

The  German  aviation  service  was  unable  to  cope  with  ours. 
Their  pursuit  airplanes  tried  to  form  barrages  inside  their  lines, 
but  rarely  accepted  a  challenge,  and  we  were  able  to  make  our 
adjustments  and  aerial  as  well  as  visual  reconnaissances  without 
hindrance.  Bombardments  on  our  rear  were  few  and  unim- 
portant 

The  aerial  reconnaissance  was  very  inferior.  It  did  not  dis- 
cover the  extent  of  the  French  preparations  and  the  artillery 
reinforcements  escaped  notice. 

MACHINE  GUNS  AND  TRENCH  MORTARS. 

Machine  guns  formed  the  chief  impediment  to  our  progress,  and 
also  occasioned  our  losses  (which  were,  however,  relatively  un- 
important) during  the  attack.  There  are  always  some  unde- 
stroyed  machine  guns,  and  their  resistance  can  only  be  success- 
fully met  by  quick  and  skillful  dispositions,  such  as  were  taken 
on  the  25th  of  October. 

The  trench  mortars  were  silenced  by  our  preparatory  fire  and 
had  practically  no  effect. 

DEFENSIVE  ORGANIZATIONS. 

The  conquered  defensive  organizations  did  not  call  for  especial 
notice.  Those  which  had  not  been  completely  demolished  ap- 
peared to  be  of  the  usual  type.  The  natural  caves  of  the  region 
had  been  utilized  to  the  maximum  extent. 

THE  ENEMY   TROOPS. 

The  opposing  forces  were  for  the  most  part  excellent.  Next 
to  the  2d  and  5th  Divisions  of  the  Guard  were  the  13th  and  14th 
Divisions  of  the  Tilth  Corps,  which  were  units  selected  from 
among  the  best.  The  other  Division  in  line,  the  47th  Iteserve, 
was  perhaps  a  little  tired,  but  the  Intervention  Divisions  (52d, 
43d  Reserve,  9th)  were  in  good  condition,  as  were  also  those 
brought  up  as  reinforcements  (6th,  3d  Bavarian,  10th). 

The  prisoners,  even  those  belonging  to  the  Guard,  had  the 
miserable  expression  of  persons  who  had  suffered,  having  re- 
mained several  days  under  an  incessant  bombardment  with- 


GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES.         199 

out  supplies.  Their  morale  had  been  effected.  Side  by  side 
with  the  serious  resistance  encountered  there  had  been  whole- 
sale surrenders,  and  the  counter  attacks  were  seldom  made  with 
any  zest. 

Many  of  the  prisoners  were  young,  about  19  per  cent  of  the 
total  being  of  the  class  of  1918. 

LOSSES. 

Three  thousand  three  hundred  dead  were  picked  up  by  us  on 
the  conquered  terrain. 

The  total  number  of  dead  could  not  be  less  than  8,000,  which 
would  correspond  normally  to  30,000  wounded.  By  adding 
11,500  prisoners,  we  may  calculate  the  total  German  losses  at 
about  50,000  men. 

In  addition  to  this,  200  guns,  222  trench  mortars,  720  machine 
guns,  and  large  quantities  of  materiel  and  ammunition  re- 
mained in  our  hands. 

The  prisoners  declared  that  our  artillery  fire  caused  such 
severe  losses  in  the  rear,  in  the  cantonments  and  camps,  which 
they  had  thought  safe  and  on  the  roads  and  paths  that  some 
of  the  men  thought  they  must  have  been  betrayed,  our  informa- 
tion had  been  so  accurate. 

Our  aviation  service  appeared  to  them  to  control  the  air,  and, 
as  a  matter  of  fact,  many  more  French  than  German  airplanes 
were  to  be  seen. 

Our  attack  was  no  surprise  to  the  Germans,  some  of  whom 
were  awaiting  it  as  a  deliverance.  Nevertheless,  the  enthusiasm 
of  our  troops  and  the  extent  of  our  preparations  were  equally 
astonishing  to  many  of  the  prisoners. 

It  is  a  current  saying  in  the  German  army  that  France  is  ex- 
hausted ;  that  the  French  army  is  incapable  of  a  great  exertion ; 
that  food  is  extremely  rare  and  discouragement  universal.  But 
when  prisoners  reach  our  lines  they  are  amazed  at  what  they 
see  and  the  surprise  of  those  who  think  and  are  sincere  is  un- 
mistakable. 

Some  officers,  scarcely  able  to  conceal  their  spite,  declared 
that  "  with  such  means  Hindenburg  would  have  done  still 
better." 

EFFECTS    OF    THE    ATTACK. 

The  dominating  fact  in  the  statements  of  the  artillery  officers 
and  the  battalion  commanders  is  the  profound  impression  made 


200        GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES. 

by  the  efficacy  and  violence  of  the  demolition  fire,  especially  in 
rear. 

The  artillery  fire  resulted — 

In  completely  demolishing  the  first-line  defenses  and  severing 
all  means  of  liaison. 

In  largely  destroying  the  artillery. 

In  rendering  all  supplying  of  rations  and  ammunition  impos- 
sible, as  well  as  preventing  relief. 

The  materiel  destroyed  by  the  bombardment  south  of  the 
canal  could  not  be  replaced.  The  Germans  had  largely  de- 
pended on  their  gas  shells  to  check  the  French  attack.  All  the 
reserve  stores  of  gas  shells  were  5  kilometers  north  of  the  canal, 
so  as  to  be  outside  the  line  of  bombardment,  and  when  they  were 
needed  it  was  impossible  to  have  them  brought  forward.  For 
the  same  reason  the  line  troops  were  four  days  without  food. 
They  were  completely  exhausted  and  incapable  of  offering  seri- 
ous resistance  when  they  were  taken  by  our  infantry. 

SOME  SUGGESTIVE  DOCUMENTS. 

The  documents  given  below  were  found  on  the  2d  lieutenant 
commanding  the  4th  company  of  the  Augusta  regiment,  and 
include  notes  exchanged  between  a  platoon  commander,  the 
commander  of  the  4th  company,  and  the  K.  T.  K.,  sector  com- 
mander. These  documents  are  added  proof  that  our  fire  had 
disorganized  the  enemy  first-line  troops,  had  caused  grave 
losses,  demoralized  both  the  commanders  and  their  men,  made 
relief  almost  impossible,  and,  in  a  word,  had  reduced  the  com- 
bat value  and  resistive  force  of  the  adversary  to  a  very  con- 
siderable extent. 

October  18th.  To  the  C'oniixiii)/  Commander. 

Up  to  the  present  time  I  have  1  man  killed  and  5  wounded. 
I  need  at  least  5  men  to  replace  the  5  who  are  incapacitated. 
Captain  Wilk  (K.  T.  K.,  sector  commander)  writes  me  he  sees 
no  reason  why  I  should  not  arrange  for  reliefs  among  the  de- 
tachments. Such  an  exchange  does  not  interest  me  in  the  least ; 
I  beg  you  will  at  least  replace  the  losses.  In  any  case  I  have 
room  enough  to  shelter  more  men  than  I  now  have.  I  have  so 
few  men  at  my  disposal  that  in  case  of  an  attack  I  must  leave 
part  of  the  trench  without  tiarrixon,  so  that  the  enemy  could 
penetrate  at  that  point  without  any  difficulty  whatever.  Please 
remember  that  I  have  only  one  single  machine  gun  to  defend  an 


GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES.         201 

extensive  sector  with;  what  can  I  do  with  one  machine  gun? 
I  beg  of  you  to  ask  the  K.  T.  K.  to  let  me  have  one  more  from 
the  machine-gun  company.  I  have  a  suitable  shelter  at  my  dis- 
posal for  this  purpose. 

The  two  other  platoon  commanders  tell  me  they  also  are 
afraid  that  the  few  men  at  our  disposal  will  not  be  able  to 
defend  the  trench  alone. 

Please  report  to  the  K.  T.  K.  that  the  artillery  has  left  me  in 
the  lurch. 

Everything  promises  well. 

( Signed )  RITTERHAUS. 

4th  Company— October  Wth,  1917,  7.10  a.  m.,  to  K.  T.  K.  Hans 
links  (left). 

Losses:  The  company  lost  yesterday  1  killed  and  4  wounded. 
Lieutenant  R.  requests  one  more  machine  gun.  Shall  I  send  the 
light  machine  gun  which  I  had  repaired  and  have  at  my  disposal 
into  line? 

( Signed )  SIEBEKT. 

Answer  from  the  K.  T.  K.,  October  19,  11)17,  7.15  o'clock. 

Yes.    Agreed. 

(Signed)  WH.K. 

October  20th,  1917.     To  the  Commander  of  the  J/th  Company. 

I.  The  afternoon  was  almost  unbearable ;  1  killed,  1  wounded, 
1  buried.    Several  shells  struck  my  shelter. 

II.  I  beg  you  urgently  to   intervene  immediately   and  very 
energetically  to  have  us  relieved  by  to-morrow  morning  at  latest. 
The  officers  and  men  are  simply  exhausted. 

(Signed)  RITTERHAUS. 

////(.  Company. — October  19,  1917,  10  p.  m.    To  the  K.  T.  K.  Hans 
links  (left). 

Second  Lieutenant  Ritterhaus  urgently  requests  relief ;  the 
troops,  as  well  as  himself,  are  completely  exhausted.  Relief  by 
part  of  the  same  company  would  not  better  the  situation,  as  the 
only  platoon  available  is  in  the  same  physical  and  moral  condi- 
tion ;  1  killed,  1  wounded,  1  missing. 

( Signed )  SIEBERT. 


202         GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES. 

Anxirer  from  the  K.  T.  K.,  October  20th,  1917,  11.10  p.  m.,  to  the 
4th  Company. 

In  view  of  the  bombardment  actually  taking  place,  relief  does 
not  appear  opportune.  If  to-morrow  morning  is  like  this  morn- 
ing, a  little  calm  or  foggy,  I  shall  have  the  4th  Company  relieved 
by  the  1st  Company. 

October  21st,  1917. — Jfth  Company'  to  the  K.  T.  K.,  Hans  links 
(left)— 7.15  a.  TO. 

I  respectfully  request  to  have  the  entire  company  relieved,  or 
I  can  not  guarantee  the  defense  of  the  sector  with  the  troops 
at  my  disposal.  I  made  this  same  request  at  4  a.  m.,  but  have 
as  yet  received  no  reply.  I  urgently  request  that  my  demand 
be  granted. 

(Signed)  S.IEBERT. 

Answer  from  the  K.  T.  K..  October  ,21,  /.''/?',  tn  the  ,'///i  CoiujHinit, 
7.25  a.  m. 

The  report  sent  in  at  4  o'clock  was  received  here  at  G.30.  In 
the  answer  I  refused  to  order  a  new  relief  at  the  present  moment. 
The  remainder  of  the  company  will  be  relieved  to-morrow  morn- 
ing. (French  translator's  note:  Only  a  portion  of  the  4th  Com- 
pany was  to  have  been  relieved  on  the  morning  of  the  21st. )  Up 
to  that  time  you  must  hold  out.  You  have  under  your  orders  in 
the  R.  I.  sector  Lieutenant  Jager  with  4  grenade  throwers  of  the 
1st  Company,  Augusta ;  in  R.  2  Sergt.  Wienand  with  one  platoon 
in  the  trench-mortar  shelter,  the  company  staff,  and  the  assault 
battalion.  The  position  absolutely  must  be  held. 

(Signed)  WILK. 


XIV. 

ACTIONS  ON  THE  CARSO, 
AUGUST  TO  SEPTEMBER,  1917. 


(•Austrian   documents   concerning  the   Artillery — Command — Third 
Army,  Section  II — Information.) 

203 


CONTENTS. 


Page. 

Headquarters  Third  Army 205 

Austrian  documents  c.oncerning  the  artillery  found  during  the 
offensive  of  August,  1917,  and  information  obtained  from 

the  interrogation  of  prisoners 205 

Command  of  Subsector  II 206 

A.  Barrage  batteries 206 

B.  Batteries  for  interdiction  fire 208 

C.  Defensive  fire 209 

D.  Liaison  officers 209 

E.  Observers 210 

F.  Means  of  liaison 210 

G.  Gun  emplacements 210 

H.  Individual  activity  of  the  executive  officer 211 

I.    To  counter- batter  mortars 211 

K.  Defense  against  "tanks" 212 

L.  Arrangements  for  artillery  observation .  . 212 

Order  for  defensive  fire  (35th  Division) 214 

Directions  for  artillery  action 215 

Legend 216 

Imperial  and  Royal  llth  Infantry  Regiment 217 

Instructions  for  the  use  of  artillery  in  an  attack 218 

204 


XIV. 

ACTIONS   ON  THE   CARSO,   AUGUST-SEPTEM- 
BER, 1917. 


HEADQUARTERS  THIRD  ARMY. 

AUSTRIAN  DOCUMENTS  CONCERNING  THE  ARTIL- 
LERY, FOUND  DURING  THE  OFFENSIVE  OF  AU- 
GUST, 1917,  AND  INFORMATION  OBTAINED  FROM 
THE  INTERROGATION  OF  PRISONERS. 

From  the  documents  found  and  the  information  obtained  from 
the  few  prisoners  taken,  it  is  evident  that  the  enemy  has  a  new 
plan  for  the  use  of  the  artillery.  Up  to  the  present  time  the 
brigade  of  field  artillery  assigned  to  a  division  has  been  sub- 
divided into  battalions  of  various  sizes,  all  dependent,  however, 
upon  the  commander  of  the  divisional  artillery,  with  the  ex- 
ception of  a  few  batteries  or  sections  assigned  to  infantry  com- 
mands for  special  duties.  They  now  appear  to  be  divided  into 
two  commands  (Gruppen),  one  formed  by  regiments  of  field 
artillery  and  light  howitzers  and  the  other  by  regiments  of 
heavy  field  artillery.  In  defense,  batteries  of  the  two  first 
regiments  are  grouped  into  mixed  battalions  for  barrage,  in 
which  may  also  be  included  batteries  of  other  field  regiments 
and  of  light  howitzers  from  the  same  sector.  They  are  com- 
manded by  a  colonel  of  artillery  (possibly  the  commander  of 
the  brigade  of  field  artillery),  tactically  dependent  upon  the 
commandant  of  the  infantry  brigade.  The  regiment  of  heavy 
field  artillery  is  commanded  by  a  colonel  or  lieutenant  colonel 
of  artillery,  who  receives  orders 'directly  from  the  commander 
of  the  division. 

This  explains  the  phrase  which  occurs  so  frequently  in  the 
documents :  "Artillery  of  the  zone  of  the  infantry  brigade." 
It  has  not  been  possible  to  obtain  precise  information  concern- 
ing the  relations  of  tactical  dependence  which  would  explain 
the  other  phrase  frequently  repeated  in  one  of  the  documents 

205 


206        GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES. 

translated:  "Batteries  tactically  dependent  upon  the  sector  of 
the  battalion." 

The  enemy  is  paying  constantly  increasing  attention  to  liai- 
son ;  thus  two  complete  telephone  systems  have  recently  been 
provided  for  the  artillery,  one  for  the  transmission  of  orders 
and  one  for  fire  adjustment. 

COMMAND  OF  SUBSECTOR  II. 

[No.  166/11  Op.] 

FIELD  POST  391,  June  16,  1917. 

The  tenth  battle  of  the  Isonzo  has  shown  the  decisive  im- 
portance of  "annihilation  fire"  ( Vernichtungsf ener )  when  it 
is  opened  suddenly  and  with  extreme  violence.  Whenever  it 
was  possible  to  reach  the  enemy  infantry  in  their  points  of 
concentration  before  the  attack  with  concentrated  volleyg,  the 
adversary  was  unable  to  make  a  serious  attack. 

It  is  therefore  the  duty  of  a  well-organized  and  well-instructed 
observation  service  to  discover  every  concentration  of  enemy 
troops  before  the  attack,  in  order  that  they  may  be  annihilated 
and  the  attack  effectively  prevented  by  a  short  but  concen- 
trated annihilation  fire  of  all  the  available  guns  (not  including 
the  sections  for  barrage  fire).  If  several  zones  are  in  question 
they  will  be  subjected  in  succession  to  similar  volleys. 

If  all  the  artillery  of  a  subsector  is  to  be  used  simultaneously, 
the  orders  to  open  fire  will  be  given  by  the  commander  of  the 
subsector,  to  whom  all  facts  bearing  on  the  question  must  be 
communicated  without  delay. 

The  order  to  fire  must  indicate  the  time  at  which  fire  is  to 
be  opened,  the  amount  of  ammunition  for  this  heavy  fire,  and 
the  area  to  be  swept. 

Only  in  case  of  imminent  danger  are  the  commanders  of  bat- 
teries to  open  fire  immediately.  The  commander  of  the  sub- 
sector  will  then  provide  other  batteries  for  use  in  that  zone. 

/Every  care  must  be  taken  in  order  that  by  means  of  the 
other  defensive  measures  of  the  artillery  the  original  density 
and  intensity  of  fire  may  be  maintained. 

The  following  are  a  few  instructions  on  the  subject : 

A.   BABKAGE   BATTERIES. 

(1)  Barrage  batteries  must  always  be  laid  in  the  direction 
of  the  zone  of  barrage,  with  the  guns  loaded.  Near  each  gun 


GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES.        207 

should  be  placed  one  large  case  of  shells  and  one  of  shrapnel, 
with  fuses  set.  If  the  battery  is  used  against  other  targets,  one 
section  must  remain  in  readiness  for  barrage  fire. 

(2)  Barrage  fire  must  be  opened  one  minute  after  request  at 
latest. 

To  this  end  the  cannoneers  of  one  section  must  always  be  in 
readiness  by  their  guns,  even  at  night  (section  on  duty). 

At  night  an  inspection  officer  must  be  present  to  supervise 
visual  signals,  to  see  that  alarms  are  given  without  delay,  and 
to  superintend  the  firing  of  alarm  guns. 

The  officer  on  duty,  especially  at  night,  must  remain  near  the 
(telephone?)  station  of  the  guns. 

The  troops  which  are  to  be  in  readiness  must  be  inspected 
often. 

(3)  All  observation  stations  must  be  occupied  day  and  night. 
During  periods  of  calm  expert  noncommissioned  officers  may  be 
detailed  for  night  duty,  but  there  should  be  an  officer  on  duty 
in  at  least  one  observation  station  of  each  battalion,  even  at 
night. 

In  order  to  ascertain,  even  at  night,  whether  a  luminous  signal 
is  sent  from  the  zone  of  action  of  his  own  barrage  battery,  small 
square  apertures  are  made  in  each  loophole  with  laths  or  small 
boards,  through  which  the  observer  can  see  the  zone  of  barrage 
of  his  own  battery. 

(4)  A  noncommissioned  officer  from  every  barrage  battery  is 
attached  to  every  company  commander  in  front  of  whose  sector 
barrage  fire  is  to  be  executed. 

These  noncommissioned  officers  will  remain  near  the  company 
commander  and  will  be  supplied  by  the  infantry  with  signal 
lanterns,  disks,  and  pistols,  with  which  the  following  signals 
may  be  made : 

Open  barrage  fire. 

Extend  fire  in  the  direction  of  the  enemy. 

(5)  The  fire  of  each  gun  must  be  accurately  adjusted  for 
barrage  fire,  taking  into  account  the  progress  of  the  two  first 
lines  and  the  intermediate  terrain. 

In  first  line  the  fire  adjustment  is  directed  by  the  battery 
commander,  assisted  by  the  company  commander  concerned. 

The  average  trajectory  should  be  from  100  to  300  meters  in 
front  of  our  own  lines,  depending  upon  the  dispersion  and  direc- 
tion of  fire,  the  ground,  and  the  safety  of  the  troops. 

As  long  as  it  is  possible  to  hold  the  small  posts  in  front  of 
the  first  line  the  barrage  must  be  maintained  in  front  of  them. 


208         GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES. 

If  they  are  obliged  to  retire  on  account  of  the  situation  or  by 
order,  the  artillery  must  be  notified  without  delay. 

(6)  The  commander  of  the  barrage  battery  must  send  officers 
to  the  front  of  the  barrage  fire  from  time  to  time  in  order  to 
obtain  accurate  information  on  the  situation  and  to  maintain 
contact  with  the  infantry. 

In  addition,  the  infantry  in  the  first  line  must  send  all  its 
officers,  one  by  one,  to  the  observation  station  of  the  commander 
of  the  barrage  battery.  On  one  hand,  they  will  bring  the  bat- 
tery commander  information  about  the  front,  and,  on  the  other 
hand,  they  will  learn  to  know  their  sector  from  the  point  of 
view  of  the  observation  station  of  the  barrage  battery  concerned. 

(7)  All  commanders  of  all  infantry  units  higher  than  a  com- 
pany are  authorized  to  request  barrage  fire,  also  all  inspection 
officers  in  the  trenches.    Requests  may  also  be  made  by  all  artil- 
lery observers  and  all  liaison  officers. 

(8)  Barrage  fire  must  be  rapid  but  regular,  and  must  last 
three  minutes  (volleys  four  rounds  per  minute  for  each  gun  of 
small  caliber). 

*The  continuation  will  depend  on  the  observations,  and  will  be 
requested  again. 

If  no  information  is  obtained,  the  volley  is  repeated  until  the 
signal  for  cease  firing  is  given. 

B.    BATTERIES  FOR  INTERDICTION   FIRE. 

(1)  All  batteries   in   the   sector  of  the  brigade  or  division 
which  are  not  intended  for  barrage  fire  are  to  be  used  for  inter- 
diction fire. 

To  these  may  be  added  the  artillery  directly  dependent  upon 
the  commander  of  subsector  II. 

If  interdiction  fire  is  executed  in  front  of  the  sector  of  adja- 
cent divisions,  it  is  called  sheltering  /ire. 

(2)  Interdiction  fire  is  not  uniformly  distributed;  the  most 
important  sectors  have  the  largest  allotment  ("normal"  inter- 
diction fire).    In  case  of  necessity  it  is  concentrated  against  a 
given  part  of  the  front  (interdiction  fire  in  the  "  center,"  "  right," 
"left"). 

Interdiction  fire  must  be  organized  in  the  same  way  as  barrage 
fire,  according  to  the  directions  for  defensive  fire. 

(3)  All  interdiction  batteries  not  employed  against  other  tar- 
gets are  available  for  normal  interdiction  fire. 

(4)  Interdiction    fire   will   be   opened    upon   request   of   the 
battalion  commanders. 


GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES.        209 

(5)  The  fire  is  executed  in  waves  (duration,  six  minutes;  one 
round  per  minute  for  small-caliber  guns ;  one  round  every  two 
minutes  for  medium-caliber  guns ;  one  round  every  six  minutes 
for  heavy -caliber  guns). 

In  case  of  immediate  danger,  volleys  of  three  minutes'  dura- 
tion, firing  the  number  of  rounds  allotted  for  one  wave. 

(6)  Interdiction  fire  must  be  opened  at  least  two  minutes 
after  request. 

(7)  Interdiction  fire  must  be  kept  as  close  as  possible  to  the 
barrage  fire. 

(8)  Observation  stations  to  be  occupied  as  in  paragraph  A  (3) . 

C.    DEFENSIVE    FIKE. 

(1)  Barrage   fire   and    interdiction    fire   combined   form   de- 
fensive fire. 

(2)  Each  gun  must  be  provided  with  a  table  in  which  all  the 
elements  for  defensive  fire  must  be  kept  accurately  up  to  date. 

(3)  Observers,  liaison  officers,  section  commanders,  platoon 
commanders,    executive    officers,    battery    and    battalion    com- 
manders must  also  be  provided  with  tables  of  the  elements  for 
defensive  fire. 

D.    LIAISON    OFFICEES. 

(1)  An  artillery  officer  must  be  assigned  to  the  command  of 
every  battery  in  the  first  line  as  liaison  officer.     They  are  se- 
lected from  the  officers  of  the  batteries  which  are  tactically 
dependent  upon  the  sector  of  the  battalion. 

(2)  The  liaison  officers  must  know  all  the  needs  and  wishes 
of  the  infantry,  and  must  inform  themselves  on  their  own  initia- 
tive of  the  situation  of  the  infantry,  in  order  to  report  on  the 
subject  to  the  artillery  commander.    They  must  remain  in  the 
closest  liaison  with  the  infantry  commanders  of  all  grades. 

They  also  supervise  the  noncommissioned  officers  for  barrage 
fire. 

(3)  Liaison  officers  are  appointed  by  the  commanders  of  artil- 
lery battalions  and  receive  from  them  precise  instructions  con- 
cerning their  duties  (mentioned  in  detail  in  the  regulations  is- 
sued by  the  headquarters  of  the  Fifth  Army  under  the  title: 
"Artillery  in  Defensive  "). 

(4)  For  the  equipment  of  liaison  officers,  see  page  41  of  the 
above-mentioned  regulations. 

29267°— 18 14 


210        GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES. 

E.    OBSERVERS. 

See  the  above-mentioned  regulations,  pages  24-34,  and  Order 
No.  165/12  Op.  of  the  commander  of  subsector  II. 

Artillery  observers  must  report  both  to  the  battalion  and  the 
company  commanders  of  their  zone.  They  must  often  go  through 
the  trenches  and  must  remain  in  close  liaison  with  the  infantry. 

F.    MEANS   OF  LIAISON. 

(1)  The  telephone  system  must  be  put  in  order  as  soon  as  pos- 
sible.   The  old  lines  must  be  transformed  into  double  lines  of  a 
semipermanent  character. 

In  the  artillery  separate  junction  boxes  must  be  used  both  on 
the  line  for  the  transmission  of  orders  and  on  the  line  for  fire 
adjustment. 

Communications  between  the  rear  and  the  first  lines  and  vice 
versa  must  not  be  made  through  the  battalion  headquarters. 

If  possible  there  should  be  numerous  reserve  lines.  The  lines 
must  be  labeled  with  red  tags  with  the  corresponding  identifica- 
tion mark. 

(2)  The  greatest  attention  must  be  paid  to  means  of  visual 
liaison.     Directions  for  the  establishing  of  a  service  of  visual 
signaling  in  the  artillery  are  contained  in  the  regulations  of  the 
headquarters  of  the  Fifth  Army,  "Artillery  in  Defensive  "  (pp. 
54-57  and  Appendixes  1  and  2 ) . 

There  must  be  daily  practice  in  signaling,  particularly  between 
battery  commanders  and  the  gun  emplacements. 
These  stations  are  regulated  by  the  commanders. 

G.    GUN   EMPLACEMENTS. 

Particular  care  should  be  taken — 

(1)  That  the  intervals  between  guns  should  not  be  too  short. 

(2)  That  the  emplacement  and  surroundings  be  kept  clean  and 
in  order. 

(3)  To  have  a  service  of  inspection  and  to  arrest  strangers, 
notifying  the  authorities  thereof. 

(4)  To  provide  covered  shelters  for  the  officers,  troops,  am- 
munition, and  telephones. 

(5)  To  follow  the  required  directions  upon  the  appearance  of 
enemy  aircraft. 

(6)  To  give  the  alarm  against  gas  attacks. 


GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES.        211 

(7)  To   organize   the   defense   against   close-combat   attacks 
(wire  entanglements,  frequent  practice  with  rifles   and  hand 
grenades). 

(8)  To  provide  for  defense  against  aeroplanes  with  guns  and 
machine  guns,  according  to  instructions. 

(9)  To  keep  the  supplies  sheltered  in  case  of  bombardment. 

(10)  To  provide  for  the  reception  of  the  visual  signals  of  the 
battery  commander. 

(11)  The  troops  must  know — 

Where  their  own  barrage  zone  is  situated. 
The  meaning  of  rockets. 
How  far  the  infantry  is  in  advance  of  them. 
What  is  in  the  vicinity  of  the  battery  and  what  roads  lead 
up  to  it. 

Where  the  nearest  communication  post  is  situated. 

(12)  To  have  orientation  tables  near  the  battery  in  order  to 
find  the  emplacement  easily. 

(13)  To  keep  a  supply  of  water  in  the  battery. 

(14)  To  detail  an  observer  to  observe  the  terrain  directly  in 
front  of  the  battery  during  combat. 

H.    INDIVIDUAL  ACTIVITY  OF  THE  EXECUTIVE  OFFICER. 

In  spite  of  all  measures  it  will  inevitably  occur  that  liaison 
between  the  battery  and  the  command  posts  and  observers  will 
be  cut  off  during  combat. 

The  worst  thing  possible  would  be  to  submit  to  the  inevitable. 

Every  effort  must  be  made  to  clear  up  the  situation  so  that 
the  battery  may  render  service,  with  the  help  of  the  elements  of 
fire  already  executed,  until  liaison  is  reestablished. 

In  such  cases  the  executive  officers  must  endeavor  without 
delay  to  obtain  information  from  the  neighboring  batteries,  tele- 
phone stations,  from  the  nearest  infantry  commands,  etc.  They 
will  send  patrols  to  points  from  which  good  observations  may  be 
taken,  and  will  send  messengers  to  tactical  commanders. 

By  having  recourse  to  all  these  methods  simultaneously,  one 
at  least  will  certainly  be  successful. 

I.    TO    COUNTER-BATTERY    MORTARS. 

After  the  last  actions  the  enemy  had  not  yet  used  these  effec- 
tive weapons.  It  is  evident  that  he  is  working  on  emplacements 
for  them. 


212        GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES. 

It  is  necessary  to  prevent  the  use  of  this  weapon. 

The  works  of  the  enemy  must  be  observed  and  any  attempt  to 
make  mortar  emplacements  opposed.  If  an  emplacement  is 
made,  any  attempt  at  fire  adjustment  must  be  prevented  by  the 
artillery  of  heavy  and  medium  caliber. 

For  this  purpose  the  commander  of  the  35th  Division  has 
designated  a  battery  of  heavy  howitzers  as  a  counter  battery  for 
mortars.  Battery  2/43  of  heavy  howitzers,  from  Lieut.  Col. 
Ruppert's  command,  has  been  assigned  to  the  56th  Brigade.  Its 
assistance  may  be  called  for  from  time  to  time  by  direct  request 
addressed  to  the  battalion  command. 

These  batteries  do  not  have  to  wait  for  a  request,  but  may 
open  counter  lire  as  a  result  of  their  own  observations. 

Every  intervention  of  this  kind  must  be  communicated  without 
delay  to  this  command,  which  will  arrange  for  demolition  by  con- 
centrating numerous  batteries  of  medium  and  heavy  caliber. 

K.   DEFENSE  AGAINST   "  TANKS." 

For  defense  against  tanks — 

The  35th  Division  has  two  small  and  one  medium  caliber  gun 
at  altitude  43  of  the  road  and  43  of  the  tunnel.  • 

The  56th  Brigade  has  two  small  caliber  guns,  and  the  R up- 
pert  battalion  must  adjust  the  fire  of  one  gun  of  the  2/43  battery 
of  heavy  howitzers  on  the  road  Bagni-San  Giovanni  and  keep  it 
in  readiness  for  fire  in  that  direction. 

Barrage  batteries  must  also  be  used  for  defense  against  tanks 
as  far  as  this  is  included  in  their  radius  of  action. 

L.   ARRANGEMENTS  FOR  ARTILLERY  OBSERVATION. 

(1)  The  barrage  batteries  must  constantly  observe  the  bar~ 
rn(je  zone  and  the  terrain  in  rear  as  far  as  the  line  Adria-Werke 
elevation  85-144. 

(2)  Long-distance  observation  is  the  duty  of  the  interdiction 
batteries  of  the  35th  Division  for  the  zone  north  of  the  railroad 
line  Mescenizza-Monfalcone-Ronchi,    and   of  the   Ruppert   bat- 
talion south  of  the  said  line. 

The  observations  of  the  Bleiweiss  battalion  extend  over  the 

entire  zone. 

******* 
The  present  order,  which  is  to  be  turned  over  in  case  of  change 
of  command,   is   transmitted  to  the  commanders  of  the  35th 
Division  and  of  the  56th  Infantry  Brigade,  and  to  the  com- 


GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES.        213 

mander  of  the  43d  Brigade  of  field  artillery,  with  a  sufficient 
number  of  copies  for  distribution  to  the  commanders  of  regi- 
ments, battalions,  groups,  and  subgroups  of  artillery  and  of 
batteries. 

F.  M.  L.  SCHNEIDER. 


6calt  I  tHJ 


6rifatfe  boa/xta.y 


214        GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES. 


r      */ttf 

I.  R.  HEADQUARTERS  OF  THE  35iH  BRIGADE  OF  FIELD  AETILLEBY. 
[No.  745/1  Op.] 

To  all  groups  (subgroups)  of  artillery  and  batteries,  to  the 
commands  of  infantry  brigades  and  regiments,  and  to  battalion 
commanders. 

To  the  commander  of  the  35th  Division,  for  information. 

FIELD  POST  617,  June  19,  1917. 

On  and  after  this  date  the  grouping  of  the  artillery  and  the 
relations  of  dependence  of  the  same  are  arranged  as  follows: 

The  telephone  extension  line  between  the  test  battery  I  of 
howitzers  and  the  Burda  group  is  not  to  be  taken  away,  but 
transformed  into  a  direct  line  between  the  Burda  and  Low 
barrage  groups. 

(2)   Orders  for  defensive  fire  (see  next  page). 


GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES.        215 


Distribution:  Groups  (sub-groups)  of  artillery  and  batteries.  Headquarters  of  infantry  and  regiments.  Batallion  Headquarters  (1  copy). 
ORDER  FOR  DEFENSIVE  FIRE  (35th  DIVISION). 

[Hb.=howitzer  ;  1/35=  1st  battery,  35th  Regiment,  etc.;  s.=sezione=  platoon.) 

= 

SS 
S'5 

*J 

,,.„.„»„,.„ 

•|«UIJON 

W 

-»,»83 

•41005 

North  battalion. 

w 

X 

M 

• 

s.  Hb.  2/35 

£                      S 

*           1 

In 

Ji 
1 

^ 

S    ! 

• 
If* 

• 

1 

X 

S 

JS 

ll 

ce 

B           S- 
«0           tj 

M 
in1 

"»"      1 

Central  battalion. 

$.  Gun  4/35 

w 

Trial  battery 
Probebl  Hb.  1 

Defensive  fire  "North." 

1/9 

«" 

J 

Hb.  3/R.  57 

Hb.  5/R.  106  Hb.3/R.  57 
$.  Hb.  1/35 
s.  Gun  4/35 

BJ 

ee 

35 

South  battalion. 

l 
6 

u 

•s 

e 

si      a:      "      "" 

M' 

* 

iA 

e 
0 

A 

S      **"      *"      "* 

X       35         »         U 

a 

„  jj 

II 

T~* 

W 

•jajua^ 

•^ 

™2^Z^ 

216        GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES. 
DIRECTIONS  FOR  ARTILLERY  ACTION. 

Attack  the  hostile  batteries  with  fire  and  gas  energetically 
during  the  artillery  preparation  of  the  enemy.  Prepare  the  dis- 
tribution of  targets  methodically  and  bracket  the  fire. 

Transfer  the  demolition  fire  to  the  adversary's  trenches  in 
order  to  observe  more  easily  whether  the  first  lines  are  occu- 
pied, establishing  by  means  of  reference  points  (on  which  the 
fire  must  be  previously  adjusted ) ,  the  targets  or  zones,  the  demo- 
lition of  which  must  be  requested  beforehand  by  the  infantry. 
This  is  for  the  purpose  of  being  able  to  open  fire  more  rapidly. 

As  soon  as  it  is  proved  or  supposed  that  the  enemy  is  ready 
in  the  trenches  or  in  the  assembly  places,  annihilation  fire  must 
be  opened  with  the  most  intense  concentration  of  all  the  guns. 
For  this  purpose  establish  certain  sectors  of  fire  (including 
roads  and  cross  roads),  bracketing  the  fire  and  organizing  it  by 
means  of  all  the  guns  according  to  the  directions  for  defensive 
fire.  The  object  is  to  suppress  the  attack  at  the  beginning  or,  at 
least,  to  shake  and  weaken  the  enemy  infantry. 

If  the  attack  is  launched,  notwithstanding,  it  must  be  made 
to  fail  by  defensive  fire. 

If  contact  is  formed  a  barrier  must  be  made  to  prevent  the 
enemy  from  bringing  up  reinforcements. 

If  the  enemy  has  made  a  breach,  destroy  the  reserves. 

If  the  enemy  has  broken  through,  direct  a  violent  artillery 
fire  on  the  enemy  within  our  lines. 

If  an  immediate  counter  attack  is  made,  cut  the  enemy  off. 

A  methodical  counter  attack  must  be  initiated  by  methodical 
artillery  preparation. 

At  critical  moments  artillery  commanders  do  not  have  to  wait 
for  orders,  as  they  are  always  delayed.  They  must  therefore  act 
upon  their  own  initiative.  A  decision  suitable  to  the  circum- 
stances will  be  greatly  facilitated  by  active  liaison  with  the  in- 
fantry and  a  well-organized  service  of  observation,  also  by  a 
thorough  knowledge  of  the  trench  system,  previous  agreement 
with  the  infantry  and  reconnaissance  of  the  terrain. 

The  action  of  the  artillery  must  be  adapted  to  the  method  of 
defense.  This  no  longer  consists  in  holding  rigidly  to  one  line, 
but  defending  a  zone  by  mtincurfrs.  The  fire  of  all  the  batteries 
should  be  adaptable  and  elastic,  and  there  should  be  no  pauses  at 
critical  moments. 


GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES.         217 

As  a  general  rule  fire  should  always  be  adjusted  by  observa- 
tion. Fire  should  be  opened  automatically  only  in  case  of  sur- 
prise, under  unfavorable  conditions  of  visability,  or  when  liaison 
has  been  cut  off.  As  soon  as  possible,  however,  pass  on  to  fire 
adjusted  by  observation.  Always  fire  upon  all  targets  which 
may  present  themselves. 

No.  227/10  Op.  no  appendixes. 

Imperial  and  Royal  Command,  28th  Division. 

Field  post  391,  August  5,  1917. 

Imperial  and  Royal  llth  Infantry  Regiment. 

Received  August  16,  1917. 

No.  227/4  with  no  appendixes. 

Imperial  and  Royal  llth  Infantry  Regiment,  III  Battalion, 
August  17,  1917. 

NOTE. — The  Austrians  differentiate  between  direct  fire  against 
works  (Zerstb'rungsfeuer),  called  "demolition  fire,"  and  direct 
h're  against  troops,  either  in  assembly  places,  in  the  trenches,  or 
in  movement,  which  is  called  "annihilation  fire"  (Vernich- 
tungsfeuer). 

LEGEND. 

(1)  The  "target  zones"  and  the  "reference  points"  used  in 
the  28th  Division  are  intended  principally  to  simplify  the  send- 
ing of  orders  to  the  artillery,  and  also  to  facilitate  communica- 
tion between  the  infantry  and  the  artillery. 

(2)  For  evident  reasons  it  was  not  possible  to  make  the  num- 
bers of  the  "  target  zones  "  agree  with  those  of  the  "  assembly 
zones "   of   the   map   1 : 25,000   issued    by    the   commander   of 
sector  III. 

Great  attention  must  therefore  be  paid  to  the  difference  in 
meaning  between  "  target  zone  "  and  "  assembly  zone."  Always 
add  the  correct  qualification  to  the  word  "  zone." 

On  the  other  hand,  each  of  the  "  assembly  zones  "  established 
by  the  commander  of  sector  III  is  always  included  in  a  single 
"  target  zone,"  and  is  therefore  included  in  the  designation  of 
the  respective  "  target  zone." 

Assembly  zone  46  is  included  in  target  zone  37. 

Assembly  zone  45  is  included  in  target  zone  38. 

Assembly  zone  47  is  included  in  target  zone  35. 

Assembly  zone  51  is  included  in  target  zone  32. 

Assembly  zone  54  is  included  in  target  zone  26. 

Assembly  zone  56  is  included  in  target  zone  28. 


218         GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN   TACTICAL  STUDIES. 


Assembly  zone  57  is  included  in  target  zone  28. 
Assembly  zone  58  is  included  in  target  zone  27. 
(3)  The  enemy  "assembly  zones,"  established  by  Appendix 
No.  2  of  the  order  of  the  28th  Division  concerning  defense,  are 
replaced  by  the  following  target  zones : 

For  assembly  zone  "  a  "  the  corresponding  target  zone  is  37. 
b  "  the  corresponding  target  zone  is  33. 
"  c "  the  corresponding  target  zone  is  32 


d  "  the  corresponding  target  zone  is  28. 
"  e "  the  corresponding  target  zone  is  24 


For  assembly  zone  " 

For  assembly  zone 
+34. 

For  assembly  zone  ' 

For  assembly  zone 
+25. 

(4)  The  principal  value  of  this  system  is  that  the  designation 
of  target  zones  and  reference  points  is  connected  with  a  simple 
system  of  visual  signaling  of  the  artillery,  which  enables  auto- 
matic fire,  independent  of  observation,  to  be  directed  against 
all  points  and  zones  numbered  in  front  and  in  rear  of  the  line, 
even  when  telephone  liaison  has  been  cut  off. 

To  be  issued  to  the  55th  and  56th  Brigades,  to  infantry 
regiments  11,  28,  and  47 ;  to  battalions  HI/3  BE  and  IV/77 ;  to 
the  commanders  of  regiment  zones  (Regiments  streifenkom- 
mandos)  ;  to  the  "  I.  B.  S.  "  artillery  (Infanterie  brigade  streifeu- 
artillerie)  ;  artillery  of  the  zone  of  the  infantry  brigade. 

Old  Appendix  No.  2  to  be  destroyed. 

F.  M.  L.  SCHNEIDER. 

IMPERIAL  AND  ROYAL  11TH  INFANTRY   REGIMENT. 

[No.  208/5  ris.] 

FIELD  POST  391,  July  26,  1917. 

The  orders  of  the  35th  Brigade  of  field  artillery  are  to  be 
communicated  for  barriage  fire,  interdiction  fire,  and  covering 
fire  for  defense  against  the  attacks  of  the  enemy's  infantry. 


Strauch  

56 

55 

Battery  for  barrage  fire  

Howitzers  4/35    .  . 

2/3  battery,  guns  4/35. 

Batteries  for  interdiction  fire.  .  . 

Mortars  305  mm.  10/1.  .  . 

Heavy  guns  14/7. 

DEFENSIVE  ] 

'IRE  NORTH. 

Mortars  305  mm.  10/1  
Heavy  guns  4/35 

Heavy  guns  14/7. 

GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES.         219 

Barrage  fire  is  delivered  in  volleys  of  three  minutes'  duration ; 
interdiction  fire  in  volleys  (three  minutes)  or  waves  (six  min- 
utes) firing  each  time  six  rounds  per  small  caliber  gun,  three 
rounds  per  medium  caliber  gun,  and  one  round  per  heavy  caliber 
gun. 

The  battalion  in  line  must  send  officers  temporarily  to  the  ob- 
servation stations  of  the  commanders  of  barrage  batteries,  to 
orient  themselves. 

Conform  with  the  following: 

On  July  27  two  officers  of  the  HI/3  BE.  (one  from  Strauch  55 
and  one  from  Strauch  56)  will  be  sent  to  the  observation  sta- 
tions of  the  respective  barrage  batteries — the  one  from  Strauch 
55  to  the  observation  station  of  the  battery  of  guns  4/35,  and 
the  one  from  Strauch  56  to  the  observation  station  of  the  battery 
of  howitzers  4/35.  These  officers  will  report  to  the  commander 
of  the  llth  Regiment  at  7  a.  m.,  where  a  guide  will  be  given  them 
to  the  observation  station. 

They  are  to  orient  themselves  carefully  and  give  a  brief  report 
on  the  visibility  of  their  own  lines,  the  terrain  in  front,  and  the 
enemy's  lines. 

IMPERIAL  AND  ROYAL  HEADQUARTERS  OF  THE  VIIlTH  ARMY  CORPS. 

INSTRUCTIONS  FOR  THE  USE  OF  ARTILLERY  IN  AN 
ATTACK. 

Two  offensives  successfully  executed  in  Serbia  by  my  army 
corps  with  relatively  small  losses,  against  strongly  held  and  for- 
tified positions,  have  shown  that  the  following  method  is  the  most 
successful  and  best  adapted  to  the  purpose : 

(1)  The  part  of  the  front  chosen  for  the  attack  was  divided 
into  zones,  according  to  the  batteries,  the  zones  being  assigned 
with  a  view  to  the  greatest  possible  effect  from  enfilade  fire. 

The  batteries  designated  for  this  purpose  adjusted  their  fire 
one  after  the  other  without  attracting  too  much  attention.  Ob- 
servation stations  for  observing  the  targets  and  the  progress  of 
the  fire  were  made  near  the  first  lines  and  well  sheltered.  Safe 
(double)  telephone  liaison  was  established  with  the  batteries. 

(2)  Fire  for  effect. — At  certain  intervals  the  fire  of  all  bat- 
teries is  concentrated  for  several  minutes,  at  definite  moments, 
to  be  determined  with  the  greatest  precision. 

These  short  volleys  are  to  be  repeated  at  irrgular  intervals 
during  the  day  and,  if  necessary,  at  night.  Between  times  the 


220        GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES. 

fire  should  be  very  slow.  The  enemy  must  not  know  after  which 
volley  the  assault  is  to  be  made  and  must  be  exhausted  by  the 
continuous  alarm. 

(3)  The  moment  of  the  last  volley  preceding  the  assault  is 
fixed  with  the  greatest  accuracy  and  communicated  to  all  the 
commanders.  At  the  appointed  time  the  range  is  changed  sud- 
denly icithout  diminution  of  intensity  and  without  the  slightest 
pause,  and  is  placed  at  a  few  hundred  meters  beyond  the  enemy's 
position.  The  attack  is  launched  at  the  same  instant. 

It  is  of  the  highest  importance  to  leave  the  enemy  unaware 
as  to  this  change  of  range  at  the  beginning  of  the  assault,  so 
that  the  enemy  infantry  shall  not  yet  have  occupied  the  fighting 
line  but  will  still  be  in  the  shelters. 

Independently  of  these  batteries,  the  duty  of  which  is  to  shell 
the  front  designated  for  the  attack,  a  part  of  the  artillery  is  nat- 
urally employed  against  those  enemy  batteries  which  are  spe- 
cially effective  and  is  also  used,  without  too  great  an  expendi- 
ture of  ammunition,  to  shell  other  parts  of  the  front,  which  are 
not  to  be  attacked,  in  order  to  deceive  the  enemy. 

It  is  of  capital  importance  for  every  artillery  action  to  be 
prepared  with  the  most  minute  care  in  order  to  lead  the  as- 
saulting infantry  to  success  with  the  fewest  losses  possible. 

F.  Z.  M.  SCHEUCHENSTUEL. 


XV. 

GERMAN  PRINCIPLES  OF 
ELASTIC  DEFENSE. 


(Translation  of  a  captured  German  document  issued  by  the 
chief  of  the  general  staff  of  the  field  army.) 

221 


XV. 
GERMAN  PRINCIPLES  OF  ELASTIC  DEFENSE. 

(Translation  of  a  captured  German  document  issued  by  the  chief 
of  the  general  staff  of  the  field  army.  I/II  No.  4432  secret  op., 
under  date  of  Aug.  30,  1917.  From  British  G.  H.  Q.  Summary, 
Jan.  20,  1918.) 


1.  Our  methods  of  conducting  an  elastic  defense,  by  distribut- 
ing our  forces  in  depth  and  fighting  in  a  defensive  zone  organized 
in  depth,  are  known  both  to  the  French  and  English.  They  have 
found  no  means  of  defeating  it,  and  their  great  attacks,  intended 
to  break  through,  have  failed  in  face  of  it.  They  now  appear 
to  attack  with  limited  objectives,  and  by  piecemeal  battering, 
carried  out,  however,  with  a  considerable  expenditure  of  force, 
attempt  to  wear  us  down,  to  inflict  losses  on  us,  and  .gradually 
to  press  us  back.  We  must,  nevertheless,  reckon  with  the  possi- 
bility of  their  making  a  renewed  attempt,  at  one  or  several 
points,  to  attain  their  final  aim,  namely,  to  break  through  on  a 
large  scale. 

Our  system  of  defense  will  also  be  able  to  cope  with  these 
tactics  most  successfully,  if,  in  accordance  with  the  experiences 
gained  on  all  the  battlefields  of  the  western  front,  the  divisions 
employ  their  three  regiments  in  line,  side  by  side,  within  the 
relatively  narrow  divisional  sectors,  and  distribute  them  in  con- 
siderable depth.  In  this  case  the  actual  divisions  in  line  will 
usually  be  able  to  repulse  attacks  with  limited  objectives  by 
means  of  their  own  troops,  without  the  assistance  of  elements 
of  the  counter-attack  division.  They  must,  at  any  rate,  make  an 
effort  to  do  so.  In  any  case  it  will  be  very  exceptional  for  the 
whole  of  the  counter-attack  division  to  be  employed. 

Holding  a  divisional  sector  with  two  regiments  in  line  and  a 
counter-attack  regiment  in  rear  increases  the  difficulties  of  com- 
mand in  battle  to  a  considerable  extent,  owing  to  the  sectors  held 
by  the  regiments  in  line  being  usually  too  broad,  and  also  on 

223 


224        GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN   TACTICAL  STUDIES. 

account  of  the  fusion  of  units  which  quickly  occurs  during  a 
hostile  attack. 

2.  With  regard  to  artillery   tactics,   the  engagement  of  the 
enemy's  artillery  with  observed  destructive  fire  remains  as  before 
the  chief  method  of  affording  relief  to  our  infantry,  and  thus, 
indirectly,  of  depriving  the  enemy's  infantry  attack  of  its  pros- 
pects of  success.     It  thus  forms  the  most  effective  support  for 
the  infantry,  although  they  do  not,  for  the  most  part,   fully 
appreciate  its  value,  and  counter-battery  work  must  be  continued 
up  to  the  moment  of  the  assault.     In  addition,   the  enemy's 
infantry  must  be  kept  constantly  under  observation  in  order 
that  their  preparations  for  the  attack  and,  in  particular,  the 
advance  and  assembly  of  the  assaulting  troops  may  be  detected 
in  time.    This  is  difficult,  since  only  a  relatively  small  number  of 
troops  are  engaged  in  these  limited  attacks,  but  it  can  not  be 
dispensed  with.     It  is  essential  for  short  but  heavy  bursts  of 
annihilating  fire  to  be  opened  immediately  on  all  targets  thus 
observed.     This  does  not  mean  that  bursts  of  fire  should  be 
opened  on  certain  defined  areas,  either  according  to  some  set 
scheme,  or  in  response  to  visual  signals.    On  the  contrary,  such 
fire  must  be  controlled  both  as  regards  time  and  space,  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  observed  movements  of  the  enemy.    For  this 
it  is  necessary  that  there  should  be  very  intimate  and  rapid 
cooperation  between   all  units  engaged  on  observation    (espe- 
cially aeroplane  and  balloon  observers)   and  the  artillery,  and 
also   that  artillery   commanders   should   make  very   quick   de- 
cisions. 

The  more  effective  annihilating  fire  is  the  more  can  barrage 
fire  be  dispensed  with.  In  the  case  of  the  latter  (in  contrast 
to  the  procedure  with  annihilating  fire)  efforts  must  continually 
be  made  to  insure  that  fire  is  automatically  opened  in  response 
to  visual  signals;  that  barrages  are  put  down  with  as  few  gaps 
as  possible;  and  that  the  barrage  is  kept  as  close  to  our  front 
line  as  our  artillery  material  will  allow.  An  essential  condition 
in  this  respect  for  all  artillery  units  is  the  accurate  determina- 
tion of  the  position  of  the  front  line  by  every  possible  method ; 
this  must  be  continually  checked  by  mutual  cooperation  between 
the  two  arms. 

3.  The  "  forward  zone  "  must  not  be  considered  merely  as  the 
foreground  of  a  defensive  system.    It  is  an  integral  part  of  the 
defense,  and  its  front  line  must  be  held  until  orders  to  evacuate 
the  whole  zone  are  given  by  the  higher  command.    This  front 


GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN   TACTICAL  STUDIES.          225 

lino  iiuisi  be  very  clearly  deiined  for  the  troops,  particularly  in 
view  of  the  arrangements  for  barrage  fire. 

4.  It  is  urgently  necessary  that  all  command  posts  should  be  so 
chosen  that  observation  from  them  is  possible  over  their  own 
battle  area,  or  at  least  over  a  section  of  it.    In  the  case  of  divi- 
sions this  principle  is  limited  by  the  necessity  of  always  main- 
taining communications   intact,   both  with   the  group  and  the 
neighboring  divisions,  etc.,  and  of  keeping  the  general  system 
of  communications  working  as  far  ns  possible.     In  the  case  of 
command  posts  of  lower  formations  this  consideration  must, 
however,  give  way  to  that  of  the  possibility  of  actual  observa- 
tion of  the  progress  of  the  fighting. 

5.  The  general  distribution  and  grouping  of  the  artillery  of 
divisions  in  line  and  the  correct  employment  of  such  artillery 
must  be  the  subject  of  clear  orders  issued  by  army  and  group 
headquarters.     Divisions  must  put  these  orders  into  force  and 
supplement  them  where  necessary  in  accordance  with  the  situa- 
tion.    Only  thus  is  it  possible  to  insure  that  the  whole  fighting 
power  of  the  artillery  is  employed  to  the  fullest  extent  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  requirements  of  the  general  sitiiation,  which 
can  only  be  fully  appreciated  at  group  or  army  headquarters ; 
this   applies   especially   to   the   concentration   of   the   artillery 
against  decisive  points. 

6.  High  ground  has  not  always  the  same  importance  in  a 
battle  on  a  large  scale  as  is  attached  to  it  in  quiet  times.     We 
have  been  unable  to  make  up  our  minds  to  evacuate  unfavor- 
able positions  on  high  ground;  we  have  endeavored  to  improve 
them  by  fighting,  and  to  hold  them ;  if  in  spite  of  these  efforts 
they  were  lost,  we  found  suddenly  that  we  could  do  without 
them.     It  was  then  clearly  seen  that,  in  the  battle  on  a  large 
scale,  it  was  very  difficult  for  the  enemy's  attacking  waves  to 
descend    to   lower   ground   from   (he   heights   we   had   lost,   and 
that   this  gave   us  far   more   favorable   conditions   for   fighting 
than    the   positions    on    the    heights   could    have    done.      Other 
favorable  positions  on  high  ground,   such   as   the  Chemin  des 
Dames    Ridge,    acquired    great    importance,    mainly,   of   course, 
because  in  this  case  it  was  possible  at   the  right  time  to  pass 
successfully  from  the  defensive  to  the  offensive. 

Essential  considerations,  when  weighing  the  advantages  of 
positions  on  heights,  are  whether  they  have  a  certain  depth 
and  whether  they  are  exposed  to  an  enveloping  or  flanking 

292G7"— 18 15 


226        GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  TACTICAL  STUDIES. 

movement.     Narrow  ridges  draw  lire  ;md  jire  difficult  to  hold, 
as  they  can  not  be  organized  in  depth. 

It  is  a  difficult  task  for  the  higher  command  to  estimate  cor- 
rectly the  importance  of  high  ground  for  the  conduct  of  a  battle 
on  a  large  scale,  and  to  make  decisions  in  such  cases  unflinch- 
ingly, even  during  the  actual  progress  of  a  battle. 

( S  igned )  LUDENOOBFF. 

o 


University  of  California 

SOUTHERN  REGIONAL  LIBRARY  FACILITY 

405  Hilgard  Avpnue/Cm  Angeles,  CA  90024-1388 

Return- this  minerial  to  the  library 

b< 


UCLA  YRL/I 


A     000550159 


LIBRARY 
PUBLIC  AFFAJRS  SERVICE 

AUG251971 

UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA 
LOS  ANGELES 


